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Abstract 
Gender-related violence is a global pandemic affecting millions of women 
worldwide. Yet, in many instances, states continue to tolerate and indirectly 
condone the various forms that it takes. In cases where the gender-related 
violence amounts to persecution because of its severity and the lack of state 
protection, victims are left with a drastic solution: to flee and seek refuge in 
another country. However, international refugee law, as one of the final 
mechanisms to protect basic human rights, has proved to be inadequate to 
provide sufficient protection for victims of gender-related persecution.  
This dissertation argues that the definition of ‘refugee’ under 
international refugee law is obsolete and in dire need of reconceptualisation in 
order to adequately encompass the unique persecution that women face 
because of their gender. Therefore, this dissertation seeks to establish the 
reasons behind the inadequate protection of victims of gender-related 
persecution. To examine this question, the dissertation carries out a detailed 
analysis of various aspects that have an impact on the interpretation and 
implementation of the international refugee law framework.  
As a result of this analysis, the dissertation demonstrates how the 
historical events that took place at the time of the drafting of the main 
international refugee law instruments impacted their substance and resulted in 
a heavily androcentric focus. Similarly, this dissertation reveals how the 
patriarchal nature of the international law regime as a whole has had a 
negative impact on gender-related asylum claims. Moreover, it discloses the 
asylum adjudicators’ gender-biased construction of ‘persecution’ and analyses 
the difficult fit between gender-related persecution and the nexus requirement 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
Furthermore, this dissertation takes the important step of examining the 
manners in which the current protection afforded by international refugee law 
to victims of gender-related persecution can be improved and developed, and 
it analyses best practices. Ultimately, based on this in-depth analysis, this 
dissertation’s key contribution to the field of international refugee law is the 
identification of the emerging recognition of gender as an independent 
category of persecution to the existing ‘refugee’ definition. This addition will 
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have a fundamental impact on the gender-equal application of international 
refugee law and, importantly, on the protection of women’s human rights 
worldwide.  
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Opsomming 
Geslagsgebaseerde geweld is ‘n wêreldwye pandemie wat miljoene vroue 
affekteer. Dog word hierdie probleem deur vele state verdra en selfs indirek 
gekondoneer. In sulke gevalle waar hierdie geweld tot vervolging lei as gevolg 
van die erns daarvan, sowel as die gebrek aan staatsbeskerming daarteen, 
het dit ‘n drastiese impak op die slagoffers. Hulle beste oplossing is dikwels 
om uit hul land te vlug en asiel in ander lande te probeer bekom. Die 
internasionale reg van toepassing op vlugtelinge as een van die finale 
regsinstrumente om basiese menseregte te beskerm, is egter nie altyd 
voldoende om genoegsame beskerming vir dié slagoffers te bied nie. 
Hierdie tesis probeer illustreer dat die omskrywing van “vlugteling” 
onder die internasionale reg daarop uitgedien is en dat daar ‘n dringende 
behoefte aan herformulering is, om die besondere vervolging van vroue as ‘n 
direkte gevolg van hul geslag voldoende te reflekteer. Om dit te kan 
bewerkstellig, poog hierdie tesis om die redes vir die ondoeltreffende 
beskerming van slagoffers van geslagsgebaseerde vervolging te identifiseer. 
Hierdie kwessie word ondersoek deur ‘n gedetailleerde analiese van verskeie 
elemente wat ‘n impak het op die interpretasie en implementering van die 
raamwerk van die internasionale reg op vlugtelinge. 
Na aanleiding van dié analiese, demonstreer hierdie tesis die impak 
wat die historiese gebeurtenisse ten tye van die opstel van die vernaamste 
internasionale regsinstrumente op vlugtelinge op hul inhoud gehad het, en 
wat gelei het tot hul sterk androsentriese fokus. Insgelyks onthul die tesis hoe 
die patriargale aard van die internasionale reg oor die algemeen 
geslagsgebaseerde asielaansoeke negatief beïnvloed het. Verder openbaar 
hierdie tesis die geslagsvooroordeelde samestelling waarmee 
asielbesluitnemers vervolg, en dit analiseer die onverenigbaarheid tussen 
geslagsgebaseerde vervolgings en die nexus vereiste onder die 1951 
Refugee Convention. 
Belangrik tot hierdie tesis is die indiepte ondersoek na verbeteringe en 
ontwikkeling van die huidige beskerming verleen aan die slagoffers van 
geslagsgebaseerde vervolgings deur die internasionale reg daarop, asook die 
ontleding van beste praktyke. Deurslaggewend tot hiedie tesis is die 
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identifisering van ‘n ontluikende gewoontereg wat geslag as ‘n onafhanklike 
vervolgingskategorie as deel van die “vlugteling” omskrywing beskou. Hierdie 
toevoeging sal ‘n grondliggende effek hê op die geslagsgelyke toepassing van 
die internasionale reg op vlugtelinge, veral die beskerming van vroueregte 
wêreldwyd. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
"[W]omen are always and never refugees – always, because they 
cannot confidently rely on state protection wherever they live; and 
never, because there is no place to which they can flee."1 
 
1 1 Background to the study 
Since its advent, international refugee law has been one of the most 
contested regimes of international law. The 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees2 (1951 Convention) offers protection to any person that 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
unwilling to return to the state of his or her nationality or habitual residence.3  
The preamble to the 1951 Convention furthermore importantly confirms the 
principle that all human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms 
without discrimination. As such the 1951 Convention was originally drafted to 
respond to the plight of the millions, of predominantly male, European 
refugees in the aftermath of World War II (WWII) while at the same time 
confirming the fundamental principles of non-discrimination and equality. 4 
Furthermore, at the time of the creation of modern refugee law, the Cold War 
was reaching its height. 5  Accordingly, the substance of the international 
refugee law framework, as I will discuss further in this dissertation, was 
undoubtedly shaped by the international politics and foreign policies of the 
time.  
                                                             
1
 A. Macklin, “Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories” (1995) 17(2) Human Rights 
Quarterly 213, 271.   
2
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 
150. 
3
 Art 1 A (2). 
4
 L. C. Chan, “Everything in Moderation: Why Gender Nexus Under U.S. Asylum Law Must Be 
Strictly Limited in Scope” (2011) 29 Boston University International Law Journal 169, 177. 
5
 J. Bhabha, “Embodied Rights: Gender Persecution, State Sovereignty and Refugees” 
(1996) 9 Public Culture 3, 7. 
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As a consequence, “the definition of a refugee incorporated into the 
Convention reflected liberal political values of (…) individual autonomy and 
rationality and excluded socialist social-economic concerns”.6 Therefore, as 
Bhabha observes, the Western claims of the 1951 Convention protecting 
universal human rights must be assessed critically in the light of this 
fundamental, liberal individualistic bias. 7  This, as I continuously argue 
throughout this dissertation is equally true with regard to the seeming gender-
neutrality of the framework.  
Since the end of the Cold War, drastic changes in world politics have 
disrupted the direct causal link between foreign policy concerns and refugee 
policy,8 and states have begun to view refugee procedures as a possible 
loophole in border control procedures.9 According to the most recent statistics 
published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
there were 19.5 million refugees in the world in 2014 10  of which women 
constituted slightly less than half. 11  Overall, as the numbers of refugees 
worldwide escalates, the West’s commitment to refugee protection has 
weakened due to an increase in restrictionist policies on migration and border 
control.12 Recently, this has been demonstrated by the slow and reluctant 
responses of some European governments to the on-going refugee crisis as a 
result of the massive influx of predominantly Syrian refugees. 
 As indicated by Amnesty International the ethical limits of the 
international order have been laid bare.13 Ultimately, refugees have become 
the personification of the conflict between two fundamental principles, “the 
belief in universal human rights (...) and the sovereignty of nation states”.14 
This conflict, as I argue in this dissertation, has had a detrimental effect on 
women’s asylum claims in particular, due to the asylum adjudicators 
                                                             
6
 8. 
7
 8.  
8
 8. 
9
 8. 
10
 UNHCR, “World at War – Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014” (UNHCR, 2014) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.html> accessed 28 October 2015. 
11
 United Nations Statistics Division, “Refugees and internally displaced persons” (UNSTATS, 
26 May 2015) <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/genderstatmanual/Print.aspx?Page=Refugees-and-
internally-displaced-persons> accessed 28 October 2015. 
12
 Amnesty International, “Global refugee statistics” (Amnesty International, 13 August 2012) 
<http://www.amnesty.org.au/refugees/comments/29462/> accessed 5 June 2013. 
13
 4. 
14
 3. 
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increasing use of culturalist arguments to turn down women's asylum 
applications. Gender-related persecution, which is defined as persecution in 
which the forms of the persecution, the motivation behind it or both are 
gendered, is often based on several instances of private behaviour. 15 
Consequently, gender-related persecution has traditionally been and 
continues to be disregarded as “relatively trivial and frivolous”, in contrast with 
the traditional grounds of persecution, as I will unceasingly demonstrate in this 
dissertation.16 This is reflected in the statistics. For example, according to the 
official statistics of the European Commission, in 2014 only 30,925 female 
asylum applicants were granted refugee status in the twenty-eight EU 
member states.17 This constitutes only 34 per cent of all refugee statuses 
granted. This can be compared to the 58,630 male asylum applicants, who 
were granted refugee status in the same year.18 Similarly, in Australia, in 
2013-2014 out of the 6500 refugee visas granted only 16 per cent (1040 
visas) were granted to female asylum seekers.19 Correspondingly, in 2013 
only 23 per cent of female asylum applicants were granted a refugee status in 
the United States (US).20  
Additionally, within the currently dominant restrictionist immigration 
policies of Western Europe, North America and Australia, adjudicators are 
often encountering a “high-stakes comparison and ‘objective’ evaluation of 
opposing normative and ethical systems, where a sovereign state’s internal 
cultural norms and policies”21 are being assessed. Very often the outcome, 
especially in gender-related persecution cases, as I will demonstrate in this 
                                                             
15
 4. 
16
 4. 
17
 Eurostat, “First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex - Annual 
aggregated data” (Eurostat, 18 September 2015). 
<ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=migr_asydcfsta> accessed 21 October 2015.  
18
 Eurostat, “First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex - Annual 
aggregated data” Eurostat. 
19
 Parliament of Australia, “Australia’s refugee population: A statistical snapshot of 2013-14” 
(Parliament of Australia, 28 November 2014) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library
/FlagPost/2014/November/Refugee_population_2013-14> accessed 21 October 2015. 
20
 In 2013, out of the 32 117 female asylum applicants to US only 7 518 were granted an 
asylum status. US Department of Homeland Security, “Refugees and Asylees: 2013” (US 
Department of Homeland Security, August 2014) 
<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2013.pdf> accessed 21 
October 2015. 
21
 US Department of Homeland Security, “Refugees and Asylees: 2013” 10. 
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dissertation, is the “invocation of state sovereignty to define ethical and 
ideological boundaries for international protection”. 22  As the current 
international refugee law regime has not been amended since its inception in 
1951, except for 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 
Protocol)23 , the refugee status criterion does not reflect the realities and 
causes behind present-day refugee flows. This is particularly true for women 
fleeing gender-based persecution. In a changing world, the development of 
the refugee law framework and consequently the addition of new categories 
for refugeedom are arguably required. 
In 2014 the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW Committee) recognised that the lack of ‘gender’ as an 
independent ground for persecution in international refugee law has dire 
consequences for women fleeing gender-related persecution.24 The CEDAW 
Committee expressed concern over the fact that many asylum systems 
continue to treat the claims of women through “the lens of male 
experiences”.25 According to the CEDAW Committee this method leads to an 
improper assessment of women’s claims to refugee status, which could result 
in their wrongful rejection.26  
The recognition by the CEDAW Committee, that international refugee 
law fails women fleeing gender related persecution, is long overdue. The 
striking inconsistencies between the protection of women’s rights under 
international and regional human rights instruments and the way women’s 
rights are protected under the international refugee law regime has prompted 
me to question the causes behind the evident and substantial gender 
protection gap under international refugee law, as pointed out by the CEDAW 
Committee and as further substantiated throughout my dissertation. The 
central question of my research is why international refugee law still struggles 
to uphold and protect the rights of women fleeing gender-related persecution 
                                                             
22
 12.  
23
 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 
267. The 1967 Protocol removed the temporal and geographic restrictions included in the 
1951 Refugee Convention.  
24
 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General recommendation 
No. 32 on the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and 
statelessness of women, 14 November 2014, CEDAW/C/GC/32. 
25
 Para. 16. 
26
 Para. 16. 
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when international human rights law has taken great leaps forward in 
acknowledging the protection of the same group. As I argue in this 
dissertation, a re-conceptualisation of the refugee definition is acutely needed 
in order to acknowledge women’s specific need for protection. This would, I 
argue, effectively end the indirect tolerance, under the international refugee 
law framework, of the persistent and brutal violent crimes against women that 
are taking place on a global scale, often committed by or condoned by the 
states. By failing to address women’s experiences of persecution, the 
international refugee framework leaves women utterly vulnerable and without 
any protection. This failure to protect victims of gender-related persecution 
arguably breaches the main objective of the international refugee law, which 
is to provide interim protection to persons who are deprived of meaningful 
protection of their essential human rights in their own state.27 As Crawley 
argues, “protection is at the heart of the responsibility that the international 
community bears towards refugees”.28  
The recognition of women’s need for specific refugee protection is not 
an entirely novel idea on the domestic level. As an example South Africa, 
already in 2008, became one of the first jurisdictions in the world to include 
’gender’ as an independent category linked to well-founded fear of 
persecution by amending its existing legislation. While this amendment has 
not yet been brought into effect and the outcome therefore remains to be 
established in the years to come, this pioneering attempt to protect women 
fleeing gender-related persecution through domestic law, together with the 
recent recognition by the CEDAW Committee, prompted me to examine on 
the one hand the causes behind the current international refugee law 
framework’s apparent failure to provide adequate protection to victims of 
gender-related persecution and, on the other, to try to unearth the way in 
which the complex nature of gender-based persecution have been 
approached under the current system.  
As the main instrument of international refugee law the 1951 
Convention has continuously guided the domestic conception of refugee 
                                                             
27
 J. Hathaway, “Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection” (1991) 4 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 113, 124. 
28
 H. Crawley, Refugees and Gender: Law and Process (Bristol: Jordan Publishing, 2001) 4. 
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protection. Therefore I found it worth exploring why states, such as South 
Africa, have deemed it necessary to move outside the realm of the 1951 
Convention to adequately protect women fleeing gender persecution. This line 
of inquiry furthermore impelled me to question whether the addition of gender, 
as an independent ground under international refugee law, would ensure a 
more genuine protection of the basic human rights of refugee women i.e. 
could the domestic approach in this regard inform the development of 
international refugee law? And would such an inclusion perhaps motivate 
more states to follow the example of South Africa? In this regard I was 
moreover motivated to examine whether the recognition of certain states of 
the need to reconceptualise the refugee definition to include gender, together 
with the recommendations of the CEDAW Committee and the development of 
gender specific human rights law could amount to emerging state practice that 
could ultimately lead to a change in the international refugee law framework 
through the creation of customary international law.  
 
1 2 Research problem 
The broad research problem that I explore in my dissertation is the underlying 
reasons for the inability of international refugee law to grant adequate 
protection to victims of gender-related persecution. My research takes its 
point of departure in the fundamental principles of non-discrimination and 
equality as protected under international human rights law and as such I 
undertake my analysis from a feminist legal perspective, as I further set out 
under sub-chapter 1 4 below.  
According to feminist critics, the current international instruments and 
the refugee determination processes fail to protect women refugees and often 
render them invisible.29  Women fleeing persecution simply cannot benefit, 
equitably, from protection under the 1951 Convention.30 Overall, the current 
statistics on women’s asylum applications, as exemplified under 1 1 above, 
                                                             
29
 N. Valji, L. A. de la Hunt and H. Moffet “Protecting the Invisible: The Status of Women 
Refugees in Southern Africa” in J. Handmaker, L. A. de la Hunt and J. Klaaren (eds) 
Advancing Refugee Protection in South Africa (Human Rights in Context Series, No. 2) 
(Oxford/New York: Berghahn Book, 2008), 214. 
30
 214. 
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reflect discrimination in the outcomes.31 Furthermore, it reveals the failure of 
international refugee law to protect women, because of the regime’s inherent 
androcentricism and exclusion of women’s experiences of persecution.  
Furthermore, as I pointed out under 1 1, the failure of international 
refugee law to protect women refugees stands in stark contrast to 
international human rights law that has been developed to safeguard women’s 
fundamental rights. This is significant, as the international human rights 
instruments, standards and jurisprudence are or should be standard setting 
and directional in the development of international refugee law.32   
For example, Article 1(3) of the Charter of the United Nations33 (UN 
Charter) calls for international co-operation in “promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction to race, sex language or religion”. In the same vein, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights34 (UDHR) guarantees the rights to life, liberty 
and security without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.35  Furthermore, Article 14(1) of UDHR expressly states 
that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution”.36 As with the rights to life, liberty and security this right to 
asylum is granted without distinction of any kind. 
The equal entitlement of women and men to civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights is also included in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 37  (ICCPR) and in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights38 (ICESCR). According to Article 3 of 
the ICCPR, the state parties “undertake to ensure the equal right of men and 
                                                             
31
 H. Crawley and T. Lester, “Comparative analysis of gender-related persecution in national 
asylum legislation and practice in Europe” para. 17 (UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis 
Unit, May 2004) <http://www.unhcr.org/40c071354.html> accessed 15 April 2013. 
32
 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-related Persecution within 
the Context of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (7 May 2002), UN Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01. 
33
 Charter of the United Nations (entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI. 
34
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women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the (...) 
Covenant”. Similarly, Article 3 of the ICESCR requires the state parties “to 
ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, 
social and cultural rights set forth in the (...) Covenant”. 
Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 39  (CEDAW) confirms women’s and men’s 
equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. Furthermore, Article 2 of the 
CEDAW condemns discrimination against women in all its forms and calls for 
the elimination of discrimination against women by all appropriate means and 
without delay. Finally, Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 40  (CAT) defines 
torture as “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, [which] is 
intentionally inflicted on a person (...) for any reason based on discrimination 
of any kind”. 
Overall, the failure of international refugee law to recognise and 
account for and women’s experiences amounts to a systematic infringement 
of women’s right to equality and fundamental human rights, which are, as is 
stipulated above, entrenched in international human rights instruments and in 
the Preamble of the 1951 Convention, as mentioned under 1 1. 41   This 
infringement is a serious cause for concern, as the role of refugee law can be 
described as the last resort to protect fundamental human rights.  
 
1 3 Research questions and hypothesis 
Against the background of the study and the research problem as set out 
above the primary research question that has guided my research is whether 
women’s absolute rights to non-discrimination, equality, dignity, life, safety 
and security of person are safeguarded under current international refugee 
law. My assumptions, in respect of this primary research question, is firstly 
that women’s rights are not adequately protected under the current refugee 
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law framework; and secondly that the addition of gender as a ground for 
persecution would considerably enhance the protection afforded to women 
and reduce existing gender discrimination under international refugee law. 
The primary objective of my research is therefore to establish whether the 
addition of gender as a ground for persecution would enhance the protection 
afforded to women and reduce existing gender discrimination under 
international refugee law in line with the fundamental rights of non-
discrimination and equality protected under international human rights law. In 
this regard I investigate, in particular, whether the omission of gender as a 
ground for persecution is owed to the substance of existing international 
refugee law, its interpretation by the domestic courts or a combination of both.  
Taking my point of departure in the primary research question and the 
related, two-folded, hypothesis set out above I have conducted my research in 
accordance with five secondary research questions related to each of the five 
substantial chapters presented.  
The first (secondary) research question relates to the origins of the 
1951 Convention. As briefly indicated under background to the study above 
and as further substantiated in my pre-study constituting the point of 
departure for my research, the 1951 Convention contains a gender bias. The 
first (secondary) research question set out is therefore why the 1951 
Convention contains such a gender bias in favour of a male experience of 
persecution and if and how the nature of international law has aggravated this 
bias.  
The second (secondary) research question examined is whether the 
current interpretation of what ‘persecution’ constitutes can encompass the 
unique persecution that women face because of their gender. This discussion 
is based on the assumption that gender-related persecution is “not the result 
of spontaneous individual behaviour but rather part of a larger pattern of 
violence caused by unequal relations of power”.42  
As the determination of persecution is central to the refugee definition, 
a further, important issue is whether the five existing grounds of persecution, 
included in the current international refugee law framework, are capable of 
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capturing persecution based solely on gender. In particular, I examine, as the 
third (secondary) research question whether the grounds most commonly 
used in gender-related persecution cases (political opinion, religion and 
particular social group) are adequate to cover the wide range of gender-
related persecution uniquely faced by women.  
Within this context, it also becomes relevant to further enquire whether 
the dichotomous construction of persecutory acts as ‘public’ and ‘private’ ones 
has aggravated the gender inequality under the current refugee law 
framework. A, fourth, connected (secondary) research question is therefore 
whether states have obligations and responsibilities under international law 
with regard to gender-related persecution committed by non-state actors.  
Lastly, as gender is currently not included under the international 
refugee law framework, my final (secondary) research question relates to the 
usefulness of the additional methods that states have used in their attempts to 
include gender-related persecution under the current refugee law framework. I 
examine whether these methods have filled the existing protection gap 
created by international refugee law, or whether more fundamental changes 
to the refugee law framework are required.  
 
1 4 Theory and methodology 
As alluded to under 1 1 above, this dissertation is based on feminist legal 
theory and applicable feminist legal methods are used in the examination and 
analysis of the relevant international and national legal refugee law 
instruments and jurisprudence. Feminist methods have been described as a 
“reaction (…) to the overwhelming masculinity of privileged and historically 
dominant knowledges, acting as a kind of counterweight to the imbalances 
resulting from the male monopoly of the production and reception of 
knowledges”.43  
The theoretical point of departure of this dissertation is based on the 
notion of the ‘dominance approach’ as framed by MacKinnon. In accordance 
with her approach, I argue that the seeming ‘gender neutrality’ of the current 
international refugee law framework is based on the ‘difference/equality 
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approach’, according to which men and women are ‘different’ but ‘equal’.44 
However, as MacKinnon argues, this approach conceals “the substantive way 
in which man has become the measure of all things”.45 This is true especially 
with regard to the definition of ‘persecution’ under international refugee law, 
which is often defined through the ‘traditional’ male-centred experience of 
persecution, which takes place in the public realm. This leaves forms of 
persecution more often experienced by women, which mainly take place in 
the private sphere, outside the protection framework of international refugee 
law. This issue is further examined in chapter 3.  
Subsequently, the ‘difference/equality approach’ offers two alternative 
routes to equality for women, either being the same as men (which is also 
termed ‘gender neutrality’ or ‘single standard’) or being different from men. 46 
Both of these approaches judge women through the standard of maleness.47 
To put it in other words, the “equality theory has been written out of men’s 
practice, not women’s”.48 
Furthermore, while the double standard of the ‘difference/equality theory’ 
has enabled men to obtain the same benefits that what women have 
traditionally had49 it does not give women any dignity of the single standard.50 
According to MacKinnon, the ‘difference/equality approach’ has silenced the 
abuse that women suffer, specifically because such abuse does not usually 
happen to men.51 In this dissertation, I argue that this is still true with regard to 
the current international refugee law’s approach to gender-related 
persecution. 
MacKinnon also argues that women are transforming the definition of 
equality “not by making ourselves the same as men (...) or by reifying 
women’s so-called differences but by insisting that equal citizenship must 
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include what women need to be human, including a right not to be sexually 
violated and silenced”.52 
In order to do so, there is a need to re-assess the question of equality in 
terms of distribution of power rather than focus on the ‘difference/equality’ of 
sexes.53  By using this approach I, in this dissertation, aim to uncover the 
existing male dominance and female subordination embedded in the 
international legal refugee framework.54  
To this end, various feminist legal methods are used in this dissertation. 
As Charlesworth states, feminist methods “seek to expose and question the 
limited bases of international law’s claim to objectivity and impartiality and 
insist on the importance of gender relations as a category of analysis”.55 This 
is done by examining the historical origins of the international refugee regime 
in chapter 2 with an emphasis on its inherent bias in favour of the male 
experience of persecution. Similarly, in chapter 2, the seeming gender 
neutrality and objectivity of the international refugee law framework is 
questioned, especially with regard to its apparent lack of protection from 
gender-related persecution.  
To analyse the research problem and test the related hypothesis as set 
out above, I apply three interlinked methods. Firstly, I use the method of 
‘searching for silences’ in the international refugee law regime. The omission 
of gender as a basis for persecution, as well as the regime’s failure to include 
protection from persecution, which is unique to women, is one of the 
dissertation’s central focus areas. As Charlesworth argues, “the silences of 
international law may be as important as its positive rules and rhetorical 
structures”. 56  This is especially important, as the silence of women exists on 
all levels of international law.57 Ultimately, these silences form an “integral 
part of the structure of the international legal order, a critical element of its 
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stability”.58 This method is used especially in chapter 2 while examining the 
current refugee law framework’s silence on gender. 
Secondly, I examine the ‘gendered coding’ of the dichotomies and 
binary oppositions 59  (especially the public/private distinction) in the 
construction of international refugee law. The utilisation of this method is 
important, as the gendered dichotomies has the effect of “blot[ting] out the 
experiences of many women and [silencing] their voices in international 
law”. 60  This method is used especially in chapter 5 while analysing the 
construction of what ‘persecution’ is interpreted by the domestic courts to 
encompass.   
Lastly, in the search for silences and apparent gender coding, I ask ‘the 
woman question’ to examine whether international refugee law takes into 
account experiences specific to female refugees and whether the existing 
legal standards and concepts might put asylum seeker women at a 
disadvantage.61 This method is used throughout the dissertation.  
Furthermore, by concentrating exclusively on the experiences of 
asylum-seeking women, who arguably constitute one of the most under-
represented, marginalised and disregarded group of women, methods 
proposed by Hunter, Crewnshaw and Minow are used to examine the 
international refugee law regime from an inclusive feminist legal standpoint.62  
In particular, by focusing on the experiences of asylum seeking women alone, 
the method of focusing on those most underrepresented as advocated by 
Hunter, is applied.63  In the same vain, through the exclusive emphasis on 
persecution uniquely experienced by women, the proposition that Crenshaw 
made to “place those who currently are marginalized, in the centre” 64  is 
employed throughout this study. Finally, by examining the discrimination and 
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hurdles faced by asylum seeking women in securing refugee status Minow’s 
proposal of promoting voices that usually remain unheard is utilised.65   
I apply the feminist theoretical approach and use the relevant methods 
set out above fully aware of the fact that anti-essentialist critics have criticised 
these methods for neglecting the differences between women. Despite 
disagreeing with some of these anti-essentialist criticisms, I recognise the 
validity of the critique against the ‘neo-colonial’ approach, currently dominant 
in the international refugee law regime. Under the neo-colonial approach the 
domestic courts have constructed victims of gender-related persecution as 
‘cultural others’ who have to be saved from their ‘uncivilised cultures’ in the 
few cases where the victims have been granted a refugee status.66  
Despite it having resulted in the granting of refugee status in few 
gender-related persecution cases, the neo-colonial approach is detrimental to 
female asylum seekers, as it fails to focus on the actual crime of gender-
related persecution itself but rather centres on the ‘moral superiority’ of the 
First World. The use of neo-colonial approach in refugee status determination 
is further analysed in chapter 5. 
A further criticism by the anti-essentialist and post-modern scholars 
relates to feminist legal theory’s approach that there are some specific 
experiences that shared by all women, which fundamentally differentiate 
women from men67, as is the case with victims of gender-related persecution. 
The anti-essentialist and post-modern critics deny the possibility of the 
existence of a general category of ‘women’, as according to the critics, there 
are always other aspects to women’s identities than their gender, and other 
reasons for their oppression than sex. 68 For example, according to Cornell, 
the construction of a category of ‘women’ is impossible, as “there is no 
ontology of female identity, only representations of ‘women’ in discourse and 
performance”. 69  Fuss, another deconstructionist, further argues that the 
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“female experience is never as unified, as knowable, as universal and stable 
as we presume it to be”70 and states that “Derrida is right to suggest that 
‘egoity is the absolute form of experience’“.71  
However, as MacKinnon argues, “postmodern feminists seldom build 
or refer to the real lives of real women directly” 72  and consequently 
postmodernism “is far, far away from the realities of the subordination of 
women”.73 Even though this dissertation is not based on real experiences 
documented through fieldwork and interviews, the real experiences of women 
who have suffered gender-related persecution are captured through the 
comprehensive analysis of case law as is carried out in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
Furthermore, as MacKinnon states, feminist theory does not argue that 
“gender is all that there is” but that “gender is big and pervasive, never not 
there (…) and that it explains a lot”.74 At the same time, feminist legal theory 
has never denied the existence of ‘skin privilege’. Nevertheless, as 
MacKinnon states, “skin privilege (…) has never insulated white women from 
the brutality and misogyny of men (…) or from its effective legalization”.75  
With regard to the violence that women of colour experience, feminist 
legal theory, on which this dissertation is based on, does not deny the 
relevance of race nor claim that the violence can be understood outside a 
racial context.76  As Mackinnon argues, according to feminist legal theory, 
‘gender’ is made up of the reality of the experiences of all women. 77 
Consequently, “to argue that oppression ‘as a woman’ negates rather than 
encompasses the recognition of the oppression of women on other bases is to 
say that there is no such thing as the practice of sex inequality.”78 By agreeing 
to MacKinnon’s standpoint, this dissertation is based on the 
acknowledgement that there is indeed a practice of sex inequality in the 
international refugee law regime. 
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Similarly, I agree with MacKinnon’s position that the basis and content of 
feminist legal theory is “the substantive experience that women in all their 
particularities and variations have” and is consequently “built on, and 
accountable to, women’s experiences of abuse and violation”. 79  As 
MacKinnon argues, the diversity of women’s experiences has not undermined 
feminist theory’s reality, but rather constituted it.80 This is true also with regard 
to the experiences of victims of gender-related persecution under international 
refugee law.  
Overall, feminist theory simply claims the reality of women’s experiences 
as a ground to stand and move from.81 As MacKinnon argues, “feminism 
makes its ‘women’ from the ground up, out of particularities (…) rather than 
from the top down, out of abstractions”,82 and thus, “the so-called essentialism 
problem cannot occur”.83 
 
1 5 Significance of the research project 
Although some academics84 argue that gender-related persecution claims are 
already included under the current international refugee law framework and 
can be brought under the persecution grounds of religion, political opinion and 
particular social group, thousands of women facing gender-related 
persecution continue to fall outside the scope of protection of the international 
refugee law regime.85  
My research highlights how the gender bias in the 1951 Convention 
continues to exclude thousands of female asylum-seekers from the ambit of 
international refugee law, which serves as the last resort to protect women 
against human rights violations. Furthermore, in my dissertation I draw 
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attention to the predominant use of the ‘male lens’ in the assessment of 
asylum claims. Through a comprehensive analysis of a number of aspects, I 
highlight the need for a re-conceptualisation of the definition of ‘refugee’ in 
order to provide a truly equal protection to those in need of it. These aspects 
include firstly the historical background of and the consequently entrenched 
gender bias in international legal instruments; secondly, the gendered 
interpretation of what ‘persecution’ entails; thirdly the legal uncertainty caused 
by the attempts to fit gender-related persecution under the existing 
enumerated grounds; fourthly the gender bias public/private dichotomy in the 
interpretation of what constitutes ‘persecution’ and lastly the examination 
inadequate solutions adopted to fill the gendered protection gap through the 
introduction of gender guidelines and complementary protection.  
Furthermore, in this dissertation I specifically underscore the need for 
the international refugee law regime to continue to evolve in order to stay on 
par with developments in other international human rights instruments with 
respect to the protection of women’s rights and the elimination of gender 
discrimination. In this regard the examination undertaken offers insight into 
the ways in which international refugee law can, and as I argue, should evolve 
in a more effective, consistent and relevant manner to capture gender-related 
persecution. This dissertation also stresses the need for greater engagement 
with the true reasons behind gender-related persecution rather than 
attempting to fit it into the existing five grounds. On a related note, my 
research plays an important role in examining the arguably growing 
recognition of gender as an independent ground of persecution, as evidenced 
by the inclusion of gender as an independent ground in certain domestic 
jurisdictions and by the CEDAW Committees’ General Recommendation No 
32, which calls for states to include gender as an independent ground in their 
national refugee determination processes. Furthermore, as this dissertation 
examines various solutions to the existing gender gap under international 
refugee law framework the analysis of the changes made to domestic 
jurisdictions regarding the inclusion of gender as an independent ground for 
persecution provides a ‘testing ground’.  The results of this analysis provide a 
good point of departure for the further development of international refugee 
law regime as a whole.  
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1 6 Scope of the dissertation 
In this dissertation I specifically analyse Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention 
and the refugee criteria embedded in it. I examine the interpretation and 
implementation of Article 1(A)(2) in domestic jurisdictions of Australia, 
Canada, France, Finland, Germany, Israel, New Zealand, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and United States, with a special focus on the attempted inclusion of 
gender-related asylum claims under the categories of religion, membership of 
a particular social group and political opinion included in the definition under 
this article. As I indicated under the research problem, while my research 
takes place within the scope of international human rights law, the main focus 
of this dissertation is not on human rights law per se, but the nature of gender-
based persecution and the ability of refugee law to protect women from this 
kind of human rights violations. International human rights law is however 
used in my research to highlight the stagnation of the development of 
international refugee law and as such a limited discussion is included in 
chapter 2. Throughout the dissertation I return to the issues of discrimination 
and inequality created by the application of international refugee law in 
relation to female victims of gender-based persecution. Furthermore, the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination as encompassed in the 
international human rights law framework are strongly linked to feminist legal 
theory which I have based my dissertation on as substantiated under 1 4 
above.   
 It is also important to set out the fact that this dissertation does not 
focus specifically on refugees generated by any specific conflict or coming 
from any specific point of origin, it was sparked by the addition of gender as a 
sixth ground in the domestic legislation of South Africa alongside another 
handful of states as I indicted above under 1 1. It is clear however that my 
research has taken a North-South, a developing-developed, a first-world-third-
world perspective as refugees, male and female, tend to leave to a location 
that is perceived as ‘better’ and ‘safer’. My research has not focused 
specifically on whether this location is in Europe, the Americas, Asia or Africa 
but rather on the effects of the international norms as they are applied either 
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directly or through the domestication of the international and regional 
instruments.   
I would however like to acknowledge that I have put emphasis on the 
jurisprudence of what I continuously refer to in my dissertation as ‘Western’ 
courts, specifically while examining the interpretation and implementation of 
‘persecution’ in with regard to gender-related violence in chapter 3. This 
selection was influenced on the one hand by the developed asylum 
jurisprudence of these jurisdictions and on the other the availability of primary 
and secondary sources in this regard. What further influenced my selection 
was the fact that while Western countries are often the final destination for 
many asylum applications from individuals leaving developing countries, their 
domestic jurisdictions have adopted a highly restrictionst approach to the 
inclusion of gender-related persecution to the refugee law paradigm in 
particular, and to refugee flows in general as demonstrated by the dominant 
‘Fortress Europe’ ideology behind the slow responses of the European 
governments to the recent Syrian refugee crisis.  
As a consequence the Western domestic courts tend to interpret the 
relevant international refugee law in a very limiting manner that leads to 
further restrictions on the access that gender-related persecution victims have 
to refugee status. My selection is not an indication of the lack of relevant 
asylum cases in other non-western jurisdictions, but could serve as good point 
of departure specifically with regard to the examination of the gender bias in 
the application of the international refugee law. 
Overall, while examining the way gender-persecution is perceived, be it 
in the UK, France, Canada or the US, the bringing together of the many 
interpretations and application of refugee law on this very matter would 
constitute a very important bird’s eye view on a phenomena that is still hidden 
under layers of misconceptions be it legal or cultural. 
As gender is introduced into the context of refuge protection all the 
aspects of its ‘being’, such as the way international refugee law was 
conceived, the inherently male-centred notion of persecution, the liability of 
the states vis-à-vis persecution, the complexity of the involvement of non-
state actors the growing understanding of gender discrimination, the 
acceptance of violence taking place in private sphere, such as domestic 
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violence, as a human rights violation, the political dimension of gender-related 
persecution, and the acknowledgement of severe gender-discrimination as a 
form of persecution become relevant to the successful use of ‘gender’ as 
ground for providing women with protection against gender-based persecution 
becomes important. As there is not enough domestic case law to substantiate 
any contribution of the introduction of gender as a sixth category yet, I have 
attempted in my research to instead, on the one hand provide evidence for 
the reasonableness and acute need for such inclusion arguably not only on 
the domestic level but also at the international level, and on the other to 
provide the context within which it could be applied taking into consideration 
all the possible drawbacks. 
Furthermore, while the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969 OAU Convention) and the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984 Cartagena Declaration) are 
important refugee law instruments and contain similar substance to the 1951 
Convention with the addition of broader refugee definition86, I have excluded 
them from this dissertation as the additions that they contain are not central to 
the discussion. Thus, the focus of this dissertation is solely on the main 
international refugee law instrument, the 1951 Convention and the definition 
that it contains. Consequently, this dissertation excludes a wider assessment 
of the expanded definitions of refugee as included in the 1969 OAU 
Convention and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration.   
Overall, while there is a need for the addition of various new categories 
to the criteria in order to provide an adequate refugee protection framework to 
all those who deserve it, this dissertation, however, focuses exclusively on the 
examination of gender-related asylum claims and the addition of gender as an 
independent ground for refugee status. Furthermore, the scope of this 
dissertation has been limited to an exclusive focus on the asylum claims of 
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female victims of gender-related persecution. While acknowledging that the 
concept of ‘gender’ is much wider than just women, and that gender-related 
persecution includes other forms of violence, than just that aimed at women 
due to their gender other claims that are often compounded with gender-
related claims in the relevant literature, such as LGBTI claims, have been 
excluded from this dissertation. In this way, the focus is only on one complex 
cause behind persecution, and there is no overly broad analysis of all gender-
related claims. This study therefore excludes a broader evaluation of the 
existing protection gaps under the current international refugee law 
framework.   
Similarly, while acknowledging there has not been a complete silence 
with regard to gender-related persecution in academic debates, human rights 
body recommendations and in certain State and UN Guidelines and policies, 
the title of this dissertation “Sixty Years of Silence”, refers to the continued 
absence of ‘gender’ as a ground of persecution in the language of the 1951 
Refugee Convention and consequently, in international law governing the 
state of refugees.  
Finally, despite the fact that women make up approximately half of the 
world’s refugees fewer women than men apply for refugee status. 87  The 
explanation given for the low percentage of women’s asylum applications is 
that persecuted women are unable to “leave their homes the same way that 
[other] persecuted (…) groups may leave”. 88  According to Valji, women’s 
“economic, cultural, and social subordination, familial obligations such as 
dependent children, and in some cases inability to gain even a passport 
without male accompaniment, prevent [them] from leaving their countries”.89 
As Crawley and Lester further observe, women only flee “when the 
circumstances have become so hostile that remaining is no longer an 
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option”.90  However, despite social, economical and cultural reasons being 
important hurdles with regard to women’s limited access to asylum, this 
dissertation focuses on solely on the legal barriers that the victims of gender-
related persecution face while attempting to secure a refugee status.   
 
1 7 Outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation begins with an analysis of the assumption of a gender bias in 
the 1951 Convention in favour of a male experience of persecution. In chapter 
2 I examine why such a gender bias exists by analysing the influence that 
historical events had on the substance of 1951 Convention. I place specific 
emphasis on the strong protection and application of the principles of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention during the drafting of the 1951 Convention. 
The heavy focus on these principles has arguably resulted in very limited 
conception and protection of human rights by the 1951 Convention. 
Specifically, the development of women’s rights within the broader field of 
human rights has highlighted the considerable gap that remains between the 
rights protected under international/regional human rights law and those 
protected within the refugee law regime. I examine this gap in detail in chapter 
2, with special emphasis on the vulnerability and intersectionality of women 
asylum-seekers. 
As a backdrop to the gendered discussions on the 1951 Convention I 
furthermore analyse the inherent patriarchal nature of international law and 
the discipline’s existing gender bias through the feminist method of exposing 
and questioning the limited base of international law’s claim to objectivity and 
impartiality. Arguably, owing to the stagnation of its development, the 
international refugee law regime will eventually be rendered ‘paradoxically 
peripheral’ to the real needs of refugee women.91 Chapter 2 also includes an 
analysis of the discipline’s underlying public/private dichotomy. The negative 
impact of the inbuilt gendered public/private dichotomy under international 
refugee law on the claims of victims of gender-related persecution will be 
further discussed in chapter 4. In sub-chapter 2 5 I use the feminist method of 
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‘searching for silences’ as discussed under 1 4 above, to examine the current 
refugee law framework's silence on gender. This is a significant part of the 
deconstruction of the current refugee regime, since the ‘silences of 
international law [are] as important as its positive rules and rhetorical 
structures’, because they enforce the status quo and are a critical element of 
the frameworks’ stability.92 
In chapter 3, I examine whether the current interpretation of what 
‘persecution’ constitutes can encompass the unique persecution that women 
face because of their gender. I specifically analyse the gender-bias 
construction of ‘persecution’ as referred to in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention. The gender bias in the definition of ‘persecution’ is examined 
through an analysis of the dominant understanding of what ‘persecution’ 
entails, which, I argue, is based mostly on male experiences. Similarly, I 
examine the gender bias caused by the primacy that the current international 
refugee law framework accords to protection from civil and political 
persecution. This discussion is based on the assumption that gender-related 
persecution is part of a larger construction of structural violence against 
women caused by uneven power relations between the sexes. 
I furthermore reflect on a number of problems related to the 
normalisation of gender-related violence and the current gender-bias 
definition of persecution. I specifically examine the lack of recognition by 
Western domestic courts of gender-related violence as persecution, despite 
its brutality and prevalence. This lack of recognition has serious 
consequences for women seeking asylum, as the concept of persecution is 
essential to the refugee definition under international law and therefore 
directly linked to the affordance of protection and a right to stay under 
domestic law.93 In chapter 3, I further explore the argument that the fact that 
‘persecution’ itself is an ill-defined concept under international refugee law has 
had a part to play in courts’ rejection of a large number of gender-related 
persecution cases. This argument is supported by Freedman who argues, that 
the various definitions of persecution in different jurisdictions have resulted in 
the strengthening of “gendered inequalities already existing in various 
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countries by failing to acknowledge breaches of women’s rights and resulting 
persecutions”.94   
Furthermore, as an example of increased level of harm required by the 
asylum adjudicators specifically in asylum claims including sexual 
persecution, case law from US is deliberated upon. Chapter 3 also contains 
an analysis of the impact of underlying global structural violence against 
women with regard to both the prevalence and trivialisation of gender-related 
persecution.  
In chapter 4 I focus on the tension in the current international refugee law 
framework between two opposing objectives. On the one hand, the obligation 
to protect victims of persecution, and on the other hand, the will of states to 
protect their borders and sovereignty by limiting the numbers of refugees to 
groups of victims of a certain type of persecution.95 This inherent tension in 
the refugee law framework, together with the stagnation of the framework’s 
development, has led to numerous problems. The cessation of the legal 
development of the regime has had an especially severe impact on women 
asylum-seekers because of gender not being expressly included as a ground 
for persecution at the time of the drafting of the 1951 Convention. The 
outcome has been the near exclusion of gender asylum claims from the 
international refugee law regime, because they do not have a proper outlet 
under the current legislative framework.96 
In chapter 4, I therefore evaluate whether the five existing grounds of 
persecution included in the current international refugee law framework are 
capable of capturing persecution based solely on gender. In particular I 
examine the efforts of adjudicators in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, US 
and UK to include gender asylum cases under the three most commonly used 
grounds of persecution: particular social group (PSG), political opinion and 
religion.  
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While discussing the inclusion of gender under the PSG ground, I analyse 
PSG with a specific focus on the problems arising from the unsuitable fit of 
gender-based persecution cases under this category. Furthermore, I examine 
the alternative ground of ‘political opinion’ category. While there have been 
some successes in applying this category to cases where the form of 
persecution has been gendered, but the motivation behind the persecution is 
based on the victim’s political opinion, this category is inadequate for a 
majority of gender asylum claims. Moreover, problems arising from the use of 
‘political opinion’ in cases where the gendered form of persecution is sexual 
are discussed through the analysis of US case law such as Klawitter v INS.97  
Finally, I focus on the attempts of domestic courts to include gender 
persecution cases under the ‘religion’ category. Similarly to PSG and ‘political 
opinion’ grounds, despite there have been a few successful gender-based 
asylum cases under this category, it remains unsuitable to cover the whole 
array of gender-related persecution cases.  
In chapter 5, I aspire to create further context and understanding of 
gender-based persecution by examining whether the dichotomous 
construction of persecutory acts as ‘public’ and ‘private’ has aggravated the 
gender inequality under the current refugee law framework. I deliberate on 
this question by using the feminist method of analysing the ‘gendered coding’ 
in the deep-rooted public/private dichotomy embedded in the current 
interpretation of persecution, as discussed under 1 4 above.98 
In this chapter I also examine specifically Australian, Canadian and UK 
courts’ response to gender-related persecution perpetrated by non-state 
actors. Furthermore, I explore whether states have obligations and 
responsibilities under international human rights and refugee law with regard 
to persecution committed by non-state actors. In this discussion, I examine 
the emerging ‘bifurcated approach’ and accordingly argue that gender-related 
violence escalates to the level of direct persecution when the violence is 
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either directly linked to the state or tolerated by the tacit silence and passivity 
displayed by the state.99  
Moreover, I deliberate on other significant hurdles that asylum-seeking 
women face, including the requirement of ‘utility’ that many of the developed 
receiving states place on them. I also analyse the multiple forms of 
discrimination that many women asylum-seekers face as well as the rapidly 
increasing xenophobic attitude towards refugees in many receiving countries. 
In the same spirit, I examine the impact of the ‘culturalist approach’, under 
which women asylum-seekers are constructed either ‘culturally’ or ‘socially’, 
which results in the diminishment of their experiences as refugees.  
Finally chapter 5 includes a consideration of the questions of the creation 
of an ‘exotic other female’ and the failure to acknowledge the multiple forms of 
discrimination that non-Western women face in the context of Western 
countries. 
In chapter 6, the last substantial chapter, I examine whether the 
inclusion of gender as an independent ground for persecution in domestic 
legislation enhances women’s rights to non-discrimination, equality, dignity, 
life and security of person and whether the current international refugee law 
regime should be similarly amended to include gender as a ground for 
persecution in order to ensure adequate protection for women asylum-
seekers. This examination focuses on three alternative approaches used 
under domestic law to capture gender-related persecution, namely gender 
guidelines, complementary protection and the addition of gender as an 
independent ground of persecution to domestic legislation. These three 
approaches, in one way or another, have been created to supplement the 
weak protection afforded by the current international legislative framework. 
 I begin chapter 6 by discussing the gender guidelines that have been 
formulated to aid adjudicators in their decision making in cases involving 
gender-related persecution. Although the creation of the gender guidelines is 
a step in the right direction, it is questionable whether they will be sufficient, 
due to their non-binding nature. Despite the creation of gender guidelines, the 
final decision is still at the discretion of the adjudicator. 
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Secondly, I analyse the emerging concept of complementary protection 
and its applicability to gender-related asylum claims. While the possibility of 
finding alternative forms of protection for victims of gender-related persecution 
is worth exploring, the lack of universal understanding and a legislative 
framework has made complementary protection an inadequate solution to the 
protection gap that victims of gender-related persecution are facing.  
I end chapter 6 by examining the alternative solution of adding gender 
as an independent, legally binding category to the refugee definition. This 
exploration includes a review of domestic legislation in Spain, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, where gender is included as an independent ground of 
persecution. In this section I examine the hypothesis that the embedding of 
gender as an independent category in the legal framework would secure 
adequate protection to those fleeing gender-related persecution. By granting 
gender the status of an independent category under the refugee definition, the 
root cause of the persecution faced by women worldwide would be 
recognised and its seriousness acknowledged.    
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Chapter 2 
Historical origins and the nature of the current refugee law framework 
 
2 1 Introduction 
Part of the problem of gender discrimination in the asylum process is caused 
by the framing, phrasing and implementation of the 1951 Convention. The 
Convention does not “recognis[e] either the specifics of gender-based 
persecution or the particularities of women refugees or of womanhood as a 
whole”.100 Oloka-Onyango argues that this is equally true whether viewed “in 
relation to the conceptualisation of the term ‘refugee’ or in the dominant 
solutions to the refugee crisis that are usually proffered”.101 
Some of the causes of the underrepresentation of women successfully 
claiming and receiving refugee status can be traced back to wording of the 
1951 Convention, as rooted in the historical contexts at the time it was 
drafted. The exclusively male delegations that drafted the 1951 Convention 
did not, for example, consider gender as a possible ground of persecution. 
Therefore gender is omitted as a valid ground on which to claim refugee 
status under the 1951 Convention definition of refugee.102 
In chapter 2 I examine the causes of the gender bias under the current 
international refugee law framework by analysing the influence that historical 
events had on the substance of 1951 Convention. In sub-chapter 2 2 I focus 
specifically on the historical origins of the 1951 Convention and its impact on 
the current refugee law framework, on both the international and regional 
levels. As mentioned in the introduction, the 1951 Convention was originally 
drafted to respond to the plight of the millions of refugees seeking asylum in 
the aftermath of WWII. It is important to note that the majority of these 
refugees were male.103 There are different reasons behind the overwhelming 
numbers of qualified male refugees. As with modern-day asylum-seekers, 
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women in the post-WWII era lacked financial means and were often the 
primary caregivers of their families, which made it very difficult for them to 
leave their country of origin. 104  More germane to the discussion in this 
chapter, however, is the 1951 Convention’s strict focus on the violations of 
civil and political rights, often committed in the (male-dominated) public 
sphere. This was arguably one of the contributing factors to the massive 
number of males in qualified refugee populations. Consequently, the 1951 
Convention arguably privileged male applicants in the post-WWII era and will 
continue to do so if not amended. To an extent, the sharply polarised politics 
between the West and the Eastern Bloc at the beginning of the Cold War was 
responsible for creating this bias in the law.  
Both the WWII and Cold War contexts had an influence on the 1951 
Convention, and the present-day international refugee law instruments display 
a very limited definition and protection of human rights. Violations of human 
rights committed by non-state actors in the ‘private sphere’ are completely 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the 1951 refugee regime, even though they 
are the common arena for gender-related persecution that women 
experience, as further discussed in Chapter 4. Subsequently, the current 
refugee regime does not acknowledge the continuing brutal crimes against 
women that are taking place around the world and often committed or 
tolerated by the state.  
In sub-chapter 2 3 I investigate the strong focus on preserving state 
sovereignty and the impact it has had on the protection awarded to women 
refugees fleeing persecution. This relates to the protectionist sentiment that is 
dominant in many developed countries.105 Additionally, I determine the impact 
of the lack of international legal instruments specifically protecting women’s 
rights during the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This section begins 
with an analysis of the travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and the drafters’ exclusive focus on safeguarding a limited area of human 
rights, namely civil and political rights. Specific attention is paid to the 
wholesale omission of gender from both the drafting processes and the final 
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instruments. This discussion also looks at the emergence of international 
instruments safeguarding women’s rights post-1951. The development of 
specific women’s rights within the broader field of human rights has 
highlighted a considerable gap that still exists between the rights protected 
under international/regional human rights law and those protected within the 
refugee law regimes. This gap is examined in detail with special emphasis on 
the vulnerability and intersectionality of female asylum-seekers. 
As a backdrop to the gendered discussions about the 1951 Convention, 
the final sub-chapter examines the inherently patriarchal nature of 
international law and the gender bias in the discipline. Firstly, the archaic 
nature of the refugee law framework is analysed. Furthermore, the seemingly 
gender-neutral character of international law is deconstructed, and the 
inherently patriarchal nature of the international law regime as whole is 
analysed. This sub-chapter also examines the discipline’s underlying 
public/private dichotomy as well as the refugee law regimes’ silence with 
regard to gender. This is a significant part of the deconstruction of the current 
refugee regime, as the “silences of international law [are] as important as its 
positive rules and rhetorical structures”, because they enforce the status quo 
and are a critical element of the frameworks’ stability.106 
 
2 2 The 1951 Refugee Convention 
The origins of modern refugee law go back to the emergence of an 
international consensus on the importance of safeguarding “the inherent 
dignity and (…) the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family”107 as a way to prevent the “extermination and unprecedented barbarity 
of governments against their own citizens” 108  that had taken place during 
WWII. In the war’s aftermath, the international community acknowledged that 
“states could no longer be regarded as the sole arbiters of the needs and 
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entitlements of their citizens” and that the citizens “might become a legitimate 
concern of international law”.109 
The drafting of the convention took place between 1948 and 1951,110 at 
the height of social dislocation in Europe.111 Consequently, the convention 
was strongly influenced by the political will to prevent persecution such as the 
Holocaust from ever happening again. Following the Allied victory, the 
international refugee law regime was shaped to find solutions for those 
persecuted as well as those displaced by the conflict. 112  As Fitzpatrick 
observes, the specific paradigm inspiring the creation of the 1951 Convention 
was “the right-wing totalitarian regime of Nazi-Germany, which acted upon its 
hatred with astounding efficiency, thoroughness and candour”.113 As a result, 
the main concern was to address the large-scale persecution directed at 
European Jews.114 Condon notes that “[a]fter the recent horror of genocide in 
Nazi-Germany, the foremost concern of the Convention drafters (...) was the 
protection of persons persecuted for racial and religious reasons”. 115 
Accordingly, the convention was drafted exclusively to promote the protection 
of those who were targeted for their race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group and political opinion, which were all bases upon 
which the Nazis chose their victims.116 These types of persecution were, and 
continue to be today, more commonly asserted by male than female asylum-
seekers.117  
Furthermore, the 1951 Convention was constructed within a heavily 
Eurocentric context, and the drafters initially limited its jurisdiction to the 
“redistribution of the refugee[s] from the shoulders of front-line European 
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states”.118 However, this restriction was criticised during the drafting process, 
where the Chinese delegate, Mr Cha, observed that the convention text “as it 
[stands] would apply only to European refugees, whereas it ha[s] to be 
remembered that other groups of people outside Europe might also stand in 
need of legal protection, either immediately or in the future”.119 Similarly, the 
Pakistani delegate, Mr Brohi, voiced Pakistan’s opposition by arguing that “the 
problem of refugees [is] not a European problem only and (…) therefore (…) 
the definition of the term ‘refugee’ should cover all those who might properly 
fall within the scope of that term”.120 Also Mr Habicht of the International 
Association of Penal Law expressed concern over the Eurocentric nature of 
the refugee definition, which would place “thousands, and in the future (…) 
hundreds of thousands of persons” outside of the refugee definition. 121 
Overall, various non-Western countries either rejected the Western view of 
the 1951 Convention or regarded it as concerning only the European refugee 
situation.122 As Coles notes:  
 
“[A]lmost all the Socialist countries denounced the politics behind the 
approach [of the 1951 Convention], which were, of course, a complete 
change from the wholesale enforced returns organized by the Allies at 
the end of the War, and they criticized vehemently both the Statute and 
the Convention. The Arab States, also, were unhappy, and they 
inserted a provision in both instruments to ensure that neither was to 
be considered as applying to Palestinian refugees. The Asian countries 
kept their distance, as did a number of major Latin American 
countries”.123 
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In summary, the drafters of the 1951 Convention “look[ed] toward past events 
rather than anticipat[ing] categorical possibilities in drawing their standard”.124  
 A further factor that influenced the drafting of the 1951 Convention was 
the international politics of the Cold War. During the drafting process, the Cold 
War was reaching its height, and the states participating in the drafting 
process were sharply polarised. 125  According to Bhabha, this particular 
context is “a crucial historical determinant of the shape of contemporary 
international refugee law”.126  
During the drafting process, the communist bloc focused heavily on the 
inclusion of the protection of social and economic rights in the 1951 
Convention, while the Western bloc accorded more importance to the 
protection of civil and political rights, with the protection focusing on those 
fleeing for ideological reasons.127 Eventually, the Western states “successfully 
utilised their greater power during the drafting process128, which resulted in a 
document that reflected largely American conceptions of civil liberties.129 As a 
result, the 1951 Convention was directed at victims of left-wing totalitarian 
governments in Eastern Europe130, with the “the definition (…) reflect[ing] 
liberal political values of (…) individual autonomy and rationality and 
exclud[ing] socialist social-economic concerns”. 131  Refugees became 
“principally conceived as male political activists who were persecuted by the 
State [while] women and children were regarded as passive dependents”.132 
Hathaway highlights the importance of Cold War politics in the 
formation of the refugee definition by noting that “the five enumerated 
categories were chosen for their expected applicability to individuals fleeing 
Eastern bloc countries where social and economic rights were emphasised 
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over political and civil rights”. 133  Owing to this ideological favouritism, the 
claims of the 1951 Convention protecting universal human rights are tainted 
by the strong liberal individualistic bias. 134  As Coles observes, the 1951 
Convention was indisputably “tailored by the Western bloc for its own 
purposes in dealing mainly with the Eastern European refugee situation, 
favouring a particular characterization of the cause of the refugee problem 
and a particular solution”.135 
The protection provided by the 1951 Convention is restricted to the 
protection of a limited category of human rights. Overall, the international 
refugee law regime suffers from an overall conceptual narrowness of human 
rights that only addresses “a narrow aspect of human dignity: the civil and 
political rights firmly rooted in Western political thought and consistent with 
Western political goals”. 136  This limited scope unavoidably has a 
disproportionately severe impact on women due to women comprising the 
bulk of the world’s forcibly migrated people.137 According to Mertus, for those 
who do not fit the definition of persecution and who not fall within the limited 
persecution grounds, there is “no recourse to international legal protection 
and, for the most part, [they are] denied any assistance”.138 
During the Cold War, the states receiving refugees had a strong 
incentive to open their doors to asylum-seekers, due to a desire to welcome 
refugees from those States which supported the opposing ideology.139 These 
states utilised the flow of refugees both to “discredit the government of the 
country of origin and to bolster the image of countries granting them 
asylum.”140 During the creation of the current refugee law regime, any type of 
humanitarian aid, including asylum, was linked to Cold War foreign policy 
concerns. 141  Hathaway further argues that neither a humanitarian nor a 
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human rights vision can account for the creation of refugee law. 142  He 
poignantly summarises the strongly political nature of the refugee law regime 
in the following statement: 
 
“If [refugee law was] conceived in humanitarian terms, [it] would be a 
politically neutral response to the needs of suffering persons who have 
in some way been forced to leave their homes. The law would not focus 
on the ‘how’ or ‘why’ of the need for protection, but rather would inquire 
only into the extent of the denial of physical security or liberty leading to 
and consequent upon departure”.143 
 
2 3 The broader framework of international and regional human rights 
law relevant to women’s refugee claims 
As discussed above in sub-chapter 2 2, the 1951 Refugee Convention was 
the first attempt to extend legal protection to a universally defined group of 
‘refugees’.144 However, it also inevitably reflects the specific concerns of its 
drafters, majority of whom were white, educated, Western males.145 During 
the travaux préparatoires, the French delegate, Mr Rain, argued that a 
connection between refugee law and human rights should be made in the 
spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.146 However, the French 
suggestion to link refugee status to violations of fundamental human rights 
and to the general human right to seek asylum 147 was rejected for being 
‘theoretical’ and too far removed from reality. 148  As Hathaway observes, 
“neither a holistic view of humanitarian need nor of human rights protection 
was seen as the appropriate foundation for the new convention”.149 Ultimately, 
the focal feature of the current international refugee law became “its rejection 
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of comprehensive humanitarian or human rights based approach in favour of 
a narrowly conceived focus”.150 
Owing to the 1951 Convention’s exclusive focus on protection from 
persecution based on civil and political rights (which primarily affected male 
European refugees), any form of persecution based on gender was 
completely absent from the 1951 Convention’s considerations. Overall, the 
issue of gender-related persecution was simply not considered significant 
enough to deliberate upon during the drafting procedure.  
According to Kumin, the drafters of the 1951 Convention “did not 
deliberately omit persecution based on gender – it was not even 
considered”.151 It was the drafters of the Convention’s failure to recognise 
women’s experiences as internationally relevant that strongly contributed to 
exclusion of gender from the definition of ‘refugee’.152 Specifically, the drafters 
failed to acknowledge that persecutors harmed the victims specifically due to 
their gender,153 and during the drafting little thought was given to forms of 
persecution which might only affect women.154 The fact that the drafters did 
not contemplate gender persecution during the drafting process did not signify 
that gender-related persecution was unfamiliar to the world 155  but rather, 
demonstrated the lack of concern for women’s rights at the time.  
Hence, the lack of international instruments focusing on women’s rights 
at the time of drafting the 1951 Convention played a major role in the 
omission of women and gender from the definition of a refugee.156 According 
to Valji, at the time there were very few international instruments for drafters 
to draw upon in recognising women’s experiences.157 Owing to the dearth of 
instruments in the Convention that would protect women’s rights in particular, 
the document has been interpreted as an instrument that protects citizens 
from abuse by their state i.e. in the public sphere, which is mostly dominated 
by male experiences.158  Consequently, the confined scope of the refugee 
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definition has had an excessively severe impact on women, 159  whom it 
effectively excludes.  
Since the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention the understanding 
of concepts such as discrimination, human rights, women’s rights, gender and 
inequalities in power has evolved and expanded significantly.160 International 
and regional human rights instruments that provide women with specific rights 
have emerged. These instruments have been crucial with regard to the 
protection of women’s human rights and have proved to be “a valuable tool for 
supplementing the more obvious deficiencies in international refugee law”.161  
Ultimately, these instruments have had an impact, albeit a very limited one, on 
the interpretation of the 1951 Convention in the form of gender guidelines, as 
is further discussed in sub-chapter 6 2.  
According to Stamatopoulou, the creation of instruments such as the 
CEDAW and ICESCR have “facilitated the incorporation of women’s 
perspectives into interpretation of the 1951 Convention via explicit non-
discriminatory principles”.162 The influence of the international and regional 
human rights instruments has resulted in both states and individuals being 
increasingly acknowledged as perpetrators of human rights violations as well 
as gender-based discrimination against international human rights 
standards.163 Conversely, this development has led to the acknowledgement 
that gender-based human rights abuses, even when perpetrated by 
individuals, may amount to the persecution of women as members of a social 
group if they occur in an overall social or political context that discriminates 
against women.164  Furthermore, the recent developments that have taken 
place through the recommendations of international human rights treaty 
bodies (mainly CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No 32) and 
the entry to force of regional instruments (Istanbul Convention) have furthered 
acknowledgement of gender-related persecution in the international plane. 
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Yet, despite these advancements, a major gap continues to exist 
between the rights accorded to women by the international human rights 
regime and the protection that the 1951 and 1969 conventions afford them. 
Kourula notes that the “efforts to address the particular situation of refugee 
women have so far fallen short of the adoption of any legally binding 
international instruments singling them out as a specific group”. 165  While 
international and regional human rights law have continued to expand and 
evolve, international refugee law has remained stagnant and is now showing 
its age.166 The refugee definition’s exclusive focus on civil and political rights 
ignores the interdependent nature of all human rights.167 As Harvey observes, 
in the light of the progressive developments in international human rights law, 
international refugee seems to be rendered marginal to the real needs of 
those in need of international protection.168  This is a particularly accurate 
assessment of the protection that the international refugee regime offers to 
refugee women.   
The failure of international and regional refugee law to protect refugee 
women stands in stark contrast to other international and regional human 
rights law instruments that safeguard the principles of equality and women’s 
fundamental rights. This point is significant, as the international and regional 
human rights instruments, standards and jurisprudence are (or should be) 
establish the standard and steer the development of international refugee 
law.169  
For example, on the international level, Article 1(3) of the Charter of the 
UN Charter 170  calls for international co-operation in “promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction to race, sex language or religion”. In the same vein, the 
UDHR171 declares the right to life, liberty and security172 without distinction of 
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any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 173 
Furthermore, Article 14 of UDHR declares the right to seek and to enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution for everyone. 
Additionally, the equal entitlement of women and men to civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights is included in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)174 and in the ICESCR.175 According to 
Article 3 of the ICCPR, the state parties “undertake to ensure the equal right 
of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in 
the (...) Covenant”. Similarly, Article 3 of the ICESCR requires that the state 
parties “ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the (...) Covenant”.  
As lex specialis, Article 1 of the CEDAW 176  confirms the equal 
enjoyment by women and men of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. Furthermore, 
Article 2 of the CEDAW condemns discrimination against women in all its 
forms and calls for the elimination of discrimination against women by all 
appropriate means and without delay. Finally, Article 1 of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT)177 defines torture as “severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, [which] is intentionally inflicted on a person (...) for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind”. 
  With regard to the African regional human rights instruments, ACHPR 
was drafted with the aim of addressing human rights from an Afrocentric 
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perspective. 178  Similarly to the international human rights, the ACHPR 
includes various non-discrimination clauses, with Article 2 providing for equal 
enjoyment of all rights in the charter, regardless of sex. Furthermore, Article 3 
provides that all individuals are equal before the law and be entitled to equal 
protection. With regard to women’s rights specifically, Article 18(3) calls for 
the elimination of discrimination against women and for the protection of the 
rights of women and children as stipulated in international declarations and 
conventions.  
The ACHPR has, however, been criticised for failing to provide 
adequate protection for African women.179 For example, Ebeku argues that 
the existing instruments have done little to improve women’s human rights.180 
Furthermore, as Nsibirwa argues, the ACHPR has failed to address various 
issues affecting the rights of women in Africa, including female genital 
mutilation (FGM), inheritance by women, forced marriages 181  and lobola 
(bride price).182 This criticism of the ACHPR is supported by the fact that, 
although it was created to guarantee the rights of both men and women, it 
expressly mentions ‘women’ only once, and even then only in a compilation 
clause dealing with the family and children.183  
Ultimately, the African Union recognised that women were still 
excluded from legal, social, economic, and cultural processes184, and in an 
attempt to fill the protection gap with regard to women’s rights, the 2003 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa (Women’s Protocol) 185  was drafted. The Women’s 
Protocol was created with the aim of protecting African women in a more 
comprehensive manner than pre-existing instruments, with a focus on 
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protecting women from forms of discrimination particular to Africa.186 With the 
completion of the drafting of the Women’s Protocol in 2003, the international 
community praised it as the most progressive tool for protecting women’s 
rights to date, thanks to it guaranteeing rights which had never before been 
ensured by the international community, such the right to an abortion.187 In 
addition, the Women’s Protocol expressly guarantees various crucial rights for 
women. For example, Article 2 binds all state parties to “combat all forms of 
discrimination against women through appropriate legislative, institutional and 
other measures”; and Article 3 guarantees a woman’s right to “dignity inherent 
in a human being and to the recognition and protection of her human and 
legal rights” while obliging the state parties to “ensure the protection of every 
woman’s right to respect for her dignity and protection of women from all 
forms of violence, particularly sexual and verbal violence”. Importantly, Article 
4, dealing with women’s right to life, integrity and security of the person, 
specifically obliges the state parties to “ensure that women and men enjoy 
equal rights in terms of access to refugee status, determination procedures 
and that women refugees are accorded the full protection and benefits 
guaranteed under international refugee law, including their own identity and 
other documents”.188 
With regard to violence committed by non-state actors in the private 
sphere, Article 4 compels the state parties to “enact and enforce laws to 
prohibit all forms of violence against women including unwanted or forced sex 
whether the violence takes place in private or public”. Article 5 prohibits “all 
forms of female genital mutilation, scarification, medicalisation and para-
medicalisation of female genital mutilation and all other practices in order to 
eradicate them”, as well as other harmful practices to women. Article 8 
guarantees the equality of men and women before the law and the right to 
equal protection. Article 11 binds the state parties to protect asylum-seekers 
in general and refugee women in particular “against all forms of violence, rape 
and other forms of sexual exploitation, and to ensure that such acts are 
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considered war crimes, genocide and/or crimes against humanity and that 
their perpetrators are brought to justice before a competent criminal 
jurisdiction”. 
By adopting the Women’s Protocol, which specifically guarantees the 
rights of women, the African Union “reinforces the message that women’s 
rights require priority attention in the protection of universal and inalienable 
rights”.189 This position taken by the AU regarding women and their rights is 
very different from the approach of the international and the African regional 
refugee instruments.  
Overall, the failure of international and regional refugee law to account 
for and to incorporate women’s experiences as persecution, amounts to a 
systematic infringement of women’s right to equality and their fundamental 
human rights, 190  which are entrenched in international human rights 
instruments and in the Preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention.191 This 
infringement is a serious cause for concern, as refugee law can be described 
as the last resort to protect fundamental human rights.  
By neglecting women’s experiences of persecution, the international 
and regional refugee frameworks leave women vulnerable and without any 
protection, while they condone the ongoing brutal crimes against women that 
are taking place on a global scale and often committed by or tolerated by the 
states. The failure to protect victims of gender-related persecution tarnishes 
the main objective of the international refugee regime, which is to provide 
“interim protection for all such persons [for whom there is no] meaningful 
protection of basic human rights – whether civil, political, economic, social, or 
cultural – in their own state”.192 Overall, as Crawley argues, “protection is at 
the heart of the responsibility that international community bears towards 
refugees”.193  
 
2 4 Gender bias and the inherently patriarchal nature of international law   
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2 4 1 The obsolete nature of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
Since the drafting of the 1951 Convention, the refugee question has become 
increasingly complex, and the past few decades have been marked by 
exceptional changes in both the kind and scale of refugee movements. 194 
The new types of refugee flows that have emerged since the end of Cold War 
have led to an increase in the number of women who have had to flee from 
their country of origin as well as in different forms of persecution directed 
specifically at refugee women.195 As Bacon and Booth observe, the number of 
women fleeing persecution has risen as a result of “only recently recognised 
circumstances specific to women [including] ‘private’ forms of harm such as 
domestic violence, sexual violence, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, 
forced abortion and severe punishment for transgressing social mores such 
as breach of dress code, promiscuity or disobedience”.196 Overall, these ‘new’ 
types of persecution directed specifically at women are a difficult fit to the 
post–WWII perception of a refugee being a person, who seeks asylum for 
reasons of ideological difference.197  
Despite drastic changes in the flow of refugees that set in motion the 
1951 Convention, the only attempt to modernise it occurred in 1967, when the 
adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees extend the scope 
of the 1951 Refugees Convention to cover those individuals who had become 
refugees as a result of events unconnected with the Second World War.198 
However, this attempt to expand and update the refugee regime was utterly 
inadequate, as the only changes to the refugee definition that the 1967 
Protocol created was the removal of the original limitations on time and 
geography. Ultimately the classical definition of a refugee as a male victim of 
political persecution has remained the standard in law and policy practice, 
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despite a growing number of refugees fleeing persecution who do not fit easily 
into the current refugee definition as per the 1951 Refugee Convention.199  
Consequently, the 1951 Convention has received criticism for its 
obsolete content, with Schenk criticising the current refugee definition for 
being “terribly outdated and (...) not reflect[ing] modern human rights 
standards”.200 The 1951 Convention has also been described as one founded 
on a highly individualistic conception of persecution.201 Stevens argues that, 
despite the current refugee definition being broader than the pre-WWII one, it 
is still based on “an outdated model that is designed to address refugee flows 
from white, Western countries during the Cold War”.202 Similarly, according to 
Schmiechen, since the end of the Cold War, the international community “has 
become increasingly aware of the limitations of the [refugee law] instruments 
and how they do not adequately address many international problems such as 
violence against refugee women”.203 Ultimately, the international refugee law 
instruments are archaic and in urgent need of reform.204  
Generally speaking, no legal system is immune to change. This is also 
true with regard to the international refugee law regime, which has become 
“inadequate in the pursuit of social goals which themselves have also become 
unclear”.205 The problems of the current international and regional protection 
frameworks are numerous and range from an “inadequate refugee definition; 
to a deficient system of obligation; to an apparent lack of capacity or political 
will to evolve”.206 Owing to the inadequacy of the current refugee definition, 
only highly contrived interpretations of the refugee definition can even begin to 
cope with the protection needs of women.207 
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It is the current refugee law regime’s limited and restrictive applicability 
that has resulted in thousands of refugees having been left ‘outside’ or 
‘beyond’ its protection.208 Thus, asylum-seekers become “objects of ad hoc, 
discretionary and extra-legal policies that finally benefit no one”.209 According 
to Arboleda and Hoy, who make the same argument, the refugee definition 
contained in the 1951 Convention is fast becoming “over-legalistic, mired in 
juridical abstraction, removed from the reality facing refugees, and subject to 
the vagaries of national interests”.210 Furthermore, as Goodwin-Gill argues, 
refugee adjudicators and administrations appear “incompetent to combine 
humanitarian policy with effective management of their borders”.211 
Hathaway states that the current refugee law regime “falls short, with 
the focus of rights protection limited to civil and political liberties and with 
definitional and procedural frameworks, which favour attainment of political 
goals at the expense of an even-handed assessment of risk to human 
dignity”.212 Overall, the current refugee law framework has been described as 
unresponsive to the needs of most refugees.213 This is especially true for 
women seeking asylum on the basis of gender-related persecution. The 
stereotype of a person fleeing from the persecution of a political system is no 
longer applicable.214 Because of its Eurocentric and reductionist nature, this 
type of persecution has become both antiquated and insufficient in the 21st 
century.215 As Oloka-Onyango argues, international refugee law, in its current 
form, can ultimately protect only a small number of de facto refugees.216 
Ankenbrand criticises the outmoded liberal rights paradigm from which current 
refugee law emerged and concludes that it “was appropriate for the situation 
of refugees after the Second World War, but fails to protect people fleeing 
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from human rights violations committed by non-state actors”,217 a point that is 
further discussed in chapter 4. Furthermore, as Cipriani observes, most 
refugees today are victims of violence, not of ideological persecution.218 Both 
of these aspects characterise gender-related persecution. Overall, the 1951 
Convention might in its current form offer basic protection. However, in order 
to guarantee true protection, it has to be complemented by other human rights 
instruments and as Goodwin-Gill argues, in due course replaced by an 
instrument appropriate to present and future needs.219 
2 4 2 The universal applicability and neutrality of international law  
With the current refugee regimes in mind, it is important to consider the strong 
traditional universalistic assumption underlying the dominant interpretation of 
both international and regional law. 220  According to this universalistic 
assumption, the international human rights regime, as an example, is 
politically, philosophically and historically universal, free of gender and applies 
across cultures to all humans.221 Overall, legal systems are considered to be 
founded on abstract rationality and are therefore regarded as “universally 
applicable and capable of achieving neutrality and objectivity”. 222  The 
international law regime, in particular, is considered by many not only to be 
impartial and objective but to have ‘universal credibility’.223   
International law is also habitually regarded to be gender-neutral, and 
thus there is a presumption in international jurisprudence that international 
human rights law governing state relations and its relations with individuals 
within states is “universally applicable and neutral”.224 Therefore, according to 
the universalistic approach, there is no need to define the gender dimensions 
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of any human right, as the rights are inherently neutral. 225  The apparent 
neutrality and universality are essential to the credibility of any legal system, 
as the system’s power and the respect accorded to it are fundamentally 
related to its ability to appear neutral and superior to individuals and 
society.226 
Feminists have challenged the traditional view of the legal system as 
inherently universal, neutral and objective. Their critique examines the 
seeming objectivism and formalism of international law in order to 
“destabiliz[e] the frozen versions of social life and human association that 
exclude women’s experiences”.227 This is done by laying bare the way in 
which the structure of international law produces “forms of rationality, 
scientificity, objectivity, and cultural and aesthetic ideals which constitute and 
reinforce the exclusion of women”. 228 According to feminist critique, 
international law, and especially the international human rights discourse, is 
not value-free but greatly influenced by the “hegemonic philosophy and 
assumptions” of its creators, a vast majority of whom are white, Western 
men.229 Consequently, international law reproduces masculine interests and 
values.230 Overall, it has been argued that there is a general overlap between 
the constitution of law and the constitution of masculinity.231  
Furthermore, as Gordon has observed, law in general “functions as a 
system of beliefs that make social, political and economic inequalities appear 
natural”.232 This is an essential observation, as it pierces the veil of objectivity 
and neutrality often associated with international law. 233  The 
acknowledgement of the value-laden nature of the international legal system 
enables the examination of international law representing and reinforcing the 
interests of those in power. As Fredman argues, these interests have always 
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been predominantly male, “not only because the vast majority of law-makers 
have been male, but also because men have dominated over women”.234 
Furthermore, Crawley argues that law as a whole is an “inherently gendered 
system, which serves to reinforce male domination”.235 Ultimately, it is the 
‘male gender’ of international law that skews the discipline.236  
The universalistic assumption has further been proved inaccurate by the 
existence of only a modest body of women’s rights jurisprudence, which is 
“marginalized from the mainstream of human rights [jurisprudence]”. 237 
Nonetheless, the dominant presupposition of the impartiality of international 
and regional law has resulted in there being no acknowledgement that their 
norms impact women and men differently.238 According to some critics, the 
experiences of most women have been comprehensively excluded from 
international law’s very limited concept of what is important to its subject 
matter.239 
With regard to the presupposed equality and universality of the 
international human rights regime, neither human rights theory nor its 
application has successfully demonstrated this assertion.240 As Kim argues, 
within the international human rights’ seemingly ‘neutral framework’, very little 
discussion has been devoted to human rights violations against women. 
Instead, “the laws that pretend to be gender neutral actually reflect male 
norms”.241  
MacKinnon explains the foundations of the apparent gender neutrality 
and universality of international law by means of the ‘difference/equality 
approach’, as discussed in the Introduction. Under this approach, men and 
women are considered ‘different’ but ‘equal’.242 However, MacKinnon argues 
that this approach conceals “the substantive way in which man has become 
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the measure of all things”.243 Accordingly, the ‘difference/equality approach’ 
offers two different paths to equality for women: either ‘being the same as 
men’ (which is also termed ‘gender neutrality’ or ‘single standard’) or ‘being 
different from men’.244 Both of these paths make ‘maleness’ the standard by 
which women are judged.245 In other words, the “equality theory has been 
written out of men’s practice, not women’s”. 246  As Freedman argues, the 
problem with this approach is that the existing values in our male-dominated 
world are accepted without a challenge, which results in women having to 
compete on male terms.247  
Furthermore, the double standard of the ‘difference/equality theory’ has 
enabled men to obtain what women have traditionally had248 without giving 
women “any dignity of the single standard”.249 According to MacKinnon, the 
‘difference/equality approach’ has silenced the abuse that women suffer 
“precisely because such abuse does not usually happen to men”. 250 
MacKinnon also argues that women are transforming the definition of equality 
“not by making ourselves the same as men (...) or by reifying women’s so-
called differences but by insisting that equal citizenship must include what 
women need to be human, including a right not to be sexually violated and 
silenced”.251  In order to do so, there is a need to recast the question of 
equality in terms of a distribution of power,252 rather than focusing on the 
‘difference/equality’ of sexes. This approach would explicitly recognise and 
expose the existing male dominance and female subordination embedded in 
the international legal framework and more precisely in the context of refugee 
protection.253 
 MacKinnon’s ‘difference/equality theory’ is useful to assess the 
construction of the international refugee law framework. Similarly to other 
areas of international law, rather than being neutral and universal, 
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international refugee law was produced using a male perspective and is 
aimed at protecting individuals from what is a predominantly male experience 
of persecution, as discussed further in chapter 3. Owing to the differences in 
persecution as experienced by men and women, the solution that liberal 
feminists support, namely “simply making sure that female refugees are 
treated the same as male refugees”, is an inadequate solution. 254  Even 
though the elimination of legal barriers that women face under the current 
international legal framework is essential, it is not sufficient. The liberal 
feminist approach of ‘formal equality’ ignores the reality of power and social 
structures and of gender domination, and by disregarding these realities it 
“perpetuates and legitimises them”.255  
Overall, “gender cannot be reduced to an afterthought”.256 Bradley is 
correct to argue that there is a need for “a more radical approach, which 
recognizes that standards have been historically ‘gendered’ from the start”.257 
Accordingly, in order to provide true protection to all refugees, the standards 
of the current refugee law framework have to be redesigned to accommodate 
both sexes.258 As Kim states, “any novel human rights theory will require both 
a female and male yardstick to ensure the protection of the human rights of all 
people”.259 
2 4 3 The patriarchal structure of international law  
It has been argued that it is not only the specific content of international law, 
such as the perspectives of international refugee law as presented above, but 
also the general structures of international law that privilege men. 260 
According to Charlesworth et al., “we inhabit a world in which men of all 
nations have used the statist system to establish economic and nationalist 
priorities to serve male elites, while basic human social and economic needs 
are not met”.261 This stance is also supported by Koskenniemi, who argues 
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that the “international legal notion of statehood operates to permanently 
privilege particular voices, and to silence others”.262 These silenced voices 
belong to women, who “form the largest group whose interests remain 
unacknowledged in the structure of the state and its sovereignty”. 263  The 
structure of the state itself is arguably a patriarchal construct as its 
foundations are anchored in the elite’s concentration and control of power, 
from which women strikingly continue to be excluded.264 Power structures in 
governments worldwide are generally masculine, and with a minority amount 
of significant positions being held by women.265  
Overall, as Wright argues, the idea of a ‘state’ is “premised on a 
patriarchal model of state authority in which male leadership is the ‘norm’ as 
well as the overwhelming practice”.266 It is this patriarchal nature of the state 
that has led Clark to adopt a somewhat radical view of the non-existent 
relationship between women and the state. According to Clark: 
 
“[T]here is no relationship between women and the state. This is not to 
say, of course, that women are not affected by the state, that they are 
not held to be bound to obey the state, or even that they derive no rights 
under and within the state. But it is to say that the state, and particularly 
the theory which has been advanced to explain and justify the authority 
of the state, is in a very fundamental sense irrelevant to women”.267 
 
The patriarchal foundation of states is further enforced by international law 
through the legal principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention, political 
independence and territorial independence, and by the legitimation of the use 
of force to defend these principles.268 All things considered, women are either 
unrepresented or underrepresented in both domestic and international 
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decision-making processes. 269  This is a serious concern as, given the 
longstanding masculine domination of all national and international structures 
that exercise political power, “the issues traditionally of concern to men 
become seen as general human rights concerns, while ‘women’s concerns’ 
are relegated to a special, limited category”.270 
Furthermore, the traditional assumption of the neutrality and 
benevolence of the state towards women has been criticised, especially by 
Third World feminists. For instance, according to Coomaraswamy, entrusting 
the state with the responsibility of ensuring women’s rights and viewing the 
state as “active and paternalistic in a benign manner” is highly 
questionable.271 According to Coomaraswamy, “the nation-state in the third 
world does not carry this ‘Scandinavian aura’”.272 Certainly, there are states 
that have been quick to adopt a cultural relativist approach to women’s rights 
and have manipulated “religion and religious codes to undermine international 
norms”.273 For example, in certain states, intimate violence is not recognised 
as a criminal act but rather seen as an acceptable form of social control within 
the family.274 As O’Hare concludes: 
 
“The overall picture is, at best neglect, and at worst complicity on the 
part of the state and the international community for approaching 
intimate violence not as a political and a human rights issue, but as a 
private matter – a social or a cultural practice, sporadic and 
individualistic in nature”.275 
 
This becomes a serious concern in the context of the international doctrine of 
state sovereignty coupled with the principle of non-intervention, which 
ultimately protects the internal activities of states from international scrutiny. 
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The combination of the traditional construction of human rights as regulating 
the public sphere together with the doctrine of state responsibility protecting 
the state from being accountable for the acts of non-state actors “absolve[s] 
the human rights community from responsibility for this form of abuse, thereby 
denying women access to international procedures to bring to account the 
perpetrators of these abuses”. 276  Overall, international legal feminism has 
rejected the presumed ‘neutrality’ of states. According to Charlesworth and 
Chinking: 
 
“[S]tatehood in international law is much more than a formal abstract 
structure. It is committed to a particular version of sexual difference and 
is unable to represent the interests of women”.277 
 
Ultimately, as a result of its exclusive focus on regulating the relations 
and behaviour of states, international law has failed to address the violations 
that affect women the most.278 The structure of international law not only 
reflects the male experience but also guarantees its continued dominance.279 
The on-going discrimination of women under international law is manifested 
both in organisational ways, through “the marginalization or outright exclusion 
of women from political power”, and in normative ways, through the focus on 
the relations between states that ignores the violence committed against 
women by private, non-state actors, who traditionally have not been viewed 
as being subject to international law. 280  The basis for international law’s 
disregard for the private actions of individuals is the mistaken assumption that 
the “impact of international law falls on the state and not directly on 
individuals”. 281  The international law regime has therefore largely resisted 
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feminist analysis,282 which examines the role of the legal system in creating 
and perpetuating the unequal position of women.283  
Overall, the very construction of international law has “made dealing with 
the structural disadvantages of sex and gender difficult”. 284  Consequently, 
women’s experiences under international law have a tendency to be silenced 
or discounted,285 and the discipline ends up constructing women as a class of 
outsiders.286 This exclusion of women in international law is a serious matter, 
because it not only takes the form of neglecting women or leaving them out 
but entails the active marginalisation and domination of women.287 
2 4 4 The public/private dichotomy under international law 
Traditionally, international law has focused on the relations between states or 
between states and individuals
 
rather than the private actions of individuals.288 
As a result, the international legal regime has largely ignored injustices that 
occur in the private realm – the realm in which the activities of women are 
historically centred.289  
Overall, modern international law rests on and reproduces a separation 
between the public and private spheres.290 This dichotomy between the two 
spheres is connected to the inherently androcentric nature and origins of 
international law.291 Especially the Western liberal philosophy has strongly 
influenced the creation of the public/private division in the international law 
regime.292  
The public/private dichotomy under international law defines ‘public’ 
questions as those falling under its realm, while it leaves the issues of ‘private’ 
nature to the domestic jurisdictions of the states. Under international law, the 
international community does not have a recognised legal interest with regard 
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to ‘private’ intra-state issues.293 In addition to the public/private division of 
international/domestic issues, a deeper level of division exists in international 
law with regard to gender. Under this public/private dichotomy, the public 
sphere is dominated by men and regarded as their ‘natural’ sphere, while 
women’s existence is restricted to the private sphere.294 This dichotomy has a 
normative dimension, with the spheres being accorded an uneven value: 
“greater significance is accorded to the public, male world than to the private, 
female world”.295 The privileging of the public sphere as the superior one has 
produced a ‘hierarchy of oppression’, wherein men are subjected to 
oppression from the state, and women are subjected to oppression by men in 
the private sphere.296 This hierarchy notwithstanding, international law has 
refused to recognise the “specificity of female life in the private sphere”.297 
Consequently, it has been argued that international law’s acceptance and 
reproduction of the public/private dichotomy enhances the primacy of the 
male world and supports male dominance.298 Overall, the realities of women’s 
lives “do not fit easily into the categories and concepts of international law”.299 
Clark explains the failure of international law to include women’s realities in 
the ‘reality’ of international law as follows:  
 
“Characterised universally by a set of rules under which men exercise 
illegitimate authority over women (…) The law (...) functions to both 
condone and encourage the exercise of this authority”.300 
 
International law in general has always functioned mainly in the public 
sphere, with direct state intervention in private sphere considered unsuitable. 
Consequently, there has been a failure to acknowledge violence against 
women in the private sphere as political; thus, such violence has been 
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accorded a “different legal significance from violence [in the public sphere]”.301 
As Bunch argues:  
 
“Female subordination runs so deep that it is still viewed as inevitable 
and natural rather than as politically constructed reality, maintained by 
patriarchal interests, ideology and institutions”.302 
 
If violence against women was acknowledged as a part of the structure of the 
universal subordination of women instead of as unconnected and isolated 
behaviour, it could not be labelled simply as a ‘private’ issue.303 Engle has 
made an important remark on the issue by arguing that the language of 
‘private sphere’ is often used as a ‘proxy’ to women.304 These two terms, 
however, are not equivalent and should not be used interchangeably. Instead 
of excluding the private sphere, international law excludes women.305  
It is important not to overlook the fact that besides dominating the public 
sphere, men also dominate the private sphere. 306  Overall, a majority of 
‘private’ issues also have a public dimension, because they are rooted in 
“public systems of oppression, patriarchy or gender international relations”.307 
Accordingly, some feminist legal theorists have argued that the ‘myth of non-
intervention’ is used simply to cover the gendered application of human rights 
law, 308  and the real reason behind the indifference towards the violence 
against women is domination. As Bunch argues: 
 
“Contrary to the argument that violence [against women] is only personal 
or cultural, it is profoundly political. It results from the structural 
relationships of power, domination and privilege between men and 
women in the society. Violence against women is central to the 
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maintenance of those political relations at home, at work and in all public 
spheres”.309  
 
The public/private dichotomy has had a detrimental impact on women, 
as it privileges men disproportionately.310 International human rights law, in 
particular, is guilty of this discrepancy, even though it is seen as “radically 
challeng[ing] the traditional distinction between international and domestic 
concerns”. 311  The international human rights regime largely focuses on 
violations committed and sanctioned by the state and thus leaves violations 
committed by non-state actors in the private sphere out of its jurisdiction.312 
This limited focus has been highly damaging to women, as a majority of 
human rights violations and persecution directed specifically at women have 
no direct link to the state. As MacKinnon argues: 
 
“[T]o act as if [the state is all there is to power] produces an 
exceptionally inadequate definition for human rights when so much of 
the second-class status of women (...) is done by men to women prior to 
express (…) state involvement”.313 
 
This is also true with regard to international and regional refugee law, 
which often deems gender-related persecution to be a ‘private’ issue falling 
outside of its jurisdiction. As Charlesworth notes, “the non-regulation of the 
private realm legitimates self-regulation, which translates ultimately into male 
dominance”.314  Yet, while the basis for public/private dichotomy has been 
exposed as a culturally created ideology, it continues to have a strong 
influence on legal thinking.315 Ultimately, this ideological construct rationalises 
the exclusion of women from the sources of power and makes it possible to 
                                                             
309
 C. Bunch, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of Human Right” 
(1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly 486, 490-491.  
310
 Qureshi (2012) Journal of Political Studies 41. 
311
 Charlesworth  (1993) Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 10. 
312
 10. 
313
 C. MacKinnon, “On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights” in K. Mahoney and 
P. Mahoney (eds) Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A Global Challenge (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993). 
314
 Charlesworth (1993) Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 10-11. 
315
 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright (1991) American Journal of International Law 627. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  69 
maintain repressive systems of control over women without interference from 
human rights guarantees, which operate in the public sphere.316  
The situation is, however, changing with regard to certain areas of 
international law directly impacting individuals, such as human rights law, 
which have been influenced by feminist perspectives.317 However, regardless 
of these developments, the engagement of international law (human rights 
and refugee law) with the gender-related violence faced by women worldwide 
remains minimal. It has been argued that despite the international human 
rights regime’s recent efforts to control the private sphere, it has been 
completely unsuccessful in doing so with regard to matters that specifically 
impact women.318 Despite the empirical evidence of violence against women 
being overwhelming and undisputed, it has not been adequately reflected in 
the development of international law. 319  The international legal order has 
started to evolve, albeit slowly, beyond its white, European origins, but “it has 
never been forced to reflect on its failure to take women seriously”.320 On the 
whole, as long as international law (and along with it, international and 
regional refugee law) maintains and supports the public/private dichotomy, it 
will continue to silence the voices of a majority of women. 
2 4 5 The silence regarding gender under the current refugee law framework 
As Charlesworth argues, the silence of international law is as important as its 
positive rules and rhetorical structures. As Charlesworth states, “permeating 
all stages of the excavation of international law is the silence of women”.321 
This silence is still an “integral part of the structure of the international legal 
order, a critical element of its stability”, as is evident in the discussion about 
the formation and structure of the refugee conventions in sub-chapters 2 2 
and 2 3.322 According to O’Hare, it is the ‘male hegemony’ over public life and 
public institutions that silence women’s voices.323 
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Edwards argues that the exclusion of women from any meaningful 
involvement with the drafting, implementing or enforcing of human rights 
norms (as in the case of the 1951 and 1969 Conventions) has led to the 
creation of a legal system that disregards the “rights, interests, concerns, 
needs and desires of women”.324 Furthermore, according to MacKinnon, “no 
woman has had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the 
social order under which women as well as men live.” 325  Additionally, as 
Kaufman and Lindquist argue, even in the rare situations where women are 
engaged in meaningful participation, they are often socially conditioned to 
accept the “male elite’s norms and interests as their own”, which results in 
women’s lives being treated from a male-centred perspective.326   
One of the revealing signs of the inherent masculinity of the international 
legal system is the language and imagery of the law that highlight its 
maleness. 327  The unrelenting use of gendered language in international 
documents reinforces the exclusion of women.328 As Edwards observes, the 
constant utilisation of masculine language operates to omit women in both 
direct and subtle ways.329  
As an example, despite appearing to be gender-neutral on the surface, 
the language used in the 1951 Convention has been criticised for being 
gender-bias.330 The 1951 Convention, as well as various other international 
treaties, omits women from its text by using only the male pronoun in 
reference to a refugee.331 The exclusive use of the male pronoun creates a 
situation where “a man is sure that he is included; a woman is uncertain”.332 
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Furthermore, with the exception of Article 24 governing refugees and 
labour issues, women’s specific situation is omitted from the 1951 
Convention.333 Similarly, the 1969 Convention is silent on refugee women.334 
Overall, international and regional refugee law, amongst many other 
international human rights law instruments, focuses on the protection of 
‘family’ as the “natural and fundamental group unit of society”. 335  This 
formulation is often used by states as an excuse to “protect the family and 
ignore discriminatory and degrading actions, such as domestic violence, that 
hurt women”.336 
The seeming gender neutrality of the 1951 Convention hides “an 
understanding of persecution, and the grounds upon which it is legally based 
that has been formulated by a distinctly male conception of what constitutes a 
fear of persecution”.337 This stance is supported by Kelly, according to whom 
international refugee law has “developed within a male paradigm which 
reflects the factual circumstances of male applicants, but which does not 
respond to the particular protection needs of women”.338  
The international refugee framework is inherently one-sided with “its 
substance and its practical application neglect[ing] the specific experiences of 
women refugees.”339 As a result, the current framework continues to maintain 
the underlying gender biases.340  According to Kim, the classifications and 
guidelines establishing the law were formulated by men with men in mind.341   
The traditional view of the refugee as male, in combination with the 
narrow and rigid interpretations of what constitutes persecution, “has had the 
effect of denying women their right to international protection”. 342 
Nevertheless, the international community has been reluctant to accept that 
the current refugee law regime is fundamentally gender-biased. According to 
Valji, “the blanket faith in the inherent justice of law to determine neutral 
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outcomes has been the largest obstacle to the acknowledgement of 
[international refugee law’s] exclusionary effect on women”.343  
Furthermore, the situation of female asylum seekers is degenerated by 
the general ‘silencing’ of refugees and the causes of their flight by history. As 
Marfleet argues, recently “policy agendas have focused more and more upon 
management of migration: upon regulating, containment and exclusion. 
Boarder issues, including those requiring historical analysis, have rarely been 
a consideration”.344  The situation has been made worse by the “dominance of 
national frames of reference and a general reluctance to consider the 
circumstances of outsider and Others”.345 This has been particularly true with 
regard to victims of gender-related persecution. 
Yet, in order to change the discriminatory nature of the current refugee 
law regime, simply “adding women [to the current categories of the refugee 
definition] and mixing” is insufficient, as that would only “obscure the fact that 
the [international refugee framework] is gendered in itself”.346 As Charlesworth 
argues: 
 
“The utter failure of the ‘liberal’ international legal system in responding 
to the global phenomenon of oppression of women should (...) make us 
question its foundations. Patriarchy is not a temporary imperfection in 
an otherwise adequate system; it is part of the structure of the system 
and is constantly reinforced by it.”347 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
The specific events of post-WWII Europe and the contemporaneous Cold War 
had a deep impact on the drafting process of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
The drafters focused especially on the plight of the millions of principally male 
refugees following the events of WWII and the Holocaust, as well as on the 
continuing political conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs. As a 
                                                             
343
 Valji (2001) Refuge 26. 
344
 P.  Marfleet, “Refugees and History: Why We Must Address the Past” (2007) 26(2) 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 138. 
345 139. 
346
 Charlesworth (1993) Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 7. 
347
 7. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  73 
consequence, the definition of a ‘refugee’ that emerged at the end of the 
drafting process is heavily based on the male experience of persecution and 
places a disproportionate weight on the protection of civil and political rights. 
This narrow definition poses a particular challenge to women asylum-seekers, 
whose experiences of persecution often fall outside of the current definition 
and who are consequently denied any protection awarded by the international 
refugee regime.  
Additionally, the refugee law framework’s heavy focus on safeguarding 
the receiving states’ sovereignty has caused severe problems for women 
asylum-seekers. The Western states have become increasingly protectionist 
since the collapse of communism and have begun to view refugee procedures 
as a ‘loophole’ in immigration control procedures. This approach can 
increasingly also be located in other parts of the world. 
One of the reasons behind the international refugee law’s 
discriminatory nature against women is its disregard of refugee women’s 
experiences, which have been rendered invisible since the very drafting 
process of the 1951 Convention. During the travaux préparatoires, drafters of 
the 1951 Convention did not deliberately omit gender-related persecution from 
the Convention’s jurisdiction but did not consider gender to be important 
enough to be deliberated during the drafting process. The drafters failed to 
recognise gender as a cause of persecution and ultimately created a 
framework that offers no real protection to victims of gender-related 
persecution. 
Furthermore, the lack of international instruments safeguarding 
women’s rights at the time of drafting the 1951 Convention had a detrimental 
effect on the protection of refugee women. However, despite certain 
developments having taken place in the interpretation of international refugee 
law since the emergence of women’s rights instruments, international refugee 
law still stands in stark contrast to the rest of the international human rights 
framework protecting women. The gap between the protection offered by the 
international refugee law and other human rights law regimes is especially 
disquieting, because refugee law is often the final option to escape serious 
human rights violations and only takes effect when all other methods to 
protect human rights have failed.   
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 The main cause of international law’s failure to protect refugee women 
is its biased and inherently patriarchal nature. Regardless of unprecedented 
changes in the causes of refugee flows, the regime itself has remained 
stagnant and has consequently become obsolete. Owing to the out-dated and 
Eurocentric definition of refugees and persecution, the definition is inadequate 
and incapable of providing protection to modern-day refugee women. Refugee 
regime’s narrow and restrictive interpretation of grounds of persecution 
continues to leave thousands outside or beyond protection. Furthermore, 
despite seeming gender-neutral, the refugee law framework is constructed in 
a manner that prioritises the male experience of persecution and provides 
protection from it.  
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Chapter 3 
The construction of ‘persecution’ under the current refugee law 
framework 
 
3 1 Introduction 
Women are targeted with numerous forms of violence linked to their gender, 
including domestic violence, marital rape, rape during armed conflicts and 
human trafficking. Women are also subjected to diverse cultural practices due 
to their gender such as female genital mutilation (FGM), forced sterilisation, 
forced marriages and honour killings. A further interrelated category of 
gender-related violence takes the form of violent repercussions for breaking 
heavily biased social/religious mores and discriminatory customary and/or 
statutory laws. It is against this backdrop that women’s asylum claims based 
on gender-related persecution take place. 
Despite its brutality and prevalence, gender-related violence clearly 
amounting to persecution is often not recognised as such by domestic courts 
adjudicating asylum claims by women subjected to such oppression. This has 
serious consequences for women seeking asylum, as the concept of 
persecution is essential to the refugee definition under international law and 
therefore is directly linked to the affordance of protection and a right to non-
refoulement.  
The lack of a universal definition of what ‘persecution’ entails in 
combination with the construction of the existing refugee definition, as 
discussed in chapter 2, have led to the exclusion of millions of women from 
the protection that the current refugee law framework profess to offer.348 As 
Freedman argues, the diverse definitions of persecution in different 
jurisdictions have resulted in the strengthening of “gendered inequalities 
already existing in various countries by failing to acknowledge breaches of 
women’s rights and resulting persecutions”.349 Overall, many states continue 
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to resist the recognition of certain forms of gender-related persecution as 
sufficient to fulfil the criteria set out in the refugee definition. According to 
Parekh, this continuing bias is the result of an absence of an appropriate 
framework under which gender-related persecution can be assessed.350 In 
many cases asylum adjudicators fail to treat gender-related persecution with 
the seriousness it deserves and deem it a private or apolitical matter falling 
outside the scope of international and domestic refugee law. Alternatively, 
courts consider gender-related persecution as either something ‘natural’ 
resulting from women’s ‘vulnerability’ or a ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’ practice not 
to be interfered with.351 
Freedman defines gender-related persecution as “persecution which is 
done to women because they are women, but also persecution which is 
carried out for other reasons, but takes a particular form because the victim is 
a woman”. 352  Freedman’s definition widens the scope to include cultural 
practices such as FGM. In contrast the dominant view, as I further present in 
this chapter through the relevant case law, is that in order for violence to 
constitute persecution, it has to contain two elements: Firstly, the violence 
experienced by the asylum-seeker has to be serious enough to amount to 
‘persecution’, and secondly, the claimant’s state of origin has to have been 
unable or unwilling to offer protection to the claimant, as further discussed in 
chapter 4.353  
In this chapter, I examine whether the current interpretation of what 
‘persecution’ constitutes can encompass the unique persecution that women 
face because of their gender. I specifically analyse the gender-bias 
construction of ‘persecution’ as referred to in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 
Convention. The gender bias in the definition of ‘persecution’ is examined 
through an analysis of the dominant understanding of what ‘persecution’ 
entails which, I argue under sub-chapter 3 2 4, is based mostly on male 
experiences. I furthermore examine in sub-chapter 3 2 2 the ill-defined nature 
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of ‘persecution’ as an concept under international refugee law, and whether it 
has had a part to play in the rejection of a large number of gender-related 
persecution cases by domestic courts. Relatedly, I argue that the courts’ 
failure to recognise gender-related persecution is in part caused by the 
normalisation of violence against women that results from the existing 
universal structural violence against women.  Similarly, in sub-chapter 3 4 3, I 
examine the gender bias caused by the primacy that the current international 
refugee law framework accords to protection from civil and political 
persecution. I depart from the assumption that gender-related persecution is 
part of larger pattern of structural violence against women, caused by 
imbalanced and gendered power relations.354 In sub-chapter 3 4 I examine 
the restrictive standpoints that domestic courts have taken towards various 
forms of gender-related persecution, including FGM, rape and sexual 
violence, domestic violence and so-called ‘honour crimes’. In sub-chapter 3 4 
4 I also examine persecution taking the form of severe gender discrimination. 
Additionally, I reflect on a number of issues related to the link between 
gender-based violence and persecution. This discussion is essential to the 
analysis in chapter 4 about the states’ responsibility for violent and 
discriminatory behaviour of non-state actors and the androcentric approach to 
asylum policy.  
 This chapter mainly examines asylum jurisprudence and case law from 
the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, France and 
Israel.355 As discussed in the introduction the selection of these jurisdictions 
was influenced by their developed asylum jurisprudence, their approaches to 
the refugee definition in Article 1 A 2 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 
availability of both primary and secondary sources.  
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3 2 Construction of persecution under international refugee law  
3 2 1 Lack of a non-discrimination clause in the 1951 Convention 
One of the main failures of the international refugee regime has been the lack 
of a non-discrimination clause, including sex and gender, as a basic 
requirement of any international legal instrument. The requirement of non-
discrimination vis-à-vis the protection of human rights has been repeated and 
reinforced by various international human rights instruments, including the UN 
Charter,356 UDHR,357 ICCPR,358 ICESCR359 and very importantly, CEDAW.360  
Even though these instruments recognise and aim to enforce non-
discrimination based on sex/gender, they have not been “interpreted and 
enforced in a manner consistent with the vigorous protection of women that 
they mandate”.361 This is specifically reflected in international refugee law, 
which continues to fail to “target explicitly the more heinous sex-based 
persecution”.362 According to Parekh, rather than being gender-neutral, the 
current refugee definition embedded in the 1951 Convention stresses the 
forms of persecution “suffered by men and virtually ignore[s] forms of 
oppression (...) specific to women”. 363  Overall, notwithstanding certain 
developments with regard to gender-related persecution, 364  the current 
situation of refugee women is worse than ever before. 365  Ultimately, the 
narrow construction of the 1951 Convention of what ‘persecution’ entails 
remains one of the main problems of the current refugee law regime and 
makes it applicable only to a very limited group of asylum-seekers. As 
Goodwin-Gill states: 
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“The 1951 Convention may offer basic protection, but it must now be 
complemented and in due course replaced by an instrument 
appropriate to present and future needs. Founded upon a laudable, if 
highly individualistic conception of persecution, premised upon 
admission and integration, the Convention’s capacity for narrow or 
restrictive interpretation in the highly structured environments of case by 
case adjudication leaves thousands ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ protection”.366  
 
As discussed in chapter 1, the roots of the refugee law regimes’ failure 
to specifically acknowledge gender-related persecution can be found in the 
events surrounding the drafting of the 1951 Convention as well as in the 
attitudes of the drafters. The situation has changed to some extent, however. 
As Marouf argues, the overall understanding of persecution has evolved to 
include certain kinds of gender-related violence, “such as rape, female genital 
mutilation (FGM), and domestic violence”.367 This is evidenced in the gender 
guidelines issued by the UNHCR, including the 1991 Guidelines on the 
protection of refugee women (1991 Guidelines on Protection), 368  the 
Guidelines on prevention and response sexual violence against refugees in 
1995 369 and again in 2003,370 the 2002 Guidelines on international protection 
from gender-related persecution371 and the 2008 UNHCR Handbook for the 
Protection of Women and Girls.372 These guidelines have been supplemented 
by the introduction of national gender guidelines in various states. 373  In 
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domestic guidelines, certain forms of gender-related persecution are 
expressly recognised. Hence the guidelines are an important policy 
mechanism to guarantee that the gender-related and gender-specific aspects 
of asylum claims are properly assessed and taken into account in procedures 
for refugee status determination. 374  Gender guidelines will be further 
discussed in sub-chapter 6 2.  
However, the crux of the matter is that these developments are very 
seldom reflected in judicial practice, as national courts often continue to view 
gender-specific forms of harm through a male-centred lens.375 Furthermore, 
there has not been a uniform incorporation of UNHCR’s gender guidelines 
into domestic policies.376 Where this has been done, the application of the 
gender guidelines has been inconsistent and arbitrary and led to unfair results 
with regard to the recognition of gender-specific persecution.377 As Freedman 
observes, only a small number of states have “officially integrated such 
directives into their legislation on asylum, and even where the directives have 
been transposed into national policies and legislations, they are not always 
adhered to in the asylum decision-making process”.378 This point is further 
analysed in chapter 6.  
Overall, notwithstanding a change in the approach towards persecution 
and violence faced by women and the existence of various UN and national 
gender guidelines, gender-related persecution continues to be regarded as 
less serious than the more traditional forms of persecution. 379  Ultimately, 
despite having an advisory role, the UNHCR has no control over the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the United States Immigration and Nationality Service’s Memorandum on Considerations for 
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women of 1995, the Australian Guidelines 
on Gender Issues for Decision-Makers of 1996, the Norwegian Guidelines for claims based 
on gender-based persecution of 1998, the South African Gender Guidelines for Asylum 
Determination of 1999 (originally drafted by the National Consortium on Refugee Affairs), the 
Swedish Migration Board’s Guidelines for Investigation and Evaluation of the Needs of 
Women for Protection of 2001, and the United Kingdom Immigration Appellate Authority’s 
Asylum Gender Guidelines of 2000 and the Home Office’s Asylum Policy Instructions of 2004 
and 2006. 
374
 Crawley and Lester “Comparative analysis of gender-related persecution in national 
asylum legislation and practice in Europe” UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit para. 
81  
375
 Marouf (2011) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 83. 
376
 Freedman Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate 90. 
377
 Parekh (2012) Journal of Global Ethics 271. 
378
 Freedman  Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate 93. 
379
 Parekh (2012) Journal of Global Ethics 270. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  81 
implementation of its guidelines, or the lack of such action, in the states’ 
domestic jurisdictions.380  
3 2 2 Lack of coherent definition of ‘persecution’ and the effect on gender-
based asylum claims  
The undefined nature of ‘persecution’ allows a “case-by-case determination of 
whether the given conduct constitutes a persecutory act”.381 Consequently, 
states have been left with a wide margin of appreciation concerning the 
interpretation of what constitutes ‘persecution’. According to Luopajärvi, this 
has led to a muddled and inconsistent state practice. 382  Furthermore, as 
Marouf argues, what is required for violence to amount to persecution, under 
the current refugee law framework, is decided on a case-by-case basis, 
without reference to any objective norms or standards, which consequently 
results in considerable discrepancies between the higher-level domestic 
courts and “striking inconsistencies at lower levels of adjudication”.383  
As Haines states, in order to amount to persecution, there must be a 
“risk of a type of harm that would be inconsistent with the basic duty of 
protection owed by a State to its own population”.384 With regard to the level 
of seriousness of the violence required to constitute persecution, Marouf has 
argued that the act has to be “more than mere harassment or discrimination” 
but does not, however, need to amount to torture or life-threatening 
violence.385 Overall, asylum adjudicators have often interpreted ‘persecution’ 
as linked to serious human rights violations.386 This has also been the stance 
of the UNHCR, which has given some guidance on the issue. According to 
paragraph 51 of the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status (UNHCR Handbook on Procedures), “a threat to 
life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
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membership of a particular social group is always persecution”. 387 
Furthermore, “other serious violations of human rights – for the same reasons 
– would also constitute persecution”. 388  The human rights approach is 
supported by Hathaway, who has defined persecution within the human rights 
paradigm as “the sustained or systematic violation of basic human rights 
demonstrative of a failure of State protection”. 389  The application of this 
approach under the international refugee framework is further discussed in 
chapter 4.  
In some situations, the utilisation of the human rights standard to define 
‘persecution’ can be beneficial to women seeking asylum from gender-related 
persecution. This is especially true in situations where the country of origin 
has acceded to human rights instruments specifically prohibiting gender-
based violence and is therefore committed to the implementation of the 
standards.390 Yet, there are some concerns that international human rights 
law itself is not free of gender bias, despite the numerous non-discrimination 
clauses included in these instruments, as discussed above under chapter 2. 
As Charlesworth et al. argue, “[t]he normative structure of international law 
has allowed issues of particular concern to women to be either ignored or 
undermined”.391 Furthermore, as Edwards observes, there is a gulf between 
the aim of international law of being a non-discriminatory and an objective 
regime applicable to all and the marginalisation of women from its domain 
caused by the regime’s inbuilt public/private dichotomy.392 Moreover, it has 
been argued that not all human rights instruments are considered ‘equal’. 
Some international human rights instruments are accorded a lower priority 
                                                             
387
 UNHCR, “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees” para. 51 (1992), 
U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1. 
388
 Para 51. 
389
 Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status 104-105. 
390
 P. Goldberg and B. Cissé, “Gender Issues in Asylum Law after Matter of R-A-” (February 
2000) Immigration Briefings No. 002, 7. 
391
 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright (1991) American Journal of International Law 265. 
392
 A. Edwards, “Age and gender dimensions in international refugee law” in E. Feller, V. Türk, 
and F. Nicholson (eds) Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR”s Global 
Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 48. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  83 
than others.393 This is especially true of the main human rights instrument 
concerned with the protection of women’s right the CEDAW.394  
Consequently, it is questionable whether basing the definition of 
‘persecution’ on the human rights standard would be the optimal solution to 
gender-related persecution. The fundamental problem is that ultimately “the 
yardstick that has been developed for defining and measuring human rights 
has been based on the male as the norm”.395 As a result, the current definition 
of ‘persecution’ under the human rights standard has led to a situation where 
the courts have more willingly accepted the so-called ‘derivative persecution’ 
of women, based on their family relations, than direct persecution of the 
asylum-seeking woman, in which case she has to fit her claim under the 
current criteria of the five persecution grounds.396  Overall, the lack of an 
objective standard of ‘persecution’ has had adverse effects on refugee 
women, and it is “highly problematic in terms of objective assessment of 
individual refugee women’s claims for asylum”.397 As Foster argues:  
 
“[t]he risk of subjectivity is particularly acute in cases involving gender-
related persecution, where decision-makers in many jurisdictions have 
shown a greater propensity to dismiss claims based on the view that 
discrimination against women is justified by culture, religion or social 
norms”.398 
 
3 2 2 Non-physical harm as persecution 
Another significant issue concerning women’s asylum claims is the 
recognition of non-physical harm as persecution. With regard to the 
assessment of non-physical harm as a form of persecution, there is a 
complete lack of guidelines, and the overall situation is unclear. 399  For 
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example, US courts have reached conflicting conclusions: The Ninth Circuit 
has stated that “persecution may be psychological or emotional, as well as 
physical”, 400  while according to the Fourth Circuit ‘persecution’ cannot be 
based on fear of psychological harm alone. 401  As Marouf observes, the 
difficulty of objectively assessing whether or not non-physical harm amounts 
to persecution has resulted in a situation where courts have been inclined to 
shy away from such assessments by merely disregarding the existence of 
non-physical harm in asylum claim cases.402 
Such conduct, however, can have serious consequences on women’s 
asylum claims, as the cumulative effect of non-physical harm is often a strong 
element of gender-related persecution. This is the case, for example, with 
gender-related persecution claims linked to sexual violence such as rape and 
forced sterilisation. In general, the consequences of sexual violence are 
deeply traumatic, and they are even further intensified in cases where the 
patriarchal construction of women’s position places the blame on the victim.403  
Moreover, in certain cases the non-physical harm related to sexual 
violence can lead to further physical harm. This is true, for example, in cases 
where the sexually violated woman is considered to bring ‘shame’ on herself, 
her family and her community and is consequently rejected or, in more 
extreme cases, murdered by the family in order to restore ‘honour’. 404 
Ultimately, the lack of a clear definition of both physical and non-physical 
persecution has resulted in a ‘creeping standard’.405  
 
3 2 3 The primacy accorded to the protection of civil and political rights 
As Hathaway argues, according to the current dominant view of international 
refugee law, the latter: 
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“[O]ught to concern itself with actions which deny human dignity in any 
key way, and that the sustained or systematic denial of core human 
rights is the appropriate standard [for persecution]”.406 
 
The first part of Hathaway’s argument is widely accepted. However, the 
second part, and especially Hathaway’s definition of the ‘core human rights’, 
which he links to the division between derogable and non-derogable human 
rights, has faced sharp criticism.407 According to Hathaway’s definition, civil 
and political rights are the ‘core rights’ and therefore non-derogable. 408 
Hathaway’s definition creates a hierarchy of rights in which economic, social 
and cultural rights are less significant, and consequently their protection is 
less absolutethan the protection of civil and political rights.409  
However, despite the 1993 Vienna Declaration, Hathaway’s definition 
closely corresponds to the reality of the current refugee law framework; the 
strong, inbuilt focus on the primarily male experience of persecution, namely 
the violation of civil and political rights in the public sphere, has exacerbated 
the obstacles faced by gender-related persecution claims. This domination is 
not only limited to legal instruments. As Oloka-Onyango argues, the bias of 
the narrow understanding of human rights, which only includes civil and 
political rights and the “artificial and unsustainable demarcation between the 
public and the private spheres of human existence”, has been “carried over 
into the work of the UNHCR and finds manifestation in the Handbook on 
Procedures”.410  
According to Oloka-Onyango, the distinction made between civil and 
political rights and other human rights in the 1951 Convention was not an 
accident but rather “conforms to both the sexist and ethnocentric perceptions 
that prevail in the formulation of international human rights law”. 411 
Charlesworth and Chinkin, in support of this analysis, argue that the 
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importance given to civil and political rights has not been “generally accorded 
to economic and social rights which affect life in the private sphere, the world 
of women”.412  
However, it is important not to undermine the significance of the 
protection of civil and political rights but to recognise that they are important to 
women and acknowledge that “much of the abuse against women is part of a 
larger socioeconomic web that entraps women, making them vulnerable to 
abuses which cannot be delineated as exclusively political or solely caused by 
states”.413 Ultimately, however, the narrow view of only civil and political rights 
as the ‘core rights’ to be protected can cause serious problems for women’s 
asylum claims, as Krivenko explains: 
 
“This classification creates in the minds of decision makers a hierarchy 
of rights and values attached to them, reinforcing the much criticized 
public/private distinction in human rights law. It also creates an 
impression that civil and political rights are more important to the 
protection to the core of human dignity than economic and social rights. 
This, in turn, places an additional burden on many non-traditional 
claimants, including women”.414 
 
3 2 4 The definition of persecution through the male experience 
In practice, the construction of what ‘persecution’ entails heavily reflects the 
male experience of persecution. Persecution, just like human rights in 
general, is ultimately defined according to “what men fear will happen to them, 
those harms against which they seek guarantees”.415 Women’s experiences, 
on the contrary, have been mostly disregarded. In its 2002 Guidelines on 
Gender-Related Persecution, the UNHCR recognised as much. Paragraph 5 
of its Guidelines acknowledges that “historically, the refugee definition has 
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been interpreted through a framework of male experiences, which has meant 
that many claims of women (...) have gone unrecognised”.416  
Strongly linked to the masculine definition of persecution is the artificial 
dichotomy between ‘public’ and ‘private’ acts that is used to determine which 
type of violence falls under the purview of the international refugee law 
regime. Under the current construction of international refugee law, only 
‘public’ persecution falls under the jurisdiction of the refugee law framework, 
while ‘private’ persecution does not. 
However, rather than debating whether international refugee law 
should protect victims from both private and public acts of persecution, the 
real issue is connected to priorities.417 As Eisler states:  
 
“[T]he issue is whether violations of human rights within the family such 
as genital mutilation, wife beating, and other forms of violence 
designed to maintain patriarchal control should be within the purview of 
human rights theory and action, particularly in social systems where 
women have traditionally been confined to the private or familial 
sphere”.418 
 
The answer to this question is negative under the current framework of 
international refugee law. This is evident from the case law, which shows the 
adjudicators’ reluctance to deal with ‘private’ persecution cases, especially 
those connected to female sexuality and reproduction, while they concentrate 
on the type of violence and harm feared by men.419 Ultimately, in order to 
respond to the universal epidemic of the brutal and systematic violation of 
women, the international refugee law framework must evolve to include 
express protection from persecution related to gender and move beyond its 
male-defined norms.420  
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On the whole, the lack of express recognition of gender-related 
persecution as such trivialises its importance and evidences that it is taken 
less seriously than other forms of persecution based on the existing 
convention grounds.421 As Freedman argues, the lack of express recognition 
of gender-related persecution “adds to the process of ‘invisibilisation’ of 
victims of gender-related persecution”.422 Ultimately, despite developments in 
the recognition of gender-related persecution brought about by the 
introduction of the UNHCR and national gender guidelines, international 
refugee law is still “a long way from an adequate recognition of the specificity 
of women’s experiences of persecution”.423 
 
3 3 Persecution unique to gender 
The lack of supportive objective evidence of gender-related persecution in the 
country of origin further exacerbates the resistance to recognise gender-
related persecution.424  Overall, information relating to women’s status and 
discriminatory social mores is often elusive and not available. 425 
Consequently, courts usually fail to pay attention to the cultural and social 
context of gender based harm as well as to “the nature of patriarchal societies 
and the values that facilitate or condone violence against women”.426 
Gender-specific persecution can be divided into three sub-categories: 
persecution committed in a ‘gender-specific manner for reasons unrelated to 
gender’ (e.g. rape), in a ‘non-gender manner due to gender’ (e.g. honour 
killings) and in a ‘gender-specific manner due to gender’ (e.g. female genital 
mutilation).427 As indicated in the introduction in addition to gender-specific 
persecution, women are also targeted because of their gender and “suffer 
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social harms exclusively because they are women”. 428  This type of 
persecution usually takes the form of discriminatory laws and policies directed 
uniquely at women. 429  Women are persecuted for their transgression of 
cultural, religious and social mores in societies where women have a 
subjugated status.430  
All of these forms of persecution are difficult to fit under the current 
refugee framework, as none of the existing grounds for persecution 
adequately correlates to the claims based on gender-related persecution. The 
consequence of the refugee law regime’s failure to acknowledge and provide 
protection from the widespread and specific persecution faced by women is 
exacerbated by the fact that women refugees are in greater need of protection 
from sexual assault, abuse and institutionalised discrimination than men.431 
The greater need for protection, however, has not been caused by 
characteristic gender differences but rather by “pervasive gender 
discrimination and women’s resulting inferior position in most societies”.432 
Overall, as Wallace argues, due to their position and status in the society, 
women are in fact exposed to “a wider range of human rights abuses than 
their male counterparts”.433 Indeed, it has been universally acknowledged that 
“whatever violations or abuses men fear in an insecure world, women fear 
[them] doubly”.434 
With regard to ‘traditional’ persecution, despite similarities in the 
circumstances and grounds, women experience it differently from men, as 
women’s experiences of political persecution clearly illustrate. Even though 
women experience political persecution, it is often difficult for them to claim 
political asylum. This is because women are predominantly “encouraged to 
take roles subordinate to men and to do the more care-related tasks, rather 
than occupying leadership positions”. 435  Consequently, however, women’s 
‘low-level’ political activities are frequently considered to be non-political, and 
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for that reason their applications for political asylum are denied.436 Overall, 
because of women’s structural situation and subordinate status, they 
experience civil and political persecution, such as racial or religious 
persecution, differently than men do.437  
An example of such a situation would be the strict religious rules 
governing the lives of women in some Muslim countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and northern Nigeria, as will be discussed further in 
sub-chapter 3 4 4. As Parkeh argues, despite the punishment for breaking 
these religious rules taking a violent form, it is not considered to be religious 
persecution.438 This is because of the normalisation of both discriminatory 
religious rules and violence against women. According to Parkeh, this is 
because in “the paradigmatic male model, religious persecution tends to be 
seen as the inability to practice your religion because of state-sponsored 
policies – not being forced, under threat of physical punishment, to practice it 
in a certain way because of your gender”.439 Consequently, even with regard 
to the ‘conventional’ civil and political persecution, women are forced to fit 
their experiences into the dominant male standard of what civil and political 
persecution entails. 
Overall, with regard to any type of persecution, women experience a 
‘gender multiplied’ form of it. What this means is that both social and 
biological factors cause women to suffer more than their male counterparts 
would from specific acts of violence, and according to Walker, these factors 
render women vulnerable to further harms.440 This was also acknowledged by 
the ECOSOC in March 2013 at the 57th Session of the Commission on the 
Status of Women (CSW), where the CSW noted that “women and girls who 
face multiple forms of discrimination are exposed to increased risk of 
violence”.441 Ultimately, as Walker argues, due to ‘gender multiplication’, the 
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original violation experienced by women is “extended, ramified and 
augmented in multiple ways that significantly alter the women’s physical 
safety and well-being, social reintegration and status, economic survival, and 
eligibility for marriage”.442  
 
3 4 Defining gender-related persecution 
While analysing gender-related persecution, it is important to differentiate 
gender-related persecution from ‘conventional’ persecution and to state 
clearly that not all violence, discrimination and harm done to women constitute 
gender-related persecution “simply because it is done to women”.443 Rather, 
gender-related persecution is a different type of persecution, in which the form 
of the persecution, the motivation behind it or both are gendered.444 
One of the main problems that victims of gender-related persecution 
face is that courts, as is exemplified in the case law discussed under 3 4 2, 
often do not take this type of persecution seriously, nor do they consider it to 
be ‘real’ persecution. Universal, deep-rooted structural injustice underlies this 
dismissive attitude and the normalisation and trivialisation of the violence that 
women face.  
According to Parekh’s definition, structural injustice can be understood 
as “the kind of everyday injustice, harm, and violence that women in all parts 
of the world experience in various ways”.445 Furthermore, Young has argued 
that there is structural injustice:  
 
“[w]hen social processes put large groups of persons under systematic 
threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable 
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others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing 
and exercising capacities available to them”.446 
 
Yet, structural injustice itself is not persecution but rather forms the context 
that ultimately “prevents gender-related persecution and human rights 
violations from being seen as such”. 447  It is because of the underlying 
structural injustice that violence against women has become normative in 
most modern societies. As Walker argues, because of structural injustice, “it is 
both normal and in accordance with established social ‘rules’ that women are 
both unequal to men and dominated by men socially, economically, and 
civilly, at least within social levels”.448 As a consequence of structural injustice, 
men’s domination over women is usually expected and accepted in various 
areas of life. 449  According to Walker, male domination is explained and 
legitimised through social, religious and cultural norms and is represented as 
“proper, divinely ordained, socially functional, natural, inevitable, innate or 
biologically determined or predisposed”. 450  The widespread existence of 
structural violence against women and its impact on the regularity of gender-
related persecution has been acknowledged by the CEDAW Committee in the 
General Recommendation 19 on the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (General Recommendation 19). 
According to the CEDAW Committee: 
 
“Traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to 
men or as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices 
involving violence or coercion, such as family violence and abuse, 
forced marriage, dowry deaths, acid attacks and female circumcision. 
Such prejudices and practices may justify gender based violence as a 
form of protection and control of women”.451 
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On the whole, universal structural violence against women is a strong 
factor in the widespread disregard of gender-related persecution. As 
Freedman argues, rather than being separate from each other, violence 
against women and gender-related persecution form part of a more universal 
continuum of violence against women that is structured by “gendered and 
racialised relations of power”.452 Gender-related persecution exists because of 
these gendered power relations and is not simply “a result of individual acts of 
violence or ‘private matters’ but part of larger structures and ideologies within 
which women have unequal shares of political, economic and social 
power”.453 
Ultimately, the normative sexism found in most modern societies, as 
created by the structural injustice against women makes it difficult “for both 
men and women to ‘see’ violence against women as (...) a gross human rights 
violation worthy of the term ‘persecution’”.454 With regard to isolated incidents 
of violence against women, despite seeming brutal, they do not seem serious 
enough to amount to persecution. It is only when the violence is perceived 
“within the framework of ‘everyday’ structural and normative violence and 
injustice” that the true nature of the violence as gender-related persecution 
becomes clear.455  
 Additionally, structural violence causes the ‘double victimisation’ of 
women targeted with gender-related persecution. As Parekh argues, due to 
the normalisation of violence against them, women are not only harmed by 
the actual perpetrator of the persecution but further victimised by “the state 
and society that are supposed to enforce the rules, norms, and law that are 
meant to protect them”.456 
According to Crawley and Lester, UNHCR has made limited progress 
since 1985, when the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme first acknowledged that “women asylum seekers who face harsh 
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or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social mores of the 
society in which they live may be considered as a ‘particular social group’ 
within the meaning of Article 1A(2)”.457 Despite this acknowledgement, the 
Executive Committee never gave its full support to the recognition of this form 
of persecution by stating that it was up to the states’ discretion in the exercise 
of their sovereignty whether or not to do so.458 As Oloka-Onyang observes, 
the Executive Committee’s message was clear: “granting asylum on the basis 
of sexual persecution is permissive (...) states are under no affirmative 
obligation to take gender into account in the grant of asylum, even if it may be 
precisely the issue of one’s womanhood that has caused flight in the first 
instance”.459 
  In 2002 a further development took place when the UNHCR recognised 
the advancements made under international law with regard to gender-related 
persecution. According to paragraph 9 of the UNHCR’s Guidelines on 
Gender-Related Persecution of 2002, “[i]nternational human rights law and 
international criminal law clearly identify certain acts as violations of these 
laws, such as sexual violence, and support their characterisation as serious 
abuses, amounting to persecution”.460 This recognition was important, as the 
conceptual foundation for the recognition of gender-related persecution was to 
be found in the international human rights instruments.461  
Furthermore, in 2002 UNHCR expressly recognised that “[t]here is no 
doubt that rape and other forms of gender-related violence, such as dowry-
related violence, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, and trafficking, 
are acts which inflict severe pain and suffering – both mental and physical – 
and which have been used as forms of persecution, whether perpetrated by 
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State or private actors”.462 The European Council has similarly recognised 
that ‘acts of persecution’ can take the form of sexual violence.463  
Regardless of the fact that gender-related persecution takes various 
forms, there is one common denominator amongst them all: women are 
discriminated against and abused on the basis of their gender. This is 
demonstrated in case law, which has recognised a wide range of valid claims, 
including sexual violence, domestic violence, punishment and discrimination 
for transgression of social mores, sexual orientation, female genital mutilation 
and trafficking as forms of persecution.464 As Macklin argues: 
 
“Gender may explain why a woman was persecuted. Gender may also 
determine the form that persecution takes. Sometimes, it may even be 
a risk factor that makes a woman’s fear of persecution more well-
founded than that of a man in similar circumstances”.465 
 
Yet, it is important to make a distinction between women being 
persecuted as women and because they are women. Despite one or more of 
the links between gender and persecution being present simultaneously in a 
gender-related persecution case, “they are not synonymous (...) [t]he idea of 
women being persecuted as women is not the same as being persecuted 
because they are women”.466 Macklin further explains: 
 
“Understanding the ways in which women are violated as women is 
critical to naming as persecution things that are done only or mostly to 
women and not to men. To say that the claimant fears persecution 
because she is a woman addresses a causal relation between gender 
and persecution”.467 
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3 4 1 FGM 
Types of persecution falling under the gender-specific persecution for reasons 
related to gender-category are gendered in both motive and form. This type of 
persecution can only be inflicted on women, and it is perpetrated because of 
the victim’s gender, such as in the case of FGM.  
FGM has been described as representing “one of the most extreme 
ways in which women are subordinated by men” and has been labelled as 
“sufficiently horrifying to make men and women question practices which 
women endure in the name of culture and tradition”. 468  In 2002 UNHCR 
expressly recognised FGM as a ‘serious harm’ capable of amounting to 
persecution in Article 9 of the Guidelines on International Protection from 
Gender-related Persecution. 469  UNHCR re-iterated this stance in 2009 in 
paragraph 7 of the Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Female 
Genital Mutilation.470 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a growing trend 
towards recognition of fear of FGM as a legitimate ground for persecution. In 
1991, following the case of Mlle Aminata Diop,471 France became the first 
country in the world to recognise that FGM could constitute persecution in 
situations where a woman is forced to undergo FGM against her will, and the 
practice is officially approved, encouraged or tolerated.472 The Commission 
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des recours des réfugiés (CRR) reaffirmed this view in 2001 in the case of 
Mlle Kinda473 in which the CRR found that:  
 
“[W]omen in Somalia who refused to submit their daughters to FGM 
risked their daughters’ forced inﬁbulation, as well as persecution with 
the consent of the general population and of the factions which ruled 
the country without it being possible for them to claim the protection of 
a legally constituted public authority”.474  
 
In 1994 the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) granted 
asylum on the basis of FGM in the case of Khadra Hassan Farah, Mahad 
Dahir Buraleh and Hodan Dahir Buraleh475 and described the practice as a 
“torturous custom”.476 According to the IRB, “[i]t is by reason of the fact that 
she is a female and a minor that the claimant fears persecution in the form of 
female genital mutilation in Somalia today”.477 
In Australia, it has also been acknowledged that FGM amounts to 
persecution. In 1997 in the case of RRT N97/19046, 478  the Australian 
Refugee Review Tribunal found that a well-founded fear of FGM practised by 
the Yomba Tribe amounted to gender-related persecution on the basis of 
membership of a particular social group of “Yomba women in Nigeria”. The 
tribunal concluded “that the Yoruba practice of female circumcision is the 
infliction of serious harm with a view to the repression or extirpation of a 
quality in females which is perceived to be dangerous to the existing order of 
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Yoruba society”, while expressly finding that “female genital mutilation 
amounts to persecution”.479  
FGM has also been recognised as a form of persecution in the United 
Kingdom, firstly in the cases of Yake v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 480  in 2000 and P and M v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department481 in 2004, and again in 2006 in the leading House of Lords case 
Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department.482 In Fornah, Baroness 
Hale of Richmond found that FGM “is a human rights issue, not only because 
of the unequal treatment of men and women, but also because the procedure 
will almost inevitably amount either to torture or to other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment”. 483  Lord Bingham supported this view and 
acknowledged the manner in which “FGM powerfully reinforces and 
expresses the inferior status of women as compared with men in Sierra 
Leonean society”. 484  Lord Brown also recognised the link between the 
gendered relations and FGM by stating that “all Sierra Leonean women suffer 
discrimination and subjugation of which the practice of FGM constitutes 
merely an extreme and ghastly manifestation”.485 
Similarly, in 1996 in the landmark case of In re Fauziya Kasinga,486 the 
United States’ Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recognised FGM as a form 
of persecution and as a basis for a successful asylum claim. According to the 
BIA, “the practice of female genital mutilation, which results in permanent 
disfiguration and poses a risk of serious, potentially life-threatening 
complications, can be the basis for a claim of persecution”.487 Furthermore, 
the BIA took the significant approach of including gender as an attribute of the 
1951 Convention’s ‘particular social group’ ground, albeit in a very limited and 
specific manner that was only applicable to the claimant’s situation. According 
to the BIA, “[y]oung women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe 
of northern Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as 
                                                             
479
 N97/19046 [1997] RRTA 4090 (16 October 1997). 
480
 19 January 2000, unreported. 
481
 [2004] EWCA Civ 1640. 
482
 [2006] UKHL 46. 
483
 Para. 94. 
484
 Para. 7. 
485
 Para. 119. 
486
 In re Fauziya Kasinga, 211. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). 
487
 357. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  99 
practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice, are recognized as 
members of a ‘particular social group’ within the definition of the term 
‘refugee’”.488  
Overall, since the Kasinga case, developments with regard to the 
acceptance of FGM as a basis for an asylum claim have been encouraging in 
the United States. The BIA and the circuit courts have adjudicated further 
asylum cases based on FGM, which has resulted in the expansion of the 
“groundwork laid in Kasinga to offer broader protection to women persecuted 
by FGM”.489  
Still, despite the progress made, a worrying fact is the emphasis placed 
on the severity of FGM required for it to amount to persecution. Disagreement 
has developed between the various circuit courts in the US on whether all 
forms of FGM constitute persecution or recognition is limited only to the most 
severe forms of the practice.490 The BIA’s position on FGM as a form of 
persecution also remains unclear. As Marouf observes, given that “all of the 
BIA’s published cases on FGM involve more extreme forms of FGM and that 
the BIA emphasizes the atrocious nature of the harm in those cases, it 
remains unclear how the BIA will treat cases of Type I FGM491“ (the least 
severe form of FGM).492 For example, in 2008 in the case of In re S-A-K- and 
H-A-H-,493 the BIA granted asylum on humanitarian grounds to the applicants 
while emphasising that the persecution in the case had taken the form of FGM 
with aggravated circumstances. As Marouf argues, BIA’s decision in In re S-
A-K- and H-A-H- suggests that “less extreme facts may not constitute ‘severe’ 
past persecution meriting a humanitarian grant of asylum”. 494  Overall, the 
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circuit court and BIA judgments reveal that immigration judges are not 
consistently treating the different forms of FGM as persecution.495  
However, notwithstanding the brutality of the practice and its growing 
recognition as a form of persecution, FGM still continues to be avoided by 
adjudicators.496 Overall, there is only a small number of successful asylum 
cases based on the fear of FGM, and the obstacles to obtaining protection for 
women fleeing FGM remain considerable. 497  These obstacles are mainly 
linked to the “broader debates and concerns about the purpose of asylum”, 
which often become particularly evident in ‘cultural’ persecution cases such as 
FGM.498  
In many cases, courts have been reluctant to acknowledge FGM as an 
express form of persecution because of concerns about cultural imperialism. 
Some courts have cited ‘cultural imperialism’ as the ground to “justify the 
failure to offer protection to women fleeing from harmful practices which are 
deemed to be ‘cultural’”.499 As Crawley argues, in these cases “the existence 
of other normative frameworks is used to undermine the principle of universal 
human rights”.500 However, the cultural relativism that is strongly evident in 
these cases leads to deeply flawed outcomes, especially when the main 
purpose of the international human rights law framework is taken into 
consideration.   
The most important reason for the recognition of FGM as a form of 
persecution and as a fundamental violation of women’s human rights lies in 
the fact that it is directly connected to the ‘philosophical core’ of all 
international human rights law: “the universal protection of individual 
autonomy”.501  
A cultural relativist standpoint was rejected by the US Immigration 
Court in the case of In re U-S-,502 in which the court granted asylum to an 
applicant who had undergone forced FGM. Furthermore, the court rejected 
                                                             
495
 99. 
496
 Crawley Refugees and Gender: Law and Process 180. 
497
 182-3. 
498
 183. 
499
 183. 
500
 183. 
501
 184. 
502
 Matter of U-S, redacted (Anchorage, AK, Immigration Court, 19 December 1996) 
<http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/law/detail.php> accessed 23 April 2013. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  101 
the INS’s arguments that the case should be rejected on policy grounds since 
such a finding would open the floodgates to refugees or would require 
granting asylum to circumcised males. With regard to the issue of the cultural 
dimension of persecution such as FGM, the immigration judge took a bold 
stance. According to the judge: 
 
“[I]n evaluation of long standing cultural traditions that have existed for 
hundreds if not thousands of year, we are on a slippery slope trying to, 
in effect, make determinations based on our standard of values. 
However, concerns about offending those who, in the words of INS, 
feel that “they are simply performing an important cultural rite that 
bonds the individual to society” cannot override statutory enactments 
and obligations”.503 
 
3 4 2 Rape and other sexual violence 
The trivialisation of sexual violence against women is present in all countries 
and societies. Generally, rape and sexual violence are considered as a part of 
universal relations between men and women.504 The normalisation of sexual 
violence is especially common with regard to sexual violence taking place 
during conflict. According to Enloe, widespread rape, especially during 
conflict, often loses its distinctiveness.505  
Freedman has challenged the normalisation of sexual violence during 
armed conflict and argued that “[r]ape in wartime should not be seen as a 
mere ‘by-product’ of generalised violence, but as a specific consequence of 
gendered, racialised and nationalist construction of gender and ethnical 
relations”. 506  Rather than being a ‘private’ act, rape and sexual violence 
committed during armed conflict are often highly politically motivated, with 
rape used as means of dehumanising women and denying them their 
femininity as part of a larger strategy to “undermine the ‘enemy’ and to 
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reinforce the power of state or opposing forces”. 507  The normalisation of 
sexual violence also takes place in the assessment of gender-related 
persecution applications and can even be described as a common 
occurrence. For example, according to Ankenbrand, despite rape and sexual 
violence being one of the least controversial examples of persecution, 
widespread rape has been dismissed by German asylum courts as the 
“common fate of women caught in a war zone” and has not been recognised 
as persecution.508  
Rape and sexual violence are common forms of gender-specific 
persecution. Unlike the courts’ usual construction of rape as a common crime 
triggered by the perpetrator’s individual motives, rape is “an exercise of power 
of women” that aims to inflict pain and humiliation and is often used for 
strategic purposes, especially in conflict situations.509 Rape is also often used 
as a form of retribution against the victim’s relatives or community, where the 
victim is punished for an imputed political opinion.510  
However, despite being one of the least controversial examples511, 
rape has often been disregarded as a form of persecution and is frequently 
treated in a manner that downplays its gravity. According to Crawley, “the 
interpretation of sexual violence against women has often differed 
substantially from the interpretation of other forms of serious harm, including 
sexual violence experienced by men”.512 Overall, as Macklin argues, some 
adjudicators have “proven unable to grasp the nature of rape by state actors 
as an integral and tactical part of the arsenal of weapons deployed to 
brutalize, dehumanize, and humiliate women and demoralize their kin and 
community”.513 This is evident, for example, in case law from the US where 
the courts have ignored rape by claiming that it is not serious enough to 
amount to persecution.  
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In Lazo-Majano v INS, 514  the asylum claimant was subjected to 
repeated and continuous rape, as well as brutal physical and psychological 
violence, by a sergeant of the Salvadorian army, since her husband, a 
member of a right-wing paramilitary group, had fled El Salvador for political 
reasons. Owing to the persecutor’s links with the armed forces and other 
authorities, the claimant was unable to seek protection from her country of 
origin. Ultimately, the claimant fled El Salvador and applied for asylum in the 
United States.  
Despite the violence faced by the asylum-seeker amounting to 
persecution, BIA held that, while it was not “unsympathetic with this 
deplorable situation (...) the fact remains that such strictly personal actions do 
not constitute persecution within the meaning of the Act”.515 On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overruled the BIA’s decision. Yet, the 
judgment was not unanimous, and Judge Poole supported the BIA’s previous 
decision by stating that despite the claimant probably having “suffered 
emotional and physical abuse in the course of her personal relationship with 
Sergeant Zuniga (...) such mistreatment is clearly personal in nature and does 
not constitute political persecution within the meaning of the immigration 
laws”.516 
Similarly, in Campos-Guardado v INS 517  the claimant was denied 
asylum by the immigration judge and BIA. She had witnessed the torture and 
murder of her male relatives involved in controversial land reform in El 
Salvador before being brutally raped by guerrillas shouting political slogans. 
On appeal, rather than acknowledging the persecution experienced by the 
claimant as such, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit defined the 
violence perpetrated as “the random expression of spontaneous sexual 
impulses by an individual military officer toward a woman, who happened to 
                                                             
514
 Olimpia Lazo-Majano v Immigration and Naturalization Service, A 24 345 083, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 9 June 1987. 
515
 Para. 8 
516
 Para. 25. 
517
 Sofia Campos-Guardado v Immigration and Naturalization Service, 809 F.2d 285, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 9 March 1987. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  104 
be captured while in the company of an uncle suspected of subversive 
political activities - in other words, a common crime”.518  
Furthermore, in certain jurisdictions women can end up being held 
responsible for the sexual violence committed against them. For example, in 
accordance with some interpretations of Islamic sharia law, the concept of 
zina requires “four male witnesses to support a woman’s claim of rape; 
otherwise a woman may find herself accused of adultery”, for which the 
punishment is physical violence or even death.519 As Collier argues, violence 
often “targets a woman’s sexuality, which is socially and politically controlled 
through society”.520 Consequently, sexual violence is often directly linked to 
the deep humiliation of the victim, caused with the aim to control and subvert 
the shamed woman more easily. 521  This is a “very deliberate strategy to 
punish and control, constituting the political use of sexuality in the service of 
repression”.522  
Generally, gender-specific persecution for reasons unrelated to gender, 
such as rape, continues to be a grossly neglected form of persecution 
affecting women. Rape and sexual violence continue to be used as methods 
of persecution against women, especially in an armed conflict, during which 
members of the armed forces often perpetrate mass rape with impunity.523  
Already in its 1991 Guidelines, UNHCR acknowledged the 
normalisation of sexual violence. Paragraph 56 recognises the trivialisation of 
sexual violence faced by women and states that “[e]ven victims of rape by 
military forces face difficulties in obtaining refugee status when the 
adjudicators of their refugee claim view such attacks as a ‘normal’ part of 
warfare”.524 
Overall, rape is often viewed as a sexual act rather than as an act of 
violence, and the rapist, even in cases where the rapist is a government 
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official, is seen as “acting from personal motivation”. 525  In many asylum 
application cases, “the sexual nature of the harm (...) serve[s] to personalise 
the event in the eyes of the adjudicator”.526 Ian McDonald QC has summed up 
the deep-rooted bias underlying the lack of recognition of gender-specific 
persecution by arguing: 
 
“If you don’t recognise that rape can be part of deliberate persecution, 
then there is an inbuilt bias against the persecution that women face 
(...) After all, if a man was beaten unconscious during interrogation, it 
would be seen as part of the political persecution he suffered – but if a 
woman is raped, it is seen as a separate problem (...) If you can 
sideline certain abus[ive] acts by saying those acts are just gratuitous 
lust, you can exclude large numbers of persecuted women from 
seeking asylum”.527 
 
The trivialisation of sexual violence against women has also led to the 
worrying phenomenon of an increased level of harm being required. 
According to Marouf, especially in the US, there is a tendency to apply a 
higher standard for physical harm related to women’s sexual and reproductive 
functions than for other types of persecution. 528  With regard to FGM, for 
example, “instead of comparing the harm at issue to an objective standard for 
persecution, [the adjudicators] compare it to the most extreme form of the 
relevant cultural practice”.529  
To explain this phenomenon, Marouf used the theory of ‘anchoring’, 
which has been described as the “tendency of judgments to be anchored in 
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initially presented values”.530 Consequently, when the ‘anchor’ is an extreme 
example of a category, it is “less likely that another related event is judged to 
fall within the same category. 531  For example, with regard to FGM, the 
landmark case of Kasinga has served as an anchor for assessing persecution 
in subsequent FGM cases. 532  However, since Kasinga involved the most 
extreme form of FGM, the result is that the courts will require increased 
severity of harm for subsequent FGM cases to be acknowledged as a form of 
persecution.533  
Similarly, with regard to cases that involve the recognition of sexual 
violence, specifically the involuntary insertion of an IUD (birth control device), 
as a form of gender-related persecution, US courts have required ‘aggravated 
circumstances’. For example, in Zheng v Gonzales, the BIA found that the 
“involuntary insertion of an IUD, unaccompanied by any ‘significant degree of 
pain or restriction’ did not constitute persecution”.534 Again in 2008 in In re M-
F-W- & L-G-,535 the BIA stated that “while having an IUD inserted involuntarily 
is certainly intrusive and hinders a person’s ability to control procreation, the 
temporary nature of its effects persuades us that such a procedure does not 
constitute persecution per se”.536  
Furthermore, with regard to domestic violence, it seems that the courts 
require either the violence to be extreme or to be combined with another form 
of severe gender-related harm in order to amount to persecution. As Mullally 
observes, there is evidence in asylum jurisprudence of repeated reference 
being made to “severe forms of domestic violence as persecution or to 
recognition of domestic violence as amounting to persecution [only] when 
combined with other more ‘exotic’ claims, such as female genital mutilation or 
forced marriage”.537 As an example the reluctance to grant and asylum to the 
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applicant, In re of R-A-538 exposes the “continuing requirement of a very high 
threshold of suffering, below which a failure of State protection can be 
tolerated”.539 
These decisions have been heavily criticised by Marouf, according to 
whom the BIA’s requirement of significant pain, bodily injury or aggravating 
circumstances for harm to amount to persecution “deviates from the general 
understanding of the term”. 540  Furthermore, by requiring ‘aggravated 
circumstances’, the BIA disregards and minimises the “involuntary nature of 
the procedure and the way that lack of consent prevents women from making 
their own decisions about their sexual and reproductive functions”.541 In so 
doing, the BIA ignores another important aspect of the harm experienced by 
women, namely the deprivation of the freedom to make reproductive 
choices.542 Generally, as Marouf argues, these decisions “both raised the bar 
for the level of physical harm required to establish persecution and failed to 
analyze nonphysical forms of harm”.543 Overall, adjudicators are cautious to 
acknowledge sexual and reproductive harm as forms of persecution, 
especially as they are “widespread and when even more extreme forms of the 
harm exist in the world”.544  
The normalisation of sexual violence is also evident in US asylum 
jurisprudence. 545  According to McLaughlin, whenever the persecution 
contains a sexual element there is a tendency on the part of immigration 
judges to reduce political oppression to the personal level. 546  As Macklin 
argues, some of the US asylum adjudicators have been “unable to grasp the 
nature of rape by state actors as an integral and tactical part of the arsenal of 
weapons deployed to brutalize, dehumanize, and humiliate women and 
demoralize their kin and community”.547  
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3 4 3 Domestic violence and ‘honour crimes’ 
Persecution falling under this category is gendered not in its form but in its 
motivation. This type of violence is perpetrated by the immediate family, 
community and the state. An example of this type of persecution is domestic 
violence, which often takes place in the ‘private’ sphere of the domestic 
setting. In these cases, the actual persecution is committed by a private 
person, such as a husband, but the resulting harm is often exacerbated by the 
lack of effective state protection caused by systemic discrimination against 
women, which results from cultural norms and practices.  
Domestic violence is one of the most widespread forms of violence 
against women, 548  as one out of three women are beaten, coerced or 
otherwise abused in her lifetime by a family member or someone known to 
her.549 In March 2013, the CWS recognised that “domestic violence remains 
the most prevalent form [of violence against women] that affects women of all 
social strata across the world”.550 Furthermore, according to the Council of 
Europe, “domestic violence is the major cause of death and disability for 
women aged 16 to 44 and accounts for more death and ill-health than cancer 
or traffic accidents”.551 As with other forms of gender-related persecution, the 
causes for domestic violence are strongly linked to the global culture of 
inequality and discrimination against women. As Freedman argues, domestic 
violence:  
 
“[…] forms part of the continuum of violence structured by unequal 
relations of power between men and women and by dominant 
constructions of masculinity and femininity. The reasons why men 
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commit violence against women and the reasons why this violence is 
frequently dismissed by police and other official institutions are linked 
to the way in which proper or normal behaviours for men and women 
are constructed and represented”.552     
 
The impact of states’ tolerance of gender-related killings and the 
consequential impunity has been noted by the UN Secretary General.  
According to the Secretary-General’s report: 
 
“Impunity for violence against women compounds the effects of such 
violence as a mechanism of control. When the State fails to hold the 
perpetrators accountable, impunity not only intensifies the 
subordination and powerlessness of the targets of violence, but also 
sends a message to society that male violence against women is both 
acceptable and inevitable. As a result, patterns of violent behaviour are 
normalized”.553 
 
In the past few decades there have been considerable developments in 
the understanding of this type of gender-based violence as a human rights 
violation under international human rights law. These developments began 
with the creation of CEDAW in 1979 and have subsequently been 
strengthened by the CEDAW Committee General Recommendations and the 
jurisprudence that has emerged under the CEDAW Optional Protocol.554 For 
example, in its General Recommendation No 19 of 1992, the CEDAW 
Committee declared that “family violence is one of the most insidious forms of 
violence against women” 555  and, among other forms of gender-based 
violence, it “seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on 
a basis of equality with men”.556 The committee went further to assert that 
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state responsibility extended to private acts where they “fail to act with due 
diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of 
violence”.557 The committee reiterated its stance on violence taking place in 
the family sphere in its General Recommendation No 21 of 1994, in which the 
committee again stated that women have the right to be free of gender-based 
violence in both public and family life.558  
Other international human rights instruments and institutions have also 
contributed to the development of the approach towards domestic violence 
under international human rights law. For example, in 2008 the Committee 
Against Torture in its General Recommendation No 2 expressly stated that 
domestic violence may constitute torture or ill treatment under CAT and 
further recognised states’ obligation to exercise due diligence to intervene, 
stop, sanction and provide remedies to victims of gender-based violence.559  
Developments with regard to denunciation of domestic violence have 
also taken place under regional human rights instruments and bodies. For 
example, in 2000 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) found 
in Maria Da Penha v Brazil560 that the states’ failure to exercise “due diligence 
to prevent and investigate a domestic violence complaint, violated the 
applicant’s rights under the American Convention on Human Rights, the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the 1994 Inter-
American Convention on The Prevention, Punishment And Eradication of 
Violence Against Women also known as the Convention of Belém do Pará”.561  
Furthermore, in the landmark case Caso González y Otras (‘Campo 
Algodonero’) v México,562 IACtHR found that Mexico had violated the 1978 
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American Convention of Human Rights563 as well as the 1994 Convention of 
Belém do Pará564. This case concerned the disappearance and death of three 
women, whose bodies were later found on a property known as ‘Campo 
Algodonero’ in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. In its milestone judgment, IACtHR 
expressly recognised for the first time the affirmative obligations of the state to 
respond to violence against women by private actors.565 Furthermore, this 
was the first time that the court had examined “cases at issue in the context of 
mass violence against women and structural discrimination” and “found that 
gender-based violence can constitute gender discrimination”.566 
Similarly, ECtHR has explicitly addressed states’ obligations with 
regard to domestic violence. In the 2010 case of N v Sweden,567 the applicant, 
an Afghan woman, argued that she would face persecution or even be killed if 
she were returned to Afghanistan following her separation from her husband 
and her extramarital relationship. By seeking separation, “she had broken with 
Afghan traditions, which meant that she risked serious persecution if forced to 
return to her home country”.568 In its judgment, the court acknowledged that 
“women are at particular risk of ill-treatment in Afghanistan if perceived as not 
conforming to the gender roles ascribed to them by society, tradition and even 
the legal system”.569  The court also acknowledged the deeper connection 
between gender inequality and domestic violence:  
 
“[A]uthorities see violence against women as legitimate, so they do not 
prosecute in such cases. In the vast majority of cases women will not 
seek help because of their fears of police abuse or corruption, or their 
fears of retaliation by perpetrators of violence. Low social status and 
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social stigmas deter women from going against their families to pursue 
justice, particularly in cases of domestic abuse”.570 
 
The court concluded that the “general risk indicated by statistics and 
international reports”571 could not be ignored, and consequently, the applicant 
faced “various cumulative risks of reprisals”572 from her husband, his family, 
her own family and from the Afghan society.573 
Yet, despite domestic violence no longer being “viewed as a matter 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State”, there still remains 
substantial gaps “between the rhetoric of human rights law and the reality of 
everyday enforcement and implementation on the ground”, which are most 
intensely felt by refugee women.574 This is mainly due to the fact that refugee 
law is not simply “keeping pace with the inclusion of domestic violence in the 
panoply of rights and positive obligations now recognized by international 
human rights law”, as Mullally argues. 575  Despite the recognition of state 
responsibility with regard to domestic violence under international human 
rights law, it still “continues to be resisted by States, even where there is 
strong evidence to suggest that the actions or omissions of the State 
demonstrate a failure to protect”. 576  As Mullally observes, progressive 
developments in human rights law “are often slow to cross over into refugee 
law, reflecting the peculiar challenge to State sovereignty that comes with a 
request for asylum”. 577  This has led to a situation where the essentially 
political nature of domestic violence continues to be questioned in asylum 
application processes.578  
Notwithstanding its prevalence, domestic violence remains 
undocumented because of victims’ reluctance to report it, the failure of 
authorities to take domestic violence seriously and the consequential failure to 
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record it as a crime.579 This is also true of the asylum determination process. 
According to Mullally, the “ambivalence with which domestic violence claims 
are treated in asylum adjudication reflects the hesitation to affirm the human 
rights norms and attendant obligations underpinning such claims”. 580 
Consequently, despite its brutality and prevalence, domestic violence has 
been described as one of the most difficult bases on which to request 
asylum.581  
The difficulty of securing asylum based on domestic violence stems 
from various factors, such as the “enormous evidentiary problems, murky 
legal standards, and the fact that domestic violence claims depart from the 
usual paradigm for asylum cases”. 582  In other words, the current 
understanding of what persecution entails is too narrow and gender-biased to 
include this type of gender-related persecution. Overall, as Mullally argues, 
while there is a growing number of state practice that suggests greater gender 
inclusivity and sensitivity in practice, under the current international refugee 
law, “women fleeing domestic violence continue to face obstacles in making 
their claims heard”.583 
In addition to the obstacles mentioned above, another major factor 
contributing to the undermining of gender-related persecution claims is the 
normalisation and trivialisation of violence against women. As Freedman 
observes, refugee women’s asylum applications are often because the 
violence and discrimination they face in their country of origin “are not 
regarded as ‘persecution’ within the sense of the [1951] Convention”.584 This 
does not mean, however, that women are not persecuted.   
The situation is further aggravated by the combination of the 
trivialisation of the violence and the victims’ silence, as “the women do not 
speak out about what has happened to them”.585 A woman’s silence is often a 
result of the normalisation of gender-related persecution and violence against 
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that woman, because women themselves “accept [the violence they have 
suffered] without questioning whether there is an alternative”.586  
However, despite (or conceivably because of) the fact that the 
normalisation of violence against women has its roots in the “devaluation of 
women and the masculinist power to define abuses against women as 
cultural, natural or private”587, the inequality of the power relations between 
men and women causing the normalisation of violence against women is often 
disregarded. For example, with regard to domestic violence, Freedman 
argues that its normalisation takes place through the “perpetuation of an 
ideology which treats it as an individual act of violence between two partners 
and not as a form of violence which is shaped by social relations of inequality 
between men and women”. 588  The connection between patriarchy and 
domestic violence was confirmed in 1999 by the South African Constitutional 
Court in the landmark case of The State v Baloyi, in which Judge Sachs 
described domestic violence as an area “where lawlessness has long been 
sustained by interlaced notions of patriarchy and domestic privacy”. 589 
Furthermore, according to Judge Sachs:  
 
“To the extent that it is systemic, pervasive and overwhelmingly 
gender-specific, domestic violence both reflects and reinforces 
patriarchal domination, and does so in a particularly brutal form”.590 
 
Yet, despite domestic violence taking place in all societies, and despite 
some states having enacted legislations making domestic violence illegal, “it 
is often condoned by the lack of punishment against perpetrators”.591 The 
trivialising impact of the failure of states to hold the perpetrators of domestic 
violence accountable has also been noted by the UN Secretary General’s 
report, according to which “impunity not only intensifies the subordination and 
powerlessness of the targets of violence, but also sends a message to society 
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that male violence against women is both acceptable and inevitable. As a 
result, patterns of violent behaviour are normalized”.592  
Similarly, the 2013 UN Interactive Expert Panel on the Elimination and 
Prevention of all forms of Violence Against Women and Girls named “[t]he on-
going normalisation of violence against women and girls, which is 
exacerbated by other social inequalities, militarisation, extreme nationalism 
and a growth in all forms of religious fundamentalisms”, as one of its key 
concerns.593 
The universal normalisation of domestic violence has also permeated 
Western asylum application jurisprudence. It has been argued that the 
normalisation of domestic violence is so pervasive that it is often not 
registered to be a proper ground for claiming asylum.594 According to Mullally 
the rifeness of domestic violence in all societies can often “lead to the severity 
of domestic violence as persecution, in and of itself, being denied”.595  
This statement is also supported by Spijkerboer, who uses 
jurisprudence from the Dutch asylum courts as the basis for his argument that 
the courts “only grant asylum for persecution they consider ‘exceptional’”.596 
According to Spijkerboer, domestic violence, rape and sexual assault “are so 
normalised that asylum courts d[o] not see them as having any kind of political 
dimension, and thus for them, these harms d[o] not constitute persecution”.597  
Ultimately, the widespread structural violence and the rife physical 
violence against women that it entails are so trivialised that they are “seen by 
the courts as normal and, as a consequence, unworthy of international 
redress”.598 
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3 4 3 1 United States  
Since the BIA’s ruling in the Kasinga case and the publication of the Gender 
Guidelines in 1995, there seemed to be a general development towards a 
more enlightened understanding of the persecution that women face as a 
result of their gender.599 Yet, with regard to asylum cases involving domestic 
violence, there has until recently been a substantial failure by the BIA to 
consider this form of gender-related persecution as a basis for asylum. In 
1997, the Immigration Court denied asylum to the applicant in the case of In 
re G- R- on the basis that there was a “lack of nexus between domestic abuse 
and enumerated ground for asylum”.600 In 1998 the Immigration Court again 
denied the applicant asylum, firstly in the case of In re A-, where it stated that 
the appellant’s fear of “a violent attack by the male members of her family 
based on her defiance of their wishes that she will not to marry her husband” 
was simply a “personal family dispute”, and secondly in the case of In re D- K, 
because the applicant had “simply not shown that the violence against her is 
related to anything more than evil in the heart of her husband”. 601 
Furthermore, in 1999 in the case of In re M- S- M-, the Immigration Court 
found that domestic violence “does not constitute persecution because the 
persecutor had no connection to the Mexican government or local law 
enforcement”.602 Yet the most notorious example of the difficulties of securing 
asylum due to domestic violence is the case on In re R-A-.603  
In In re R-A-, the asylum applicant, a Guatemalan woman, had been 
subjected to years of brutal violence by her husband. In addition to raping her, 
the applicant’s husband “dislocated her jaw, nearly pushed out her eye, tried 
to cut off her hands with his machete, kicked her in the abdomen and vagina, 
and tried to force her to abort when she was pregnant with her second child 
by severely kicking her in the spine. He would drag her by the hair, use her 
head to break windows and mirrors, whip her with pistols and electric cords, 
                                                             
599
 A. Sinha “Domestic Violence and US Asylum Law: Eliminating the “Cultural Hook” for 
Asylum Claims involving Gender-related Persecution” (2001) New York University Law 
Review 1562, 1564. 
600
  1564. 
601
  1564. 
602
 1564. 
603
 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 908 (B.I.A. 1999). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  117 
and threaten her with knives”.604 Yet, notwithstanding her numerous attempts 
to seek state protection, the authorities refused to intervene. Ultimately, the 
applicant fled to the US where she applied for asylum.  
Despite recognising the “heinous abuse” that the applicant had been 
subjected to, the BIA ultimately denied asylum to the applicant because the 
applicant had failed to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the 
persecution and one of the convention grounds.605 With regard to the motive 
of the persecution, due to the arbitrariness of the persecutor’s pattern of 
abuse, the BIA found a “total absence” of any motive as defined in the 1951 
Convention. However, as Heyman observes, the BIA’s conclusion that the 
perpetrator did not have the necessary motive for his acts to constitute 
persecution under international refugee law reflects the court’s “failure to 
grasp the appalling phenomenon of domestic violence”.606 The seriousness of 
the BIA’s failure to acknowledge domestic violence as a form of persecution is 
reflected by the UNHCR’s release of an Advisory Opinion regarding the 
matter in 2004 in which it defended the applicant’s position as a refugee.607 
Jurisprudence since the BIA’s decision in the case of In re R-A- has been 
described as “arbitrariness run amuck”.608 
However, the approach of the US towards domestic violence as a 
ground of persecution has partly changed since 2009, when the Obama 
Administration’s policy on domestic violence as a ground for asylum 
completely reversed the Bush Administration’s strong opposition on the 
issue.609 In July 2009, the Department for Homeland Security (DHS) filed a 
supplemental brief to the BIA in the case of L-R, which involved a woman 
seeking asylum on the basis of being subjected to years of domestic abuse, 
including being raped at gunpoint, being held captive and being the victim of 
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attempted murder by her husband, who had tried to burn the applicant alive 
when he learnt she was pregnant.610 In the brief, the DHS offered “alternative 
formulations of ‘particular social group’ that could in appropriate cases qualify 
aliens for asylum”.611 According to the brief, these alternative formulations 
“might well be applicable to [domestic violence] cases”.612 As Musalo states, 
these developments have “open[ed] the door to the protection of women who 
have suffered these kinds of violation”.613 Consequently, following the DHS’s 
brief, on 10 December 2009, the applicant in In re L-R- was granted asylum.  
Yet, despite the brief of the DHS having developed the way that the US 
government views domestic violence asylum cases, many immigration judges 
have rejected this approach and continue to express “scepticism regarding 
the viability of domestic violence as a basis for asylum under any 
circumstances”.614  As Bullard observes, this shift in the US government’s 
approach “does not mean applications based on domestic violence will sail 
through the immigration system”.615  
For example, in an unreported case of 2010, the court denied asylum to 
a victim of domestic violence on the basis that not all countries are “as good 
as the United States on women’s rights, but that does not mean that the 
United States should grant asylum to all women of the world”.616 In another 
unreported case of the same year, the immigration judge denied asylum while 
refusing to acknowledge PSG in the domestic violence context and stated that 
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“nothing had changed since R-A”. 617  In a 2012 unreported case, the 
immigration judge rejected a PSG construct of “Honduran women unable to 
leave a domestic relationship” and consequently denied the applicant asylum 
while concluding that “[h]arm resulting from a social problem” does not 
constitute persecution based on an enumerated convention ground.618 
 
3 4 3 2 United Kingdom 
In 1999, the House of Lords handed down a landmark judgment in the case of 
Shah and Islam,619 which concerned two women who had been subjected to 
domestic violence in Pakistan. Both of the appellants claimed that their 
husbands had falsely accused them of adultery in Pakistan, and if they were 
returned they would be subject to criminal proceedings for sexual immorality 
leading to physical punishment or stoning to death. In its judgment, the House 
of Lords ultimately accepted domestic violence as a ground for persecution 
and that the appellants were part of a ‘particular social group’ and granted 
them asylum. With regard to domestic violence, Lord Steyn denied its political 
nature and dismissed persecution on grounds of political opinion as being 
“unsustainable”620, while Lord Hoffman found discrimination against women to 
be institutionalised in Pakistan “by the police, the courts and the legal system, 
the central organs of the State”.621 As Mullally observes, the findings of the 
House of Lords in Shah and Islam “reveals again the difficulties of capturing 
women’s human rights claims” within the Convention’s current grounds.622 
Overall, however, the findings of the House of Lords in Shah and Islam, which 
recognised victims of domestic violence as a ‘particular social group’ and 
consequently as a group entitled to the protection of 1951 Refugee 
Convention, marked a “significant turning point” in gender asylum law in the 
UK and elsewhere.623  
                                                             
617
 Hastings College of Law, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case #6550, as 
cited by Bookey (2013) Hastings Women’s Law Journal 141. 
618
 Hastings College of Law, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case #8282, as 
cited by Bookey (2013) Hastings Women’s Law Journal 141. 
619
 Islam (AP) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal 
ex parte Shah (AP) (Conjoined Appeals) [1999] 2 AC 629, [1999] 2 All ER 545. 
620
 12. 
621
 19. 
622
 Mullally (2011) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 477. 
623
 477. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  120 
 Nevertheless, despite these developments, the increased usage of the 
Detained Fast Track (DFT) procedure by the UK Border Authority (UKBA) has 
put the judicial progress achieved at risk. The DFT is an accelerated 
procedure for assessing asylum claims that, according to the UK Border 
Agency, can be decided “quickly”. However, as a report by Human Rights 
Watch points out, “it is inherently unsuitable for complex cases” such as 
gender-related persecution cases.624  
The unreported case of Fatima H625 demonstrates the shortcomings of 
the DFT procedure with regard to gender-related persecution cases and its 
failure to provide adequate protection to victims of domestic violence. The 
applicant in this case was a Pakistani woman, who was a victim of rape and 
had “sustained domestic violence by her husband, a wealthy and powerful 
figure in her region of origin”.626 The applicant was “terrified” to report the 
abuse to the police, as “she was aware that her husband was close to them” 
and eventually fled to the UK, where she applied for asylum. 627  The 
applicant’s asylum claim was decided through the DFT procedure, which 
ultimately resulted in the rejection of her application due to her lack of 
credibility and because she “could seek gender specific protection at a women 
only police station in Pakistan”.628 The adjudicator, however, failed to analyse 
the available country information sufficiently. 629 According to available 
information, there was a very limited number of the special police stations 
overall and a complete lack of them in the applicant’s region.630 Ultimately, 
according to the Human Rights Watch, the main problem with the DFT 
procedure is its “failure to follow the UKBA’s own Gender Guidelines”.631 More 
generally, however, the fundamental problem with the Guidelines is that their 
implementation is “neither consistent nor universal”.632 
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3 4 3 3 Australia  
In 2002, the Australian High Court handed down a judgment in the landmark 
case of Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (Khawar)633 in 
which the applicant was a Pakistani woman who had fled the country after 
suffering years of escalating domestic violence at the hands of her husband. 
The question before the court, as defined by Judge Gleeson, was “whether 
the failure of a country of nationality to provide protection against domestic 
violence to women, in circumstances where the motivation of the perpetrators 
of the violence is private, can result in persecution of the kind referred to in Art 
1A(2) of the Convention”634, which the court answered in the affirmative.   
However, despite this positive development, the judgments in post-
Khawar cases indicate that the area remains complex and challenging in 
Australian jurisprudence, which puts the progress achieved with Khawar at 
risk. In the 2002 case of SBBK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs,635 the Refuge Review Tribunal (RRT) denied asylum to an 
Iranian applicant who had been physically and sexually assaulted by her 
husband on numerous occasions.636 The applicant had fled Iran and applied 
for asylum in Australia. She feared that if she were returned to Iran her 
husband would kill her and her son. According to the judgment, the RRT 
“found that the applicant claimed to have family problems (...) but did not 
consider this of sufficient seriousness to be regarded as persecution”.637 The 
RRT further found that “the social restrictions and type of problems faced by 
[the applicant] did not extend to the level of harm which could be considered 
as persecution within the meaning of the Convention”.638 Moreover, “although 
the finding was that her husband was violent, there was no consideration [by 
RTT] of the degree of violence or the detailed incidence of such violence”.639 
Finally, with regard to the applicant’s return to Iran, the RRT simply found that 
“her ex-husband ‘will be angry with her’”640 and concluded that “even if her ex-
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husband harmed her if she returned, this would not constitute persecution for 
a Convention reason”.641 The Federal Court of Australia later found an error of 
law in the RRT’s judgment with regard to the lack of assessment whether 
there would be effective protection available from the state if the applicant 
was threatened with violence by her husband upon her return and remitted 
the case back to the RRT for reconsideration.642  
A similar case came before the RTT in 2004, and again the RTT 
denied the applicant asylum in a similar manner. In NAIV v Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs,643 the applicant was a 
Nepalese woman who had been subjected to domestic violence by her 
husband because of their different religious views. In its judgment, the RTT 
accepted that “being a partner in an inter-caste marriage could constitute 
membership of a particular social group”. However the RRT found that the 
claim of “low level discrimination to which the [applicant] referred did not 
amount to persecution”.644 With regard to the domestic violence, the RTT 
accepted that the “marital problem” experienced by the applicant “made her 
vulnerable”, but ultimately the tribunal found that this did not “advance her 
case in respect of the Convention”.645  
In 2009, the RTT denied asylum to the applicant in AZAAR v Minister 
for Immigration and Citizenship.646 In this case, the applicant, a Vanuatuan 
woman, had been the “subject of significant domestic violence in [Vanuatu] at 
the hands of her husband, but was not able to be provided with reasonably 
effective State protection because of systemic discrimination against women 
resulting from cultural norms and practices”. 647  In its judgment, the RTT 
agreed that the applicant had been subjected, and if she returned to Vanuatu 
would continue to be subjected, to serious harm in the form of domestic 
violence from her husband.648 The RTT also found that the applicant belonged 
to a PSG of either “Vanuatu women” or “married Vanuatu women”. However, 
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the RTT ultimately denied the applicant asylum on the basis that the harm 
inflicted on her was not because of her membership of a particular social 
group and that the RTT was not satisfied that “there was a real chance of her 
being denied protection by the authorities in Vanuatu should she require it 
upon her return there”.649  
Finally, in 2011 the Australian Federal Court handed down judgment in 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZONJ.650 In this case, the court 
overturned a decision of the Federal Magistrate Court, which had found a 
jurisdictional error in the findings of the RRT with respect to its approach to 
assessing a domestic violence claim under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
The applicant, a Fijian woman, had been the victim of domestic violence 
carried out by her husband and feared that she would be subjected to further 
domestic violence if she was returned to Fiji.651 According to the applicant, the 
“entrenched discriminatory attitudes within the Fijian courts” had resulted in a 
failure to prosecute perpetrators and protect victims. 652  Furthermore, the 
applicant stated that despite the enactment of the Domestic Violence Decree 
in 2009, the Fijian government has a discriminatory policy towards women’s 
rights and specifically tolerates or condones the practice of violence towards 
women.653 When the applicant had brought her complaints to the attention of 
the police, little or no effective action was taken against her husband.654 
Despite having acknowledged these facts, the Federal Court 
overturned the Federal Magistrate Court’s judgment, according to which the 
RRT had erred jurisdictionally, as its reasoning lacked “any explicit evaluation 
of the efficacy of the relevant measures in actually providing protection to a 
person in the position of the (...) Applicant, in light of the claims made in 
relation to police attitudes and cultural approaches to resolving domestic 
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violence by reconciliation”.655 Ultimately, the RRT had reached the conclusion 
that it “found no evidence that there would be a selective and discriminatory 
withholding of state protection” and consequently denied the asylum to the 
applicant. 656  However, the Federal Court upheld the RRT’s decision. 
According to the Federal Court, because the domestic abuse “lacked 
motivation connected to the Convention” and the Fijian state or state agents’ 
inability to prevent such violence was “for reasons unconnected with the 
Convention”, asylum could not be granted.657  
 
3 4 3 4 France 
According to Brocard et al., French asylum adjudicators determining refugee 
status do not take gender-related persecution adequately into consideration 
when judging the merits of an application.658 Consequently, women seeking 
asylum for fear of gender-related persecution are rarely awarded adequate 
protection.659 Overall, the testimonies of women asylum-seekers are not found 
to be credible. Furthermore, the persecution the women, seeking asylum, 
have experienced or are faced with is often not considered to fall under the 
protection of refugee law. Brocard et al. argue that the adjudicators often 
“misunderstand, minimise or deny” asylum-seeking women’s experiences.660 
 The shortfall of the French asylum assessment system with regard to 
the recognition of gender-related persecution can be attributed to a lack of 
understanding of the nature of domestic violence as well as ignorance about 
the reality of women’s positions in their countries of origin.661  
Furthermore, as the decisions of the Commission des recours des 
réfugiés (CRR) in the cases of Mlle EG662  and Mme AM663  demonstrate, 
                                                             
655
 Para. 23. 
656
 Para. 26. 
657
 Para. 34. 
658
 L. Brocard, H. Lamine and M. Gueguen, “Droit d”asile ou victimisation?” (2007) 75 Plein 
Droit (Gisti, December 2007) <http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?article1052#nb5> accessed 10 
June 2013. 
659
 75. 
660
 75. 
661
 75. 
662
 Commission des recours des réfugiés (CRR), Mlle EG Decision No 549296, 7 July 2006 
(UNHCR RefWorld, 2006) <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45d5cb5e2.pdf> accessed 10 June 
2013. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  125 
rather than granting asylum per se, the CRR most commonly grants an 
alternative form of protection (‘protection subsidiaire’) to victims of domestic 
violence. However, with regard to FGM or the threat of an ‘honour crime’, the 
CRR has granted asylum to women fearing gender-related persecution.664  
 
3 4 3 5 Israel  
The Israeli refugee jurisprudence has in general been resistant to 
acknowledging gender asylum. On various occasions, the Court for 
Administrative Affairs has denied asylum to victims of domestic violence on 
the basis that the persecution had taken place in the ‘private sphere’, which 
makes the claims ‘personal’, and they consequently fall outside of the realm of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. By reaching these conclusions, the court failed 
to acknowledge the political nature of the domestic violence phenomenon.  
In the 2012 case Xie Guang v The Minister of the Interior,665 the Court 
for Administrative Affairs denied asylum to a Chinese woman living in a 
lesbian relationship, who had been previously been subjected to domestic 
violence by her husband. The applicant had fled her abusive husband from 
China to Israel and had stayed illegally in Israel for two years before applying 
for asylum. The applicant had been threatened with further violence by her 
husband and family for having violated the family’s honour, if she ever were to 
return to China.666 In its judgment, the Court for Administrative Affairs upheld 
the earlier decision by the Ministry of Interior to deny the applicant asylum and 
held that as the applicant was not being “persecuted by State authorities or a 
specific group or organization in her country but by her husband, who had 
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been persecuting her in the past”, she was not entitled to recognition as a 
refugee, as “such family persecution is not one of the grounds for asylum”.667 
Similarly, in another 2012 asylum application case, Grace Kappachi v 
The Minister of the Interior, 668  the applicant, a Nigerian woman fleeing 
domestic violence, was denied asylum by the Court for Administrative Affairs. 
The applicant had been forced by her father to marry a much older man from 
a rival clan.669 In 2007, a violent conflict between the applicant’s and her 
husband’s families led to the murder of her parents and brothers. The 
applicant fled to Israel where she applied for asylum based on fear of violence 
from her husband and his family. 670  In its judgment, the Court for 
Administrative Affairs held that the persecution feared by the applicant was of 
a ‘personal nature’ and consequently “none of the grounds listed in the 
Refugee Convention [were] applicable”.671 
In 2013, another victim of domestic violence was denied asylum in the 
case of Jane Doe v The Minister of the Interior.672 In this case, the applicant 
had fled Nigeria following her father’s threat to kill her after she had refused to 
marry his debtor. The applicant had also been subjected to violence by the 
suitor’s family.673 In upholding the decision by the Ministry of Interior to deny 
the applicant an asylum, the Court for Administrative Affairs held that the 
applicant “did not establish an objective fear of persecution since her father 
only threatened her once”.674 Furthermore, according to the court, “none of 
the grounds for refugee status listed in the Refugee Convention [were] 
applicable in this case since it seemed that the applicant was a victim of a 
family dispute”.675 
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3 4 4 Discrimination based on gender as a ground for ‘persecution’ 
Similarly to the normalisation of violence against women, the normalisation of 
discrimination against women has had a detrimental effect on refugee 
women’s asylum applications. Gender discrimination not only obstructs 
women’s educational and career opportunities but “also places their health 
and safety in jeopardy”.676 As McLaughlin argues, “institutionalized gender 
discrimination is a pervasive reality that permeates every segment of society 
and culture”.677 This has also been true of asylum assessment processes, in 
which gender discrimination is often considered to be part of the status quo of 
the country of origin and therefore should not be recognised in the context of 
refugee status determination. 
With regard to asylum adjudication, the existence of a discriminatory or 
sexist environment in the country of origin has actually hindered the granting 
of asylum because of concerns of the so-called ‘opening of the floodgates’. 
These unfounded fears of the asylum adjudicators are based on the fears that 
once gender-related persecution is accepted as a basis for asylum, it will 
“immediately inundate the [country] with [woman] asylees”678 because of the 
universality and prevalence of gender-related persecution and gender-
discrimination. However, asylum adjudicators should not take the floodgate 
concerns into consideration when they assess individual asylum claims. As 
Musalo et al. argue 
 
“[w]hat is most troubling about the treatment of women’s asylum claims 
(...) is that a female asylum-seeker is apparently unable to enjoy 
refugee status simply for the fact that she fears persecution as a 
woman in a sexist environment. A similar predicament does not face a 
man or a woman who fears torture or inhuman treatment as a member 
of a discreet religious or ethnic community in a society characterized by 
racism, fundamentalism or other kindred ultra-nationalism. In contrast, 
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his or her claim is more readily and directly assessed on race, religion 
or nationality grounds”.679  
 
In order to amount to gender persecution, the harm does not have to 
be focused directly at the physical integrity of women but can take the form of 
discrimination.680 This is a crucial inclusion, as gender-based discrimination is 
“practiced universally and is enforced through law, social custom and 
individual practices”.681 In many countries, the discrimination and persecution 
of women is enshrined in the law.682 
Gender-discrimination is defined in Article 1 of CEDAW, which 
encompasses both direct and indirect discrimination against women. 
According to Article 1, gender-discrimination comprises 
 
“[A]ny discrimination, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field”.683 
 
As a consequence, as Charlesworth observes, any practice, notwithstanding 
its motive, “that results in unequal enjoyment of rights by women” constitutes 
discrimination.684 Yet, with respect to international refugee law, it is important 
to note that the discrimination itself is not enough to warrant asylum, but it 
must be severe in order to amount to persecution. According to Haines, 
discrimination alone is “not enough to establish a case for refugee status”, 
and consequently, “a distinction must be drawn between a breach of human 
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rights and persecution”.685 Clayton supports this view by stating that, “the 
Refugee Convention protects against persecution, but not against 
discrimination”.686  
Accordingly, the UNHCR has recognised severe gender discrimination 
as a form of persecution in various policy documents. In 1990, the UNHCR 
Executive Committee acknowledged for the first time the connection between 
a violation of women’s rights guaranteed by CEDAW and gender 
discrimination amounting to persecution by recognising that;  
 
“[I]n light of the increasingly universal character of the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, severe discrimination (...) may justify the granting of refugee 
status”.687 
 
Furthermore, in 1991, the UNHCR published its 1991 Guidelines on 
Protection688, in which it acknowledged that refugee claims brought by women 
who are subjected to persecution due to having transgressed the laws or 
customs of the state, “present difficulties under this [current] definition”.689 
Consequently, paragraph 55 of the 1991 Guidelines expanded the notion of 
persecution by recognising that protection from sexual discrimination is “a 
basic right of all women” and that “severe sexual discrimination” can 
constitute persecution under certain circumstances.690 
Furthermore, paragraph 53 of the 1991 Guidelines on Protection, 
acknowledges that discrimination, when “combined with other adverse factors 
[such as a] general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin”,691 can in 
some cases amount to persecution. The UNHCR confirmed the possibility of 
discrimination amounting to persecution in its 2002 Guidelines on 
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International Protection (2002 UNHCR Guidelines).692 According to paragraph 
14, while ‘mere’ discrimination is not to be perceived as persecution, “a 
pattern of discrimination (...) could, on cumulative grounds, amount to 
persecution and warrant international protection”.693 
Moreover, the 2002 UNHCR Guidelines clarify that “gender-related 
persecution encompasses a wide range of treatments”694 and recognise that a 
discriminatory law or policy that has a gender dimension and carries a 
disproportionate punishment for non-compliance can amount to 
persecution.695 According to the 2002 Guidelines: 
  
“[t]here is no doubt that rape and other forms of gender-related 
violence, such as dowry related violence, female genital mutilation, 
domestic violence and trafficking, are acts which inflict severe pain and 
suffering – both mental and physical – and which have been used as 
forms of persecution, whether perpetrated by the State or private 
actors”.696  
 
Furthermore, as the 2002 UNHCR Guidelines state, “[s]evere punishment for 
women who, by breaching a law, transgress social mores in a society could 
[also] amount to persecution”.697  
Various national Gender Guidelines, such as the Canadian Guidelines 
issued by the IRB Chairperson on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing 
Gender-Related Persecution (Canadian Guidelines),698 also acknowledge that 
severe gender-based discrimination may amount to persecution for reasons of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Canadian Gender Guidelines not only 
acknowledge “persecution resulting from circumstances of severe 
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discrimination on grounds of gender”699 in general but also more specifically 
persecution taking place “as the consequence of failing to conform to, or for 
transgressing, certain gender-discriminating religious or customary laws and 
practices in their country of origin (...) [which] singl[e] out women and plac[e] 
them in a more vulnerable position than men”.700 These guidelines will be 
further discussed in sub-chapter 6 2. 
 With regard to the severity of discrimination required for it to amount to 
persecution, there is no uniform definition. According to the UNHCR Gender 
Guidelines, “[w]hile the universal right to freedom from discrimination on 
grounds of sex is recognized, and discrimination can constitute persecution 
under certain circumstances, the dividing line between discrimination and 
persecution is not a clear one”.701 According to the definition in the Canadian 
Gender Guidelines, ‘severe’ gender-discrimination “may amount to 
persecution if it leads to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for 
the claimant and if it is imposed on account of any one, or a combination, of 
the statutory grounds for persecution”.702  Macklin, by contrast, argues the 
presumption is that “if the law discriminates by selectively abrogating 
fundamental human rights of designated groups, the law itself persecutes”.703 
According to Macklin, it should not matter that “it would be relatively ‘easy’ for 
the claimant to obey the [discriminatory] law (and thus avoid prosecution) (...) 
if in so doing she must forsake a protected freedom”. 704  Edwards further 
argues that “severe community ostracism or discrimination” may also reach 
the level of persecution.705 
Discriminatory laws amounting to persecution are often connected to 
religious tenets and created to uphold certain social mores. As Neal argues, 
religious doctrines, when given legal force, “can be used first to discriminate 
against and then to persecute women”.706 Gender-discriminatory laws as a 
whole were denounced by the ECOSOC in March 2013 at the 57th Session of 
                                                             
699
 Para A(I)(3). 
700
 Para A(I)(4). 
701
 UNHCR, “Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women” (July, 1991) U.N. Doc. 
ES/SCP/67. para. 55. 
702
 Para. A(I)(3). 
703
 Macklin (1995) Human Rights Quarterly 230. 
704
 230. 
705
 Edwards Violence against Women under International Human Rights Law 61. 
706
 Neal (1988) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 210. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  132 
the CSW, with the commission reaffirming that “women and men have the 
right to enjoy, on an equal basis, all their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” and urging “States to (...) devote particular attention to abolishing 
practices and legislation that discriminate against women and girls, or 
perpetuate and condone violence against them”.707 
The gender-discriminatory laws often regulate the private sphere, 
including discriminatory family, social and criminal laws. Examples of such 
laws can be found in post–Islamic Revolution legislation in Iran. As Neal 
argues, the ‘official discrimination’ against women taking place in Iran is 
rooted in the post–Islamic Revolution constitution’s “pronouncement on the 
proper place of women”.708  
According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, “women 
are to return to their ‘natural role’ of child-bearer and mother”.709 According to 
the Preamble of the Constitution, before the Islamic Revolution, women were 
“drawn away from the family unit” while being part of the workforce but are 
now expected to re-assume the “serious and precious duty of motherhood”.710 
As Neal observes, the Iranian constitution implies that the return to traditional 
gender roles is necessary for the functioning of society and consequently, “the 
welfare of the nation implicitly requires the regulation of women’s status and 
position”.711 As a result, women have become “inescapably subordinate” to 
men within the confines of the family. 712  According to Neal, the deeply 
discriminatory and subordinate status of women is clear from the “breadth of 
powers” conveyed exclusively to the men under Iranian family law, which 
includes the right to have multiple wives, the right to divorce their wives at will, 
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the right to forbid their wives from fulfilling religious observances and the right 
to prohibit their wives from working.713 
  In addition to family laws, various other discriminatory laws exist in 
Iran, which govern the social sphere and “exclude women from life outside the 
home”.714 Amongst other restrictions, these laws severely restrict women’s 
educational and career opportunities and are “manifestly designed to 
subjugate women”.715 An example of such a discriminatory social and ‘moral 
law’ is the law compelling women to veil themselves. As Neal argues, this law 
ultimately “oppresses women both physically and psychologically” with 
women who refuse to wear the veil or hejab being branded as prostitutes who 
are considered to be “corrupt, seditious, dangerous, and destructive of public 
honor”.716 Furthermore, the punishments for the failure to comply with the 
social laws are “disproportionately severe”, with the punishment for refusal to 
wear the veil being “seventy-four lashes, administered immediately and 
without formal review”.717 
Iranian criminal law also treats women as inferior to men, which leads 
to their “victimi[sation] without legal protection or redress”.718 One of the most 
gender-discriminatory laws in Iran is related to murder where the victim is a 
woman. In these cases, the punishment is “conditioned upon the payment of 
compensation by the victim’s family to the family of the murderer or assailant 
for their loss”.719 With regard to situation where a woman is murdered by her 
husband, the chances of any retribution are even slimmer. As Afshar argues, 
women are so subordinate to men under Iranian laws that husbands may 
“virtually murder [their wives] without any fear of legal consequences”.720  
Furthermore, under Iran’s shari’a laws, sexual violence cases are 
especially problematic for the women victims because of the practice of 
equating one male witness to two female witnesses.721 As a consequence, it 
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is extremely difficult to secure a conviction in a rape case, for example, as “a 
lone woman does not constitute a witness – even when she is the victim”.722 
This is also the case under Pakistan’s Hudood laws, according to which a 
woman alleging rape must “corroborate her complaint with the testimony of 
four male witnesses. Failure to prove that sexual contact occurred without 
consent leaves the complainant vulnerable to criminal prosecution herself for 
adultery or fornication”.723 According to the Human Rights Watch: 
 
“[T]he Hudood laws affect all citizens of Pakistan, but are applied to 
women with particularly disastrous effect. Women are discriminated 
against by law [and] they find it extremely difficult to prove rape and 
may face criminal prosecution if they fail to do so”.724 
 
As a consequence of escalating national and international criticism to 
the Hudood laws, there was an attempt to reform the laws in 2006. However, 
following “massive opposition” to the reform, “the most discriminatory aspects 
of the legislation” were left in place.725  
Similar discriminatory laws also exist in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, 
in addition to laws compelling them to veil themselves, women “are not 
allowed to drive, must sit at the back of public buses, are limited in their 
educational and employment opportunities and may not travel without the 
consent of a male relative”.726 As Macklin argues, these restrictions “may be 
understood as strand[s] in a web of oppression that cumulatively amounts to 
persecution of Saudi women”.727 Ultimately, the various restrictions aimed at 
women under Saudi legislation result in “consequences of a substantially 
prejudicial nature for the claimant” with regard to women’s “ability to access 
educational facilities, to earn a livelihood, and to function as an autonomous 
and independent individual”.728  
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The shari’a laws of northern Nigeria have also been a cause for 
concern due to their discriminatory and persecutory nature. As Freedman 
argues, the implementation of these laws “can be seen to reinforce the 
discrimination that was already existent towards women (...) and to create a 
political climate within which discriminatory behaviour is encouraged and 
given a legislative framework”.729 
Yet, it is important to acknowledge that gender discrimination and 
violence against women are not limited to developing countries or countries 
implementing shari’a laws but is a universal occurrence that also takes place 
in countries that have traditionally been considered ‘non-refugee 
producing’.730  According to Randall, “women’s subordination vis-à-vis men 
continues to characterize virtually all known societies, while the degrees, 
extent and manifestations of the phenomena differ, sometimes profoundly”.731  
 
3 5 Conclusion 
Already in the early 1990s, Bunch argued that if any group other than women 
were subjected to similar routine torture, starvation, terrorism, humiliation, 
mutilation and murder, it would “be recognized as a civil and political 
emergency as well as a gross violation of the victims’ humanity”.732  With 
regard to women, however, violence is often normalised and belittled as 
demonstrated in this chapter. To this day, the situation has not changed.  
This is also true of the international refugee law regime. Despite the 
non-discrimination requirement being solidly embedded in international 
human rights law, the practice under international refugee law continues to fail 
to meaningfully implement the principle. The failure of the international 
refugee law regime, and the domestic courts applying it, to provide adequate 
protection for women asylum-seekers fleeing gender-related persecution is 
demonstrated in the construction of ‘persecution’ as the detailed discussion in 
this chapter have shown.  
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In this chapter I examined whether the current interpretation of what 
constitutes ‘persecution’ can encompass the unique form of persecution that 
women often face because of their gender. In this regard I demonstrated how 
violence against women is often normalised and belittled in asylum 
adjudication processes due to underlying deep-rooted structural injustices. 
Overall, the general construction of what ‘persecution’ entails has been 
unclear at best. Yet, to some extent this is understandable, as the main aim 
behind leaving the description of the term undefined was to allow a case-by-
case determination of whether the given conduct constitutes a persecutory 
act. A further rationale behind leaving the definition of term open-ended was 
to ensure that it would accommodate future forms of persecution, unseen at 
the time of drafting.  
Furthermore, under the current dominant construction of ‘persecution’, 
primacy is given to the protection of civil and political rights. This narrow 
construction has been detrimental to women applying for gender asylum, as 
the persecution they face is part of a “larger socioeconomic web that entraps 
women, making them vulnerable to abuses which cannot be delineated as 
exclusively political or solely caused by states”. 733  Similarly, the lack of 
recognition of non-physical harm amounting to persecution has put women 
refugees at a disadvantage. 
Because the international statutory definition of ‘persecution’ is heavily 
biased in favour of the male experience, women’s experiences of persecution 
may not seem true to the male adjudicators, whose “realms of experience 
differ so greatly from that of the female claimants”. 734  Furthermore, the 
manner in which the evidence of domestic violence is presented can 
adversely affect the applications of refugee women. According to Mullally, 
“narrative inconsistencies, calm demeanour or late disclosure of evidence are 
often viewed negatively” by the adjudicators assessing the credibility of 
victims of domestic violence.735 As Love notes, women who are fleeing alone, 
without male family members, from persecution directed at them because of 
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their gender “often face greater obstacles proving their eligibility for refugee, 
and thus asylum, status”.736 
Overall, women are often subjected to double persecution. In addition 
to facing ‘traditional persecution’, women are often subjected to unique 
persecution based solely on their gender. Gender-related persecution takes 
various forms, ranging from physical and sexual violence to severely 
discriminatory laws that severely limit women’s rights and freedoms. Despite 
its variety, the element common in all of the forms of this type of persecution 
is that the motive or the form – or in certain cases, both the motive and the 
form – is gendered.  
Despite overwhelming evidence of the violence against women in 
various states amounting to persecution, domestic courts have been reluctant 
to recognise it as such as. Rather than assessing the violence experienced by 
refugee women on its face, Western domestic courts often trivialise the 
violence. The normalisation takes place with regard to all forms of persecution 
that women are uniquely subjected to: physical and sexual violence, as well 
as severe gender discrimination.  
The Western states’ vigilant protection of their sovereignty, manifested 
by attempts to eliminate any possible asylum ground leading to the possible 
‘opening of the floodgates’, has been one of the main causes behind the gap 
between their human rights rhetoric and the lack of protection they offer to 
victims of domestic violence. 737  As Mullally argues, the Western states’ 
“preoccupation with immigration control continues to limit the willingness of 
States to grant asylum, particularly when faced with a human rights violation 
that is both familiar and endemic”.738 Yet at the same time, as Indra observes, 
“a strong international resistance to the inclusion of gender as an explicit 
criterion for refugee status exists, most particularly on the part of those states 
which fear that this might result in a critique of their national gender 
relations”.739 
Women fleeing gender-related persecution face various obstacles in 
applying for asylum under the current construction of international refugee 
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law. Ultimately, both the definition of a ‘refugee’ under international law and 
the wide discretion given to the courts to adjudicate asylum claims “fail to 
account for the unique problems facing women asylum-seekers”.740 Overall, 
the process of determining ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ is deeply 
subjective. The adjudicator subjectively decides whether the fear of 
persecution exists, whether it is credible and well-founded and whether it is 
based on one of the five categories of persecution recognised under 
international refugee law.741  
The situation is made especially difficult for asylum-seeking women, as 
none of the existing five categories are adequate to protect victims of gender-
related persecution consistently, and the courts are often reluctant to expand 
these categories to include gender-related claims.742 As Love argues, “the 
strong reliance on judicial discretion combine[d] with the structural biases 
against female refugees (...) undermines many gender-based persecution 
claims”.743  
Furthermore, difficulties in communication and credibility problems often 
contribute to the denial of women’s asylum claims.744 Ultimately, even if the 
women applying for asylum appropriately communicate their claims, and there 
are no issues of credibility, “harms they have suffered may be dismissed by 
(...) judges as personal abuse, rather than the political persecution which may 
lead to a grant of asylum”.745  
With regard to the problems of communication, these often take place 
when the asylum application is based on sexual violence amounting to 
persecution. As Love observes, the situation is complicated by the fact that 
matters of a sexual nature are considered taboo in various cultures and 
because asylum-seeking women “often react to sexual violence with feelings 
of guilt, isolation and fear, [they] commonly resist attributing their flight to 
sexual violence”.746 This behaviour often leads to situations where women fail 
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to accurately convey the nature and severity of the sexual violence they have 
experienced and are consequently denied asylum by the adjudicators.747  
Domestic violence, in particular, is often linked to the perceived ‘proper 
role’ of a woman in society and frequently takes place when the social or 
religious mores that define ‘proper behaviour’ are broken. This is especially 
true of so-called ‘honour crimes’, where women are subjected to brutal 
violence, or in the worst case, murdered when they are viewed as having 
transgressed the norms of acceptable behaviour for women and consequently 
having ‘brought shame’ on their families and societies.748  
Honour crimes, instead, are strongly linked to the control women’s 
sexuality in particular and have been described as “powerful means through 
which men exert their dominance over women”.749 The male dominance over 
women’s sexual expression and reproductive rights is further reinforced by the 
condoning attitudes and acts of the states in which honour crimes and 
domestic violence takes place regularly. 750  As the special rapporteur on 
violence against women, Rashida Manjoo, has observed: “globally, the 
prevalence of different manifestations of [gender-related] killings is increasing, 
and a lack of accountability for such crimes is the norm”.751 Furthermore, the 
special rapporteur has highlighted that rather than being a new or isolated 
form of violence, gender-related killings are the extreme manifestation of 
existing forms of violence against women and are in fact “the ultimate act of 
violence which is experienced in a continuum of violence”.752 ECOSOC has 
also expressed concern about violent gender-related killings of women and 
girls in particular with respect to “countries where the concept of femicide or 
feminicide has been incorporated in national legislation”.753  
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Some commentators, as well as the UNHCR, have suggested the 
adoption of Gender Guidelines as a solution to the inclusion of gender-related 
persecution to the realm of international refugee law. This suggestion, 
however, has proved to be inefficient as well as problematic, as Gender 
Guidelines “have been adopted only in a minority of jurisdictions worldwide, 
and their effectiveness, where adopted, continues to be disputed”.754 This will 
be further discussed in sub-chapter 6 2. 
Ultimately, the dominant construction of ‘persecution’ under the current 
international refugee law regime does not ensure adequate protection of 
women refugees fleeing gender-related persecution. As discussed above, 
with regard to the protection of refugee women, the main downfall of the 
current regime is its failure to recognise gender as a cause of persecution. 
Until the current refugee regime is adequately modernised to include gender, 
thousands of women will continue to struggle to fit their asylum applications 
into the current refugee framework, and in the worst-case scenario, will 
continue to be left out of the international protection they so desperately need 
and legitimately deserve. 
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Chapter 4 
Gender persecution and the nexus requirement in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention 
 
4 1 Introduction 
Thus far I have presented two different perspectives on the framework within 
which women fleeing gender-based persecution are forced to attempt to fit 
their asylum claims; the drafting perspective where the foundation for 
international refugee law was constructed without women fleeing gender-
based violence in mind and the persecution perspective where the gendered 
nature of persecution that women suffer from was added and explored from 
the perspective that it does not fit under either of the two existing legally 
binding frameworks. In this chapter I focus my attention on exploring the 
nexus requirement i.e. the link between persecution and one of the five 
grounds established in Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention as replicated in 
the 1969 OAU Convention. The following chapter adds another layer to this 
discussion by presenting further context to gender based persecution 
considering the location where most gender-based persecution takes place, 
non-state actors as persecutors, the concept of utility in the refugee status 
assessment process and the culturalist approach in portraying of third-world 
women as ‘cultural others’. 
 Some of the most difficult issues in current international refugee law 
jurisprudence arise over whether a gender-related asylum claim involves 
persecution owing to one of the five enumerated grounds. 755  As I have 
highlighted in the previous chapters, Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention 
stipulates that in order to be afforded protection, the applicant must prove that 
her/his fear of persecution is “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion”.  
However, based on the foregoing discussions these five grounds are 
arguably no longer adequate or appropriate, in general, with respect to 
contemporary claims of refugee status, as they were not, as I pointed out in 
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chapter 2, developed as criteria that would be applicable to “all people in all 
places for all times”.756 As Heyman observes, regardless of the seriousness of 
the persecution experienced, if the ground for persecution is not included in 
the existing five enumerated grounds, a proper asylum application cannot be 
made.757 In this regard there is an increasing recognition that in a majority of 
asylum applications based on gender persecution, women face barriers to 
protection due to the issue of ground, despite the fact that the violence they 
have experienced amounts to persecution.758  
The subsequent sub-sections examine the efforts of various 
jurisdictions to include gender asylum cases under the existing international 
refugee law framework. One of the most commonly used grounds in gender 
asylum cases is the PSG, which will be analysed in the second sub-section. 
The first sub-section will discuss the problems arising from the unsuitable fit of 
gender-based persecution cases under the PSG category, with a specific 
focus on the inconsistency of the cases’ outcomes as well as the inherent 
problem of the claims’ circularity. Ultimately it is the intrinsic legal uncertainty 
that renders PSG an unworkable category in relation to gender asylum claims.  
The second sub-section examines the option of including gender 
persecution claims under the ‘political opinion’ category. As this sub-section 
demonstrates, there has been some success in applying this category to 
cases where the form of persecution is gendered, but the motivation behind 
the persecution is based on the victim’s political opinion. However, similarly to 
the PSG category, this category is ill-suited to a majority of gender asylum 
claims, specifically those cases where gender is the motivation for 
persecution. Furthermore, the political opinion category has proved to be 
unreliable in cases where the gendered form of persecution is sexual. Various 
Western courts have failed to acknowledge the political element in sexual 
violence against women and simply view it as a ‘private harm’. Overall, 
Western asylum adjudication system’s depoliticisation of women’s 
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experiences of persecution is particularly manifest in cases involving sexual 
violence.  
The final sub-section focuses on the attempts to include gender 
persecution cases under the religion category. Yet again, even though a few 
gender-based persecution cases have been successfully brought under this 
category, it does not cover the whole array of gender persecution cases, as 
discussed. Overall, similarly to the other existing categories of persecution, 
trying to fit a gender persecution case under the religion category in order to 
include it in the existing refugee law framework is a profound misinterpretation 
of the actual motivation behind the persecution and ultimately renders 
persecution experienced exclusively by women due to their gender invisible. 
  
4 2 Inclusion of gender persecution cases under the PSG category 
Owing to the numerous problems that women asylum-seekers face when they 
submit their asylum applications on ‘traditional’ persecution grounds, various 
asylum adjudicators have attempted to ameliorate the situation by including 
claims of gender persecution to the “empirically vexing”759 category of PSG. 
As a consequence, this has led to highly inconsistent results. This approach 
was first adopted by the European Parliament in 1984, when it passed a 
resolution calling upon states to “recognise that women who face harsh or 
inhuman treatment for having transgressed social mores constitute a 
‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the definition of refugee in the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”.760 The following year, 
the UNHCR Executive Committee made its first declaration concerning the 
position of women asylum-seekers and passed Conclusion No. 39 on 
Refugee Women and International Protection, which recognised that:  
 
“States (...) are free to adopt the interpretation that women asylum-
seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having 
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transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live in may 
be considered as a particular social group”.761 
 
In its Conclusion No. 39, the UNHCR addressed two of the main obstacles to 
gender-related persecution claims; firstly the lack of characterisation of 
cultural and social norms as persecution and secondly the lack of causal 
relation to a convention ground.762   
In 2002, the UNHCR reiterated this approach in its Guidelines, 
according to which “sex can properly be within the ambit of the social group 
category, with women being a clear example of a social subset defined by 
innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated 
differently than men”.763  
However, the inclusion of gender in the existing legal framework under 
the PSG ground has been highly problematic in practice, as the category does 
not afford apt protection to victims of all forms of gender persecution. 764 
Furthermore, the use of the PSG category in gender-related claims has led to 
an arbitrary standard of adjudication, as is evident from the case law 
presented below. 765  The inconsistencies in the outcomes of the gender-
related persecution cases can be attributed to the unclear definition of the 
category, which has been described as “ambiguous, narrow and contrived”.766 
As Justice McHugh observed in A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs767 (A) “[c]ourts and jurists have taken widely differing views as to what 
constitutes ‘membership of a particular social group’ for the purposes of the 
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Convention”.768 Overall, no uniform interpretation of what constitutes a PSG 
has emerged among the Western jurisdictions.  
One of the most difficult aspects of defining PSG as a ground for 
gender-related persecution applications is the issue of circularity. This 
problem arises when the application is based on a PSG comprising 
“persecuted women” or “previously abused women”. 769  By basing the 
definition of the PSG on the actual persecution experienced, the essential 
two-step requirement embedded in the 1951 Refugee Convention (a well-
founded fear of persecution based on one of the grounds of the convention) 
becomes a one-step requirement.770 As Schenk observes, in these cases “the 
claimant effectively argues that she is persecuted due to membership in a 
persecuted social group”. 771  The circularity of the argument makes the 
success of the claim highly unlikely, as the case of A772 demonstrates. In its 
judgment in A, the Australian High Court held that the “characteristics defining 
a social group [cannot] be a common fear of persecution as this would negate 
the purpose of linking the refugee definition to civil or political status”.773 
Overall, the dominant international legal sentiment is to preserve the structure 
and integrity of the 1951 Convention. The leading view is that the drafters of 
the 1951 Convention intended the concept of PSG “to apply to social groups 
which exist independently of the persecution”.774 Consequently, PSG cannot 
be based solely on the persecution experienced.775 The UNHCR affirms this 
approach in its 2002 Guidelines, according to which “[i]t is well-accepted that 
it should be possible to identify the group independently of the persecution”.776 
However, arguably in complete contradiction, the 2002 UNHCR Guidelines 
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further state that “discrimination or persecution may be a relevant factor in 
determining the visibility of the group in a particular context”.777  
The ambiguity in the 2002 UNHCR Guidelines can be taken as an 
indicator of the complexity and difficulty of defining the PSG category. It also 
demonstrates the UNHCR’s struggle to find a balance between preserving the 
existing structure of the 1951 Refugee Convention and confronting the 
obvious need to amend and modernise international refugee law in order to 
provide adequate protection to victims of gender-based persecution. 
The problem of circularity has been dealt with, especially in US courts, 
by requiring ‘internal cohesion’ within the proposed PSG. However, the 
requirement of ‘internal cohesion’ has created an “often mechanistic and 
reductive classification problem” when there is an attempt to fit gender-related 
persecution under the PSG category. 778  This problem is caused by the 
delimiting construction of “artificial and ossified sub-categories of women who 
are recognized as subjected to persecution” in the absence of a more suitable 
category on which to base gender claims.779   
Eventually, the requirement of ‘internal cohesion’ within the PSG, 
combined with as narrow a construction of the PSG as possible, has led to the 
removal of external cohesion as a way of defining PSG.780 This has caused 
various problems, specifically for the gender persecution cases, as the 
definition of PSG solely on gender is considered too wide. The fear of the 
refugee-receiving jurisdictions is that, with the relaxation of the requirements 
of internal cohesion, the PSG category could “subsume the entire framework 
of the asylum law”781 and cause a flood of asylum-seekers.   
The fear of widening the definition has also been noted in paragraph 31 
of the 2002 UNHCR Guidelines, according to which “[t]he size of the group 
has sometimes been used as a basis for refusing to recognise ‘women’ 
generally as a particular social group”. 782  However, the 2002 UNHCR 
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Guidelines dismiss this argument and state that it “has no basis in fact or 
reason, as the other grounds are not bound by this question of size”.783  
Nevertheless, in practice it is arguably because of this fear that 
European states are loath to accept a more general recognition of gender as 
a PSG.784 On the whole, the fear of a massive influx of refugees being able to 
build feasible claims, combined with the absence of a universal definition of 
PSG, has led to Western jurisdictions defining PSG as narrowly as 
possible. 785  This has led to reluctance by Western courts to recognise 
‘women’ as a group under the PSG ground, especially in cases where gender-
related persecution in the country of origin is widespread.786 
Owing to the reasons mentioned above, the qualification of gender-
related asylum claims under PSG category and the outcome of gender 
asylum cases in which PSG is used as a ground are increasingly inconsistent 
across Western jurisdictions. The discrepancy has been especially 
problematic in the US.787  
Despite there being a growing body of case law accepting gender at 
least as a part of PSG, numerous US courts continue to refuse to do so. For 
example, the initial success of the pioneering case of In re Kasinga 788 , 
discussed in sub-chapter 3 4 1, in which the BIA accepted gender as a 
component of PSG for the first time, was followed by a severe backlash 
caused by the BIA’s decision in In re R-A-789. As Randall argues, this case 
demonstrated “a blatant unwillingness (...) to recognize gender as the basis of 
persecution”.790  Overall, as Bosi argues, despite BIA’s decision to include 
gender in the meaning of PSG in Kasinga, the inconsistent rulings post-
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Kasinga have demonstrated that women who base their asylum claims on 
gender as a PSG “fight a new battle with each case”.791 
In In re R-A-, even though it acknowledged that the applicant had been 
subjected to severe gender-related physical and sexual persecution 
committed by her husband over decades, the BIA rejected the applicant’s 
asylum claim, because the persecution had not taken place on the account of 
the existing convention grounds.792 The BIA rejected the applicant’s assertion 
of belonging to a PSG comprising “Guatemalan women who have been 
involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that 
women are to live under male domination”. 793  According to the BIA, this 
definition lacked ‘a voluntary association’ among the members of the group, 
which is required by the PSG.794 Despite this requirement contradicting the 
existing standard of PSG as defined in the earlier case of In re Acosta,795 the 
BIA held that ‘voluntary association’ was of “central concern”.796 However, the 
introduction of the element of ‘voluntary association’ as a requirement has 
made it very difficult to fit gender-related persecution cases under the PSG 
category and has received widespread international criticism. For example, in 
the case of Re ZWD,797 the RSAA New Zealand criticised “the tendency of 
some jurisdictions to impose a requirement of voluntary association”798 while 
stating that by doing so “the Court[s] fail to recognize the importance of the 
persecutor’s perception in defining a social group”.799 According to the RSAA, 
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“the existence of a voluntary associational relationship, an internally-defining 
factor, has no origin in the Refugee Convention”.800 Similarly, the ‘voluntary 
association’ requirement has been rejected in the UK by the House of Lords in 
Islam and Shah 801 and by the High Court of Australia in A v Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.802 Furthermore, according to the 2002 UNHCR 
Guidelines, “[t]here should (...) be no requirement that the particular social 
group be cohesive or that members of it voluntarily associate”.803 
Despite the later vacation of the BIA’s decision by the attorney general 
in 2001 and the decision in 2009 by the Immigration Judge (IJ) to grant 
asylum to the applicant in In re R-A-, there is still no conclusive decision on 
gender as a component in the PSG category.804 The US asylum adjudicators 
continue to resist the inclusion of gender as a component of PSG, especially 
in asylum applications by victims of domestic violence. For example, in 2010, 
in an unreported case, a US asylum court stated that “nothing had changed 
since R-A-”.805 Similarly in 2011, US asylum adjudicators denied asylum to 
victims of gender-related persecution by rejecting the notion that “Indian 
women in a domestic relationship and unable to free themselves from their 
partners and viewed as property by nature of their position in a domestic 
relationship” 806  and “women in abusive relationships in El Salvador who 
escape the country in order to flee their abuser”807 form a PSG. As Bookey 
observes, in recent years various US courts have reached similar conclusions 
in several other gender-related persecution cases brought under the PSG 
category.808 
Furthermore, in cases where victims of gender-related persecution 
have been granted asylum on a PSG ground, the courts have had to resort to 
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legal manipulation. This has led to a complex and constricted construction of 
the PSG. For example, in Kasinga, rather than acknowledging that the 
persecution in question (female genital mutilation) was based solely on 
gender and consequently defining the PSG as women in general, the BIA 
defined the relevant PSG as comprising “young women of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu tribe who had not undergone female genital mutilation and who 
were opposed to the practice”.809   
There have however, been some advances regarding the utilisation of 
the PSG ground in gender-related asylum claims in the recent years. For 
example, in a 2005 case entitled Ali v Ashcroft,810 the Ninth Circuit granted 
asylum to a Somali woman “whose brother-in-law was shot and killed in her 
home while she was being raped by members of a militia group of a rival clan 
who opposed Ali’s political beliefs”.811 In this progressive decision, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed IJ and BIA’s decisions branding the gender-related 
persecution in question as private harm and instead held that the appellant 
was persecuted based on her political opinion as well as her membership in a 
PSG that encompasses her clan. 812  However, what makes the situation 
problematic and is a cause for serious worry is that as a result of persistent 
uncertainty and inconsistency in case law, the decision reached might have 
been very different “if [it] had been brought in circuits other than the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals”.813 For example, despite the asylum-warranting facts 
of the case, the application would most likely have been refused if it had been 
heard by the Fifth Circuit, which additionally requires the persecution having 
been “performed with a ‘punitive intent’”.814  
  Furthermore, in 2009 the Obama Administration published a brief that 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) submitted in the In re L-R- case. 
In this brief, the DHS acknowledges that groups comprising “Mexican women 
in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and “Mexican women who 
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are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within domestic relations” 
could form a PSG.815 In general, according to the DHS brief, PSG for victims 
of domestic violence could be formed by taking into account “the way in which 
the abuser and society perceive their position in a domestic relationship”.816 
As the DHS further stated, “in some cases, a victim of domestic violence may 
be a member of cognizable particular social group and may be able to show 
that her abuse was or would be persecution on account of such 
membership”. 817  Yet, despite the DHS having proposed a new legal 
justification for granting asylum to victims of domestic violence, it still “stopped 
short of advocating a full grant of protected status”.818 
Notwithstanding these developments, many US immigration judges 
continue to reject the wider approach towards gender asylum cases and 
express “scepticism regarding the viability of domestic violence as a basis for 
asylum under any circumstances”.819 As Lobo observes, “the lower US courts 
rarely recognize ‘women’ as a particular social group; they either deny gender 
asylum claims or grant relief via a more narrowly-defined particular social 
group”.820 Overall, while the US has recognised a limited amount of cases in 
which the PSG is at least partly constructed on gender, including some cases 
involving FGM and domestic violence, there are still large problems that can 
only be remedied by broadening the definition of refugee to include gender.821  
By comparison, the Canadian Supreme Court highlighted the element 
of immutability in the construction of a PSG in one of the most progressive 
cases with regard to gender-related persecution, namely Canada (Attorney 
General) v Ward (Ward). 822  In Ward, Justice La Forest identified three 
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categories for defining a social group within the meaning of the refugee 
definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention. These categories include innate or 
unchangeable characteristics, voluntary association for reasons so 
fundamental to human dignity that the applicant should not be forced to 
forsake the association and association by a former voluntary status, 
unalterable due to its historical permanence. 823  Furthermore, Justice La 
Forest acknowledged ‘gender’ itself, without any qualification, as a basis for 
PSG, because it is an ‘innate characteristic’.824  
Despite the Canadian Supreme Court’s ruling in Ward, there is still 
confusion in Canada as to whether or not gender alone can constitute a PSG. 
According to the Canadian Gender Guidelines, PSG cannot be “based solely 
on the common victimization of its members”.825 Yet, the Guidelines also state 
that PSG is “not defined solely by common victimization if the claimant’s fear 
of persecution is also based on her gender”.826 As Adjin-Tettey argues, this 
seems to suggest that PSG will be defined by “reference to gender and some 
other characteristic, usually the common victimization which confronts group 
members”.827 This approach has been used before, for example in the cases 
of Narvaez v M.C.I.828 and Diluna v M.E.I., in which the PSG was defined as 
“women subject to domestic abuse”,829 and in Cheung v M.E.I, in which the 
PSG was defined as “women in China who have more than one child, and are 
faced with forced sterilization because of this, form a particular social group 
so as to come within the meaning of the definition of a Convention refugee”.830 
Despite the positive impact that the definition above of a PSG has had, 
especially on the success rate of gender-based persecution claims, this 
approach is problematic because of its underlying circularity. As Adjin-Tettey 
argues, “naming a particular harm feared as the basis of defining the group 
deviates from the focus on immutability as the foundation of gender-based 
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social groups (...) The common victimization is of course not innate, and is 
clearly not the basis upon which the harm is feared”.831 This was noted by the 
IRB in America Torres,832 where the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) 
found the applicant’s assertion that she belonged to a PSG consisting of 
“abused women who do not receive any effective protection from their home 
state” to be circular. In rejecting the PSG, the IRB stated that a “claimant must 
fear persecution for a Convention reason. The Convention reason must pre-
exist the persecution. To argue that someone is persecuted for the reason 
that she is persecuted is [irrational]”.833 
In order to eliminate the problem of circularity, PSG has to be defined 
with regard to the vulnerability in general caused by an innate character (such 
as gender) rather than “by reference to particular forms of vulnerability”.834 
Adjin-Tettey argues that it is logical to base PSG on gender alone, as: 
 
“Women constitute a particular social group both because of an innate 
characteristic that they share (gender), and because of their 
susceptibility to serious human rights violations. The fact that not all 
women are targets of gender-related serious human rights abuses at 
any one particular time does not affect the designation of women as a 
particular social group”.835 
 
Like the Canadian jurisprudence, the UK House of Lords has 
recognised gender as a component of PSG, in Islam and Shah.836  In its 
judgment, the House of Lords rejected the Court of Appeals’ finding that there 
was “no common uniting attribute which could entitle the appellants to the 
status of ‘membership of a particular social group’”.837 In construing the PSG 
category, the House of Lords identified three required elements, namely a 
common immutable characteristic, a social perception test (as proposed by 
Lord Hope as an alternative test to the common immutable character test) and 
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a prohibition of persecution experienced. The latter was the defining element 
of the PSG, because of the circularity of the argument. Furthermore, the 
House of Lords noted that there was no need for every one of the members to 
fear persecution in order for them to compose a PSG.838 Despite accepting 
that gender constituted a part of a PSG, the House of Lords was divided in its 
judgment on whether the PSG should comprise “Pakistani women” or 
“Pakistani women accused of adultery”. Consequently, similarly to the 
situation in Canada, it is unclear whether or not the House of Lords ruled that 
gender alone constitutes a PSG.  
Undeniably, the lack of express acceptance of gender alone as the 
basis of a PSG is one of the biggest obstacles for a woman asylum-seeker 
fleeing gender-based persecution to overcome. With the exception of 
Ireland, 839  Germany, 840  Sweden 841  and Spain, 842  European countries have 
taken a more restrictive approach to the interpretation of this ground.843 For 
example, according to a 2012 report by the European Parliament (2012 
European Parliament Report), in France “authorities are reluctant to consider 
gender as a Convention ground”.844  Furthermore, in cases where PSG is 
used, the French asylum authorities “tend to limit the definition of a PSG by 
adopting a cumulative approach to PSG and requiring that applicants ma[k]e 
their opinion/behaviour public, resulting in a non-gender-sensitive approach 
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and leaving some women applicants unprotected”. 845  The report also 
observed that in the UK, “if more than one Convention ground was engaged 
in, only the non-gender-related Convention ground was given appropriate 
consideration in women’s asylum cases”.846 
Overall, rather than including gender persecution in the domestic 
asylum legislation, various European states have opted to make the asylum 
process more gender-sensitive by publishing legally non-binding Gender 
Guidelines. For example, neither Dutch nor Norwegian legislation “include any 
mention of gender-based persecution”. 847  However, Norway’s Ministry of 
Justice issued gender guidelines in 1998 that recognised persecution 
committed by non-state agents and the possibility of gender constituting a 
convention ground for the granting of refugee status.848 Asylum guidelines in 
the Netherlands (Vreemdelingencirculaire) further “advocate a ‘gender-
inclusive approach to asylum’”,849 and it is the official policy of the Dutch 
government that: 
 
“[p]ersecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group 
may also be taken to include persecution because of social position on 
the basis of sex. This may be especially true in situations where 
discrimination against women in society, contrary to the rulings of 
international law, has been institutionalized and where women who 
oppose this discrimination, or distance themselves from it, are faced 
with drastic sanctions, either from the authorities themselves, or from 
their social environment, where the authorities are unwilling or unable 
to offer protection”.850 
 
Similarly, Lithuania, which has no binding asylum legislation with 
regard to gender persecution, has issued a non-binding electronic manual that 
“incorporates a number of gender-related persecution points, including a 
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definition of a Particular Social Group [with] reference to gender as one 
possible PSG”.851  
According to the 2012 European Parliament Report, PSG in Europe is 
“disproportionally used in gender-related cases compared to the other 
Convention grounds”.852 However, possibly due to the restrictive approach 
adopted by the European states, the report concluded that while PSG is 
almost exclusively the ground used in gender persecution cases, it is often 
neither properly analysed nor defined.853 
The rejection of gender alone as a ground for PSG has led to the 
emergence of the ‘gender +’ standard, which requires refugee women to 
identify themselves “more narrowly as a part of a particular subset of the 
female population”.854 This is one of the main difficulties that arise when PSG 
is used as a ground in gender persecution cases. As the 2012 European 
Parliament Report observes: 
 
“One of the difficulties [of using the PSG category] is that gender alone 
may not be enough for the applicability of the particular social group, 
which means that international protection is not granted. Unless the 
reasons for persecution include gender in addition to another ground, 
there is a restrictive interpretation”.855 
 
Consequently, at worst, the incorporation of gender as a sub-division of 
PSG can turn out to be nothing more than pseudo-inclusion, leaving victims of 
gender-related persecution without real protection. Even in jurisdictions where 
‘gender’ alone is accepted as a PSG, such as Sweden, studies suggest that 
the inclusion of gender as a sub-category of PSG has “had little impact on 
practical applications”.856 This is caused by the hidden gender bias in the 
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actual inclusion of gender itself in the legislative framework.857 As Nilsson 
explains:  
 
“In the investigation that the Government bill is based on there is also a 
discussion about ‘wife-battering’, where it is declared that there may be 
many reasons for a woman to be exposed to serious battering; for 
instance, because she has been unfaithful, or accused of being 
unfaithful – the primary or driving force normally being seen to be 
jealousy. According to the investigation, it would be far-fetched to say 
that the action of the man in these cases is due to her “membership of 
a particular social group”.858 
 
Owing to the hidden gender bias, the aforementioned investigation 
makes a majority of domestic violence cases out to be ‘private harm’, while it 
completely ignores the root cause: ongoing structural violence against 
women. It is this larger framework of structural violence, which takes the form 
of domination and control and of which domestic violence is a manifestation 
that is aimed at women solely because of their gender.      
The inclusion of gender as a mere sub-category of PSG has a 
detrimental impact overall on gender-related asylum claims. As Kandt argues: 
 
“[G]ranting women refugees asylum under the ‘social group’ category 
lessens the importance of gender-based persecution in comparison to 
the other four categories of persecution recognized in the UN 
Convention definition, such as race or national origin. This is the case 
because gender is still not on par with the other four categories 
because it is hidden under the social group rubric”.859 
 
Treating the inclusion of gender in the PSG as a solution to the 
exclusion of women from the current refugee framework has received serious 
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criticism. According to Bosi, this approach has created a “mechanistic and 
reductive classification problem by creating artificial sub-categories that are 
arbitrarily either denied or granted asylum”.860 Similarly, Doyle argues that the 
incorporation of gender in the ‘particular social group’ category is simply 
unsatisfactory.861 Tuitt has further criticised the inclusion of gender under the 
‘particular social group’ by stating that the category is, like other grounds of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, “Eurocentric and gender-partisan”. 862 
According to Tuitt, relying upon PSG compromises women’s status as 
refugees. Ultimately, “by denying women a gender-specific identity within the 
Convention definition, the morality of the Convention is reasserted”. 863 
Crawley echoes this sentiment by stating that the inclusion of ‘women’ under 
PSG should be treated as a last resort. She concludes that the framework for 
asylum determination has to be transformed in order to include women “not as 
a special case deviating from the norm, but as one of many groups (...) in a 
heterogeneous universe”.864  
Although there have been some positive legal developments, Western 
asylum adjudicators generally continue to fail to provide adequate protection 
to victims of gender persecution, because they do not incorporate the cases 
under the PSG category. As Birdsong argues, the lack of precedent and the 
wide discretionary powers of the domestic courts have led to judicial 
uncertainty with regard to the PSG category and have made it “difficult to 
readily predict how such cases may be decided before filing”.865 Even though 
the utilisation of the PSG category has been successful in some types of 
gender-related persecution cases, its applicability to gender-based 
persecution cases is very limited. Thus, PSG continues to be a tremendously 
uncertain nexus for the majority of gender-based persecution cases in which 
women seeking refugee status on that basis receive inadequate protection.866  
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4 3 Inclusion of gender persecution cases under the political opinion 
category 
Besides the attempt to construct a PSG as discussed in the preceding sub-
chapter, Western courts have taken additional approaches in their attempts to 
accommodate asylum applications based on gender-based persecution. One 
of them is trying to fit these claims under the ‘political opinion’ category, as 
indicated in Article 1(A)2 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This has been 
done by construing ‘political opinion’ to include a woman’s attitude towards 
her government or her opinion about the treatment of women in her 
country.867 Political opinion has also been attributed to women based on “the 
perception of members of the established socio-political structure that she 
holds inappropriate views because of her deviation from prescribed roles”.868 
The use of political opinion as a ground for persecution in gender asylum 
claims has also been sanctioned in the 2002 UNHCR Gender Guidelines. 
According to the Guidelines:  
 
“Political opinion should be understood in the broad sense, to 
incorporate any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of State, 
government, society, or policy may be engaged. This may include an 
opinion as to gender roles. It would also include non-conformist 
behaviour which leads the persecutor to impute a political opinion to 
him or her”.869  
 
The utilisation of the ‘political opinion’ category has, however, proved to 
be problematic for victims of gender-related persecution. While overt 
expression of political opinion through conventional means has traditionally 
been accepted as a basis for political asylum, “the less conventional forms of 
political resistance [often applied by women], such as a refusal to abide by 
discriminatory laws or to follow prescribed rules of conduct, are often wrongly 
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categorised as personal conduct”.870 The less traditional forms of women’s 
political resistance have also been recognised in the 2002 UNHCR Gender 
Guidelines, according to which “direct involvement in political activity does not 
always correspond to the reality of the experiences of women in some 
societies”. 871  According to the 2002 UNHCR Guidelines “women are less 
likely than their male counterparts to engage in high profile political activity 
and are more often involved in ‘low level’ political activities that reflect 
dominant gender roles”.872 The Guidelines further state that, “these factors 
need to be taken into account in gender-related claims”.873  
Yet, in practice this is rarely the case. As Crawley observes, “women’s 
political activities have typically been seen as marginal, peripheral or non-
existent”.874 There is also a tendency in Western courts to “depoliticise the 
experiences of women seeking asylum” and a failure to acknowledge the 
“gendered forms that political participation and resistance may assume”.875 
Case law reflects this tendency. 876  Furthermore, in cases where Western 
courts have accepted women’s activities as political, they are often viewed as 
being so ‘low-level’ that the applicant’s fear of persecution is considered to be 
unfounded.877  
The inherent gender bias in the interpretation of what constitutes a 
political opinion has been also demonstrated by several Western courts that 
“grant[ed] male refugees asylum while female refugees were denied asylum in 
similar cases”.878 Kandt argues that such occurrences are fairly common.879 
In addition, what makes the use of the political opinion nexus in gender 
asylum cases problematic is that, in a similar manner to the PSG ground, the 
results of the cases in which it has been used are rife with inconsistencies. 
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This is particularly true of US jurisprudence. In the first successful case in the 
US in which gender-related persecution was brought under the ‘political 
opinion’ ground, Lazo-Majano880 the Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision 
to reject the claim and granted asylum to the applicant who had been sexually 
and physically abused over an extended period of time by an army officer for 
whom she worked. According to the BIA’s earlier finding, the harm that the 
applicant had experienced and feared “was strictly personal and did not 
constitute persecution”.881  
In its innovative judgment, the Ninth Circuit found that the applicant 
was eligible for asylum based on her actual political opinion as well as the 
political opinion imputed on her by her persecutor. 882  With regard to the 
imputed political opinion, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a person does not have 
to be politically active or aware to suffer persecution on account of political 
opinion. It is sufficient that the persecutor thinks that the person is guilty of a 
political opinion”.883 While analysing the asylum claim, the Ninth Circuit took 
an expansive approach to the interpretation of ‘political opinion’ and came to 
the conclusion that if the circumstances of the case were seen in a social 
context, the persecutor was: 
 
“[…] asserting the political opinion that a man has a right to dominate 
and he has persecuted [the applicant] to force her to accept this 
opinion without rebellion. [The persecutor] told [the applicant] that in his 
treatment of her he was seeking revenge (...) His statement reflects a 
(...) generalized animosity to the opposite sex, an assertion of a 
political aspiration and the desire to suppress opposition to it. [The 
applicant] was not permitted by [the persecutor] to hold an opinion to 
the contrary. When by flight, she asserted one, she became exposed to 
persecution for her assertion. Persecution threatened her because of 
her political opinion”.884 
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The Ninth Circuit’s decision indicates that where a woman “demonstrates a 
resistance to male domination, or to the state’s refusal or inability to protect 
victims from gender-based violence and/or repression, she expresses a 
political opinion and can provide the grounds for a claim to asylum and a well-
founded fear of persecution”.885   
The Ninth Circuit’s wide interpretation of the political opinion nexus has 
been contradicted, however, in various post-Lazo-Majano cases, causing 
judicial uncertainty and confusion about the current state of the law. For 
example, in Campos-Guardado886 the Fifth Circuit denied the applicant’s claim 
for asylum based on an imputed political opinion. In Campos-Guardado, the 
applicant had been forced to watch the political assassination of her uncle and 
her cousins by a group of guerrillas and was then raped while the guerrillas 
shouted political slogans.887 One of the guerrillas had later threatened to kill 
the applicant on numerous occasions if she revealed his identity. Believing 
that she would not be protected by the state in El Salvador, the applicant fled 
to the US and applied for asylum. In its judgment, the Fifth Circuit denied 
asylum and upheld the BIA’s ruling according to which the sexual violence 
that the applicant had experienced was private harm and took place as a 
result of a ‘personal relationship’ rather than an imputed political opinion.888  
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Campos-Guardado has been criticised 
specifically for not detecting the political undertone of the violence inflicted on 
the applicant. As Bahl argues, while the type of violence inflicted “was clearly 
delineated by gender (...) the reason for assaulting [the applicant and her 
uncle and cousins] was probably the same”.889 The decision has also been 
widely criticised for contradicting the earlier case of Lazo-Majano and for 
missing the opportunity to “explore and define gender-specific persecution 
claims”.890  
One of the main failures of the court, however, was to view sexual 
violence as a private act while ignoring its political nature. As Bahl argues, the 
ambivalent attitude of Western courts in general “is typical when the abuse is 
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sexual, reflecting a reluctance to consider rape and other sexual assaults as 
violent acts constituting persecution (...) It is indeed easier to consider such 
acts as being personally motivated, and confining them to the private 
domain”. 891  This sentiment is echoed by Crawley, who argues that the 
depoliticisation of women’s experiences of persecution is “particularly evident 
in cases involving sexual violence”.892  
 In Klawitter v INS,893 the Sixth Circuit upheld the BIA’s denial of asylum 
in a case where the applicant had been blacklisted and sexually assaulted by 
the Chief of Security and Internal Affairs in the Polish government due to her 
refusal to join the Communist Party. In rejecting the asylum application, the 
Sixth Circuit found that sexual violence experienced by the applicant was 
premised on the persecutor’s personal interest in her rather than “any interest 
on his part to ‘persecute’ her”.894 As Kandt observes, the Sixth Circuit failed to 
recognise the violence against the applicant committed by the Chief of 
Security and Internal Affairs as persecution because the court viewed it as a 
romantic gesture.895  
 One of the most recent rejections of the ‘imputed political opinion’ 
approach utilised by the Ninth Circuit in Lazo-Majano was in the case of In re 
R-A- as discussed in 3 4 1.896 Contradicting Lazo-Majano, the BIA rejected 
the applicant’s assertion that the physical and sexual violence that the 
applicant’s husband subjected her to was motivated by an actual or imputed 
political opinion (mainly the applicant’s resistance to the belief that women are 
to live under male domination). The BIA dismissed the applicant’s opinion 
simply as “the common human desire not to be harmed or abused”. 897 
Similarly, in In re Kuna,898 the BIA rejected the assertion that the applicant, a 
woman from the Democratic Republic of the Congo subjected to domestic 
violence by her husband, was persecuted because of her imputed political 
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opinion. According to BIA, the applicant was subjected to persecution simply 
because “her husband was a despicable person”.899  
There have since been positive developments with regard to the use of 
political opinion as a ground for certain types of gender asylum claims, 
including domestic violence. In 2002, political opinion was accepted as a 
ground for gender-related persecution in the US in a string of unreported 
cases. In the first case, the IJ characterised the applicant’s belief that she 
should free from abuse by her husband as ‘feminism’ and consequently 
awarded the applicant asylum on the grounds of political opinion.900 In the 
second unreported case involving domestic violence, the BIA constructed the 
opinion as a “belief in the right to live independently and free of male 
dominance”,901 while in the third case, the board defined the political opinion 
in question as the applicant’s “refusal to conform to the societal norm of being 
subservient”.902  
Despite the positive outcomes of the abovementioned cases, the 
discrepancy of the results in the use of political opinion as a ground, 
especially in cases involving domestic violence, corrodes the credibility of the 
political opinion ground as being able to provide adequate protection to 
victims of gender-related persecution. More importantly, however, as Macklin 
argues: 
 
“[D]omestic violence is not about what a woman believes, but about her 
gender identity—and the sexist beliefs of the man who abuses her. 
This cannot be captured under the rubric of political opinion because 
(...) political opinion refers to the victim’s beliefs, and not those of the 
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persecutor. Contorting resistance to domestic violence into a political 
opinion is both awkward and unnecessary”.903  
 
Similarly, according to Randall, while the strategy of fitting gender asylum 
claims under political opinion category “has succeeded for some individual 
women seeking asylum”, in the process “it has (...) produced contorted legal 
reasoning to support such claims”.904 
 Some cases have, however, been relatively successful in bringing 
gender-based persecution claims under the political opinion category. This 
has been the case especially with regard to claims involving forced 
sterilisations and forced abortions. Specifically with regard to gender asylum 
claims involving fear of forced sterilisation due to the Chinese government’s 
one-child policy, Western courts have seen the gender-related persecutory 
act as effectively constituting “punishment for refusal to abide by Government 
policies”. 905  By means of forced sterilisations, the Chinese government is 
imputing a political opinion on the victims, “because it brands [the victim] as 
an opponent of the regime and punishes her on this basis”.906 With regard to 
forced sterilisation/forced abortions, there have been a variety of successful 
claims under political opinion across Western jurisdictions, including the 
US,907 the UK908 and New Zealand.909 
Correspondingly, the use of political opinion as a ground for gender-
related persecution claims has been quite successful in claims involving 
women’s opposition to extreme institutionalised forms of discrimination and 
oppression. For example, there have been several cases in which women 
have refused to succumb to strict religious dress codes or have “expresse[d] 
views of independence from social or cultural dominance of men in [their] 
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society”,910 and where the courts have construed this to be an expression of 
their political opinion. For instance, in the Canadian case Namitabar v Canada 
(Namitabar) 911  the Court of Appeal recognised that “laws of general 
application – such as a dress code – could be persecutory”912 and linked the 
Iranian applicant’s fear of persecution (74 lashes with a whip for her refusal to 
wear a chador) to a political opinion. According to the court, “in a country 
where the oppression of women is institutionalized any (...) act opposed to the 
imposition of a clothing code will be seen as a manifestation of opposition to 
the established theocratic regime”.913 As MacIntosh argues, in Namitabar “the 
court recognized that what may appear as an inconsequential act—a 
woman’s decision about what to wear—may be categorized as a political 
statement that puts a women’s safety at risk and that this political statement is 
of a character to trigger international protection obligations”.914 This approach 
has been supported by Macklin, according to whom “identifying women’s 
resistance to gender subordination as political opinion [is] profoundly feminist, 
if indeed one believes that “the personal is political,” and that patriarchy is a 
system constituted primarily through power relations, not biology”.915  
However, there have also been contradictions in the results, even in 
these types of gender-asylum cases, as demonstrated by the British 
Immigration Appellate Authority’s (BIAA) decision in Mahshid Mahmoudi 
Gilani v The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Gilani).916 Despite 
recognising that “women in particular in many instances suffer horrendous 
treatment” as a result of “minor infringements of the Islamic faith”,917 the BIAA 
nevertheless found that “failing to conform with social mores did not amount to 
an expression of political opinion”.918 
According to a 2012 report by the European Parliament, while some 
European countries such as Belgium, Hungary, Italy and Malta have 
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occasionally included gender-based persecution under the political opinion 
category, asylum adjudicators in France, Spain and Sweden “generally fail to 
implement a broad gender-sensitive definition of political opinion”. 919  With 
regard to France, the report found that there had been a “worsening of 
practice in this type of claims”.920 Similarly, with reference to Sweden, the 
report found that despite the domestic preparatory works outlining examples 
of gender-sensitive interpretation of the concept of political opinion, the 
“decision-makers at all instances almost systematically fail to encompass a 
broad gender-sensitive definition of political opinion and religious opinion 
which includes opinions on gender roles expressed verbally or by 
transgression of gendered social norms or laws”.921 Furthermore, according to 
the report, the existing Swedish Gender Guidelines “do not observe the need 
for a gender-sensitive interpretation of political opinion”.922 
In addition, according to the report, in France, Hungary, Sweden and 
the UK, women who base their asylum claim on the political opinion category 
have experienced serious obstacles especially if their political involvement 
was low-level or not viewed as “organised political activity”. 923  The report 
further concluded that theoretical acknowledgement of women being less 
likely to hold high-profile political positions due to traditional gender roles “is 
not reflected in the asylum practice” of the aforementioned countries. 924 
Overall, despite catering (to some extent) to certain types of gender-based 
persecution claims, such as domestic violence and forced sterilisation, the 
‘political opinion’ category effectively excludes many other gender-based 
claims. 925  The inclusion of gender-based persecution claims under the 
‘political opinion’ category has been further criticised for “fundamentally 
misconstruing the underlying purpose of the [Refugee] Convention”. 926 
Political opinion as a ground is a particularly difficult fit with regard to the 
majority of sexual violence cases amounting to persecution. As Chan argues, 
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“the fundamental harms of rape and sexual violence are far from the political 
opinions that the Convention originally envisioned in the form of political 
dissidents, but rather much more closely tied to gender”.927 
Using the political opinion category to define gender-based persecution 
“denies the real cause of persecution” and thus, makes a “poor substitute for 
an independent gender nexus”.928 Ultimately, the political opinion category 
cannot cater to the wide range of claims based on gender-related persecution 
and “fundamentally mischaracterises” the experiences of women refugees.929  
 
4 4 Inclusion of gender persecution cases under the religion category 
The third option is to include gender claims under the existing international 
refugee law framework through the ‘religion’ category. According to paragraph 
72 of the UNHCR Handbook, persecution for religious reasons can take 
various forms, including “measures of discrimination imposed on persons 
because they practise their religion or belong to a particular religious 
community”.930  
The 2002 UNHCR Guidelines acknowledge in Section 25 that “[w]here 
a woman does not fulfil her assigned role or refuses to abide by the codes, 
and is punished as a consequence, she may have a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of religion”.931 The 2002 UNHCR Guidelines 
further recognise that “[a] woman may face harm for her particular religious 
beliefs or practices, or those attributed to her, including her refusal to hold 
particular beliefs, to practise a prescribed religion or to conform her behaviour 
in accordance with the teachings of a prescribed religion”.932 In Section 26, 
the UNHCR 2002 Guidelines also state that there is often overlap between 
“the grounds of religion and political opinion in gender-related claims, 
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especially in the realm of imputed political opinion”. 933  According to the 
Guidelines, “[w]hile religious tenets require certain kinds of behaviour from a 
woman, contrary behaviour may be perceived as evidence of an unacceptable 
political opinion”.934 
Similarly, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs’ Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision Makers acknowledge in 
paragraph 4(30) that “in certain societies, the role ascribed to women may be 
attributable to requirements of state or official religion”.935 According to the 
same paragraph, “the failure of women to confirm to this role or model of 
behaviour may (...) be perceived by authorities or other agents of persecution 
as a failure to practice or hold certain religious beliefs and as such an attempt 
to corrupt the society or even as a threat to the religion’s continued power”.936  
Moreover, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board’s Guidelines 
on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution 937 
recognise that a woman might be persecuted for religious reasons. According 
to the Canadian Guidelines, a woman who “chooses not to subscribe to or 
follow the precepts of a state religion may be at risk of persecution for reasons 
of religion”.938 The Canadian Guidelines further include the right not to hold a 
particular belief system and the right not to practise a prescribed religion to be 
part of freedom of religion.939  
With regard to Europe, the 2012 European Parliament Report, as 
referred to in 4 2, found that there is often “some overlap between the 
grounds of political opinion and religion in gender-related claims for 
asylum”. 940  However, in some countries, such as France, Sweden
 
and 
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Hungary, gender persecution cases are rarely mainstreamed into the concept 
of religion. 941  Similarly in Austria, the recognition of a transgression of 
religious or social mores is rare,942 and various cases have been rejected due 
to the view that “there is no Convention ground”. 943  The 2012 European 
Parliament Report further found that there had been a worsening of practice 
especially in France.944 According to the report, women face major difficulties 
in the recognition of religion as a convention ground in gender-related asylum 
claims, because the “French authorities [fail] to apply a gender-sensitive 
interpretation of the Convention ground of religion”.945 Generally, the practice 
is inconsistent across all countries.946 
Overall, as with the inclusion of gender under the ‘political opinion’ 
category, the problem with including gender under the ‘religion’ category is its 
very limited applicability. Despite potentially being advantageous in certain 
specific gender-related claims, the religion category still leaves the majority of 
gender-related persecution cases outside the scope of the 1951 Convention. 
More importantly, trying to fit gender-related claims under the religion 
category once again fundamentally misconstrues the actual reason for 
persecution and ultimately reduces persecution experienced uniquely by 
women due to their gender undetectable. 
 
4 5 Conclusion 
As demonstrated above, one of the most difficult hurdles faced by women 
applying for asylum under the existing international refugee law regime is the 
requirement of nexus between the persecution experienced and one of the 
five grounds embedded in the 1951 Convention. The reason behind the 
difficulties that women experience is not the legitimacy of the persecution 
experienced but clearly the lack of gender as an explicit ground for 
persecution under the current refugee definition. As a consequence, victims of 
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gender related persecution have been forced to try to fit their claims under the 
existing grounds, namely PSG, political opinion and religion, but these 
attempts have resulted in mixed outcomes, as discussed above. None of the 
existing grounds are capable of providing appropriate protection for women 
fleeing persecution due their gender. 
Overall, by attempting to fit gender-related persecution claims under 
the existing but ill-fitting grounds rather than acknowledging gender as an 
independent ground for persecution, the current international refugee law 
framework provides an insufficient, “patchwork-like [and] individualized micro-
level solution to a complex macro level social (...) problem”. 947  More 
worryingly, because of the unsuitable use of the current persecution grounds, 
an inappropriate focus has been placed on these highly fabricated and often 
logically questionably grounds, rather than on the real cause of the 
persecution experienced by women: their gender. As Stevens argues, “merely 
incorporating gender-based violations into the already existing categories is 
an insufficient approach to removing the inherent biases women currently 
must overcome in order to obtain refugee status”.948 
Without a radical modernisation of the current international refugee law 
framework and the inclusion of ‘gender’ as an independent ground of 
persecution, women seeking refuge on the basis of gender-related crimes 
have “no proper outlet to seek such sanctity”. 949  Without a complete 
transformation of the refugee law framework with regard to gender as a 
ground for asylum, millions of women will continue to be denied the protection 
that they deserve, which will be a setback for the fundamental humanitarian 
purpose of the international refugee law regime.  
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Chapter 5 
The complex context of gender-based persecution 
 
5 1 Introduction 
In chapter 3 I presented an in-depth analysis of the problems and 
shortcomings of the current refugee definition with regard to gender-related 
persecution. In chapter 4 I subsequently engaged with the issues of linking 
persecution with any of the five grounds set out in Art 1(a) of the 1951 
Convention and Art 1(1) which is the nexus requirement and the related 
problems. Before presenting some of the solutions in chapter 6, a handful of 
issues relating to the context of gender-related persecution, the actors 
commonly involved in gender-related persecution and the implications of 
underlying policies will be highlighted in this chapter.  
The aim of this chapter is to create further context and understanding of 
gender-based persecution by examining whether the dichotomous 
construction of persecutory acts as ‘public’ and ‘private’ has aggravated the 
gender inequality under the current refugee law framework. I deliberate on 
this question by using the feminist method of analysing the ‘gendered coding’ 
in the deep-rooted public/private dichotomy embedded in the current 
interpretation of persecution, as discussed under 1 4 above. 
The first sub-chapter discusses the deep-rooted public/private dichotomy 
in the currently dominant definition of ‘persecution’ and its detrimental effects 
on women’s asylum applications based on gender-related persecution. The 
issue is analysed through an examination of the gender-bias construction of 
‘public acts’ and an exploration of the political dimension of gender-related 
persecution building on the important conclusions drawn in the previous 
chapter.  
Next, Western asylum adjudicators’ gender-bias approach to persecution 
perpetrated by non-state actors is discussed in the second sub-chapter. In 
this discussion, the emerging ‘bifurcated approach’ is examined, and 
accordingly I argued that gender-related violence escalates to the level of 
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direct persecution when the violence is either directly linked to the state or 
“condoned by the tacit silence and passivity displayed by the state”.950  
The additional requirement of ‘utility’, which many receiving developed 
states place on refugee women, is discussed in the third sub-section of the 
chapter. The policy of highlighting the ‘utility’ of the asylum-seekers ultimately 
results in favouring ‘easily assailable’ refugees, who are almost exclusively 
male. Women, by contrast, are often considered to be more difficult to 
assimilate, due to their lack of education and work experience, which is 
caused by their limited access to social and economic opportunities in their 
countries of origin, as was highlighted in sub-chapter 1 6. Furthermore, the 
various types of discrimination many that women asylum-seekers face is 
analysed. Besides discrimination based on gender, women asylum-seekers 
from other developing countries often face discrimination based on their race. 
Refugee women, in particular, have become targets of ‘othering’ in the 
selection process for resettlement. This has eventually led to a situation 
where refugee women’s migration from the Third World to Western countries 
has virtually ceased951 and women are increasingly forced to seek asylum in 
neighbouring developing countries, which places a heavy burden on these 
host countries.   
The fourth sub-chapter discusses the rapidly increasing xenophobic 
attitudes towards refugees that has emerged as a further obstacle for asylum-
seeking women. The more and more xenophobic, racist atmosphere is 
particularly detrimental to women asylum-seekers, as it often causes them to 
“remain silent about their experiences of gender discrimination and violence 
within their own communities”.952  
Finally, the impact of the ‘culturalist approach’ will be discussed in the final 
sub-chapter. Under this approach, women asylum-seekers are constructed 
either ‘culturally’ or ‘socially’, which results in the diminishment of their 
experiences as refugees. By attributing persecution experienced by women 
refugees to culture alone, the adjudicators deploying the ‘culturalist approach’ 
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fail to recognise violence against women as a global phenomenon and as the 
“most pervasive abuse of human rights”.953  
 
5 2 Public/private dichotomy  
The majority of violence experienced by women takes place in a domestic or 
family setting, which international (and domestic) law has traditionally viewed 
as a ‘private sphere’.954 Violence and/or discrimination in the private sphere is 
often considered to fall outside the jurisdiction of international law and more 
importantly, in the context of the present research, outside the scope of both 
international and domestic refugee law.955 Despite international human rights 
law being commonly regarded as a “radical development of international law”, 
because it contests the traditional public/private dichotomy between states 
and individuals embedded in the international law discipline, “it has retained 
the deeper, gendered, public/private distinction”.956  
As I discussed under 3 2 3 above primacy is often given to the 
protection of civil and political rights, and protection is often directed towards 
protection of men facing persecution within their public life.957 As important as 
this protection may be, it does not address the “special ways in which women 
need legal protection to be able to enjoy their right to life”.958  
On the whole, owing to the legal system’s focus on ‘public’ actions by 
the state, there is a high level of violence against women around the world 
that international law does not address, even though such violence often 
amounts to persecution. 959  As Goodwin-Gill argues, “the problem with much 
of the violence against women is precisely that it is perceived either as 
‘domestic’ or as individual and non-attributable to the State or [an]other 
political structure. It is ‘private’, unlike the ‘public’ dimension to so much 
political, ethnic or religious persecution”.960 
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The ‘dichotomous construction’ of acts into ‘public’ and ‘private’ has 
further aggravated the inequality of the current refugee law framework, as this 
construction focuses on society from a male perspective and disregards the 
political nature of the private sphere.961 It allows “theorists and practitioners 
alike to ignore the political nature of family, the relevance of justice in personal 
life and, as a consequence, a major part of the inequalities of gender”.962  
 
5 2 1 Common conception of gender-related violence amounting to 
persecution as a ‘private’ act 
As a result of the public/private division, as shown above, a majority of the 
persecution faced by women refugees is often deemed to be ‘private’ and 
consequently is not considered to fall under the jurisdiction of the international 
refugee regime. As Parekh argues, “legal systems as a whole continue to 
operate under the assumption that we can neatly separate private, gender-
based violence from more serious public, political persecution”.963 
One of the main causes behind the failure to treat gender-related 
persecution with the same seriousness as other forms of persecution is that it 
has been understood “either as something private and hence not serious or 
as something resulting from women’s ‘natural’ vulnerability and thus not 
connected to deeper structural barriers”. 964  Generally, gender-related 
persecution is viewed as apolitical and being in direct contrast to the kind of 
political persecution that is privileged in the Refugee Convention.965 
This is especially true of sexual violence, which the international 
community only very recently began to accept as persecution as discussed in 
sub-chapter 3 4 2. Until recently, the assumption that rape is an arbitrary act 
of harm, not persecution, was fatalistically accepted.966 As Indra observes, 
under the current refugee framework, “state oppression of a religious minority 
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is political, while gender oppression at home is not”.967 Similarly, domestic 
violence is not merely a ‘personal abnormality’, as it is often understood in the 
assessment of asylum cases, but rather entrenched in universal structural 
violence against women. 968  As Charlesworth and Chinkin argue, violence 
against women is never a ‘purely’ private issue.969 Nonetheless, violence that 
takes place at home has been described as ‘frivolous’ and is considered to be 
less grave and less worthy of official consideration than other forms of 
violence.970  
Indeed, as Parkeh observes, the gender-bias public-private dichotomy 
continues to have such a solid grip in the asylum adjudicators’ legal thinking 
that even “state-enforced sterilization and abortion, ‘heinous’ spousal violence 
that is not responded to by the state, and rape by soldiers in the context of 
civil war do not count as persecution and, as such, do not qualify the women 
who experience them for asylum”. 971  Ultimately, if the persecution 
experienced by the woman asylum applicant is something that men could also 
experience, the application has a stronger chance of succeeding than if the 
persecution faced by the woman applicant is unique to women. In such cases, 
the persecution is seen as trivial or private.972 
5 2 2 The political/public dimension of gender-related persecution  
The way in which women are often perceived during the asylum procedure 
demonstrates aspects of discrimination.973 Often women’s reasons for fleeing 
are rejected “because women are attributed a dependent, apolitical, caring, 
family role”.974 This gender bias in the interpretation of the scope of refugee 
law is evident from case law that demonstrates the unwillingness of asylum 
adjudicators to recognise the prevailing political nature of gender-related 
violence. 975  As McLaughlin observes, notwithstanding the fact that many 
victims of gender-based persecution can “legitimately demonstrate that their 
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abuse contains a political element (...) immigration judges will routinely ignore 
these political aspects, preferring instead to classify such abuse as a private 
matter between the oppressor and his victim”.976  
 Yet, the main problem with the public/private dichotomy is not whether 
“human rights standards should apply to private as well as public acts” but 
rather what should be prioritised. 977  As Eisler argues, the real issue is 
“whether violations of human rights within the [‘private’ sphere] such as genital 
mutilation, wife beating, and other forms of violence designed to maintain 
patriarchal control should be within the purview of human rights theory and 
action”.978 So far, asylum adjudicators have seemed reluctant to answer in the 
affirmative.  
 Nonetheless, despite so frequently being defined as ‘private’, gender-
related persecution often has a highly political dimension. For example, rape 
is not merely a personal crime of sex but rather a crime of power, as I set out 
under sub-chapter 3 4 2 above.979 As Schulman argues, by raping a woman, 
a man is essentially expressing his dominance over her.980 Ultimately, rape is 
a way to “demonstrate a belief in a society powered by males” and therefore 
leaves “the realm of personal abuse and [enters] the public sphere”.981 
Similarly, domestic violence has a strong political dimension to it. 
Ultimately, domestic violence is yet another type of weapon that is used in the 
expression of a belief in a male-dominated society.982 Sinha, for example, 
argues that domestic violence has its roots in “both power structures of 
inequality and gender-biased social norms”. 983  Far from being individual, 
random acts, “violence against women at the hands of their partners is a 
pervasive and systemic exercise of patriarchal power”.984  
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Aliaskari argues that women who resist and report domestic violence 
are in fact expressing a political opinion against a male-dominated society. 
According to Aliaskari, “even though the woman is only requesting assistance 
to stop the physical abuse, her society and her peers may view her as 
someone who opposes the government and its laws, or holds political beliefs 
contrary to the current system”.985 
Nonetheless, the victims of domestic violence seeking asylum based 
on gender-related persecution often struggle to prove the political motivation 
behind domestic violence. For example, in In re R-A- as discussed in sub-
chapter 3 4 3, in denying the asylum to the applicant, the BIA found that the 
applicant had “failed to show that her husband’s motivation to harm her fell 
within any of the statutory protected grounds”.986 
Similarly, the political nature of ‘honour crimes’ is unambiguous. By 
refusing to abide by the social rules imposed on them, women ‘dishonour’ 
their families, which at worst can cost them their lives at the hands of their 
family members. By rejecting the social mores and the ‘proper’ role of a 
woman, women “are portraying their belief in a different value system, and are 
subsequently persecuted for it”.987 However, all of the forms of gender-related 
persecution labelled as ‘cultural practices’ stem from the “devaluation of 
women and the masculinist power to define abuses against women as 
cultural, natural or private, not political”.988  
However, notwithstanding the fact that the public/private distinction has 
been acknowledged as a ‘culturally constructed ideology’, it continues to have 
a strong impact on the refugee law framework.989 As Indra observes, the 
“dichotomy of private and public spheres remains deeply grounded in 
discourse about refugees and leads to many ironies concerning notions of 
rights, privacy and culture”.990 
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5 2 3 Representation of women as ‘vulnerable’ and the consequent erosion of 
the political nature of the persecution women experience  
The inbuilt dichotomy of the refugee law framework not only disregards the 
persecution that women face in the private sphere but also ignores the 
persecution they face in the public sphere. Owing to the entrenched 
dichotomy, there is a general assumption that “women are less likely to 
participate in politics than men”. 991  Consequently, women’s political 
participation, such as challenging discriminatory laws and policies, is often 
misinterpreted as ‘personal conduct’. 992  As Refugee Women’s Resource 
Project already observed in 2003, women’s activities are often interpreted as 
being too ‘low-level’ to be considered political and to result in persecution.993 
The danger of dismissing women’s political participation as insignificant was 
further highlighted by the UK Border Agency’s in its 2010 Guidelines on 
Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim (UKBA Guidelines), 994  which warns 
against “equating [women’s] lower-profile political activities with low risk”.995 
According to the UKBA Guidelines, “[t]he response of the state to such activity 
may be disproportionately persecutory because it may be considered 
inappropriate for women to be involved at all”.996 However, despite the UKBA 
Guidelines, in practice the ‘political opinion ground’ is often unsuccessfully 
applied in women’s asylum applications because of the assumption that 
“women’s political participation would not be seen as important, or significant 
enough to be persecuted by the police in their home country”.997  
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Furthermore, women are less likely to be recognised as refugees due 
to the social and political framework of their asylum claims.998 As Valji, et al. 
state, the absence of recognition of women’s political involvement prevents 
them from seeking asylum on political grounds.999  
As Mascini and van Bochove observe, under asylum law women are 
mainly considered as family members. 1000  Rather than independent 
individuals, they are seen through these gender-roles as women who are 
subordinate to men.1001 Such stereotyping has had a detrimental effect on the 
success of women asylum-seekers’ applications.1002 Furthermore, as Mascini 
and van Bochove observe, women protesting against the disappearance or 
execution of missing family members, resisting persecutory reproduction 
politics or deviating from expected social mores are viewed as being 
prompted by emotions rather than political ideas.1003 
Ultimately, as Kneebone argues, the representation of refugee women 
as ‘vulnerable’, submissive and dependent will enhance chances of success 
of refugee women’s claims the most. According to Kneebone, a “Refugee 
Woman’s claim is most likely to be accepted when it is a ‘good woman’ claim. 
That is, if it occurs whilst she fulfils her role as wife/mother/sister”.1004 This 
construction, however, has a deeply damaging effect on asylum. Ultimately, 
the stereotype of refugee women is actively being constructed as one of  
‘defenseless victims’ of a cruel anti-female culture more often than that of 
‘dissidents’ who actively resist against the political and religious oppression of 
women.1005 
The UNHRC has recognised this problem. In the 2002 UNHCR 
Guidelines, the UNHCR strongly supported the interpretation of ‘political 
opinion’ in the broadest sense, as well as the inclusion of “opinion about 
gender roles” and “non-conformist behaviour that leads the persecutor to 
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impute political opinion to their victims’ under the category”.1006 However, only 
a very limited number of countries comply with the guidelines. One of the 
countries that have incorporated these guidelines is the United Kingdom. 
According to section 6.17 of the UK Border Agency’s ‘Instructions Considering 
Asylum Claims and Assessment of Credibility’,1007 the “experiences of women 
in their countries of origin can often differ from those of men, and [their] 
protest, activism and resistance may manifest themselves in different 
ways”.1008 Furthermore, the Swedish Gender Guidelines recognise that “the 
political activity of women can be expressed in different way to men, but give 
rise to much larger risk and vulnerability”. 1009  Despite the recognition of 
women’s different form of political activity in the national gender guidelines, in 
practice the asylum authorities often have a very traditional way of looking at 
the concept of political activity.1010  
 
5 3 Persecution by non-state actors 
As has been alluded to in sub-chapters 2 5 3, 2 4 5 and 4 2 above the refugee 
law framework has traditionally ignored persecution by non-state actors, 
because these acts take place in the ‘private sphere’ and are carried out by 
private actors without any state culpability. 1011  This approach, however, 
ignores the states’ positive obligations, or due diligence, towards its citizens to 
protect their broader human rights. A state’s failure to protect women from 
gender-based violence perpetrated by non-state actors “represents an 
uncoordinated, yet highly efficient matrix of inertia, consolidated at all loci of 
the criminal justice system”1012 and results in a breach of the state’s positive 
obligation to protect. Furthermore, the refusal of a state to interfere in 
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violations taking place in the ‘private’ sphere has wider consequences, as it 
“insulates abuse of pre-existing patriarchal power within that sphere, 
perpetuating and justifying the patriarchal organisation of the ‘public’ 
sphere”.1013 As Heyman argues: 
 
“[I]t is uncertain when the state’s failure [to prevent the persecution] 
rises to an unacceptable level and warrants an asylum grant. It is 
uncertain how rampant the abuses must be, how persistent they must 
remain, how ineffective the government must be in combating them, to 
justify the dramatic intervention of the asylum state”.1014 
 
It is important to acknowledge that under the current refugee definition 
there is no requirement that the state itself be the violator.1015 As indicated by 
Haines, persecution committed by non-state actors would also fall under this 
definition.1016 This view is further echoed in the UNHCR Guidelines, according 
to which “[w]here serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed 
by the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are 
knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove 
unable, to offer effective protection”.1017 The European Council has equally 
recognised persecution by non-state actors.1018 
With regard to the international and regional human rights frameworks 
in general, a strong acceptance of state responsibility is emerging in cases 
where non-state actors have committed serious gender-related violence, and 
in this regard there is more and more case law concerning cases of domestic 
violence. For example, in a number of cases the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has confirmed that the state’s inability to protect the applicant 
from domestic violence has amounted to a violation of the European 
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In the 2008 case of Bevacqua and S. v 
Bulgaria,1019  the applicant, who had been subjected to years of domestic 
violence by her husband, ultimately filed for divorce and escaped with her son 
to a shelter for abused women. Following the divorce, the applicant was 
battered by her ex-husband again. The applicant’s requests for criminal 
prosecution were rejected on the ground that it was a ‘private matter’ requiring 
a private prosecution.1020  
In its judgment, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 of ECHR 
following the Bulgarian authorities’ failure to “impose sanctions or otherwise 
enforce [the husband’s] obligation to refrain from unlawful acts”.1021 According 
to the court, this failure “amounted to a refusal to provide the immediate 
assistance the applicant needed”.1022 The court went further to stress that the 
authorities’ view “that no (...) assistance was due as the dispute concerned a 
‘private matter’” was incompatible with their positive obligations to secure the 
enjoyment of the applicant’s Article 8 rights.1023  
 Similarly, in the case of Opuz v Turkey1024 (Opuz) the applicant and her 
mother were assaulted and threatened over a number of years by the 
applicant’s husband. Despite the applicant and her mother filing various 
complaints with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the husband was not 
prosecuted, because they withdrew their complaints after the husband had 
“harassed them into doing so, threatening to kill them”. 1025  In 2001, the 
applicant’s husband stabbed the applicant numerous times and was 
consequentially imposed a nominal fine.1026 Following the incident, both the 
applicant and her mother again filed numerous complaints with the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office stating that their lives were threatened.1027 The applicant’s 
husband was questioned and released with the public prosecutor stating that 
there was “no concrete evidence to prosecute [the applicant’s husband] apart 
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from the allegations made by the applicant”.1028 Ultimately, in March 2002, 
following the applicant’s attempt to leave her husband, the husband shot the 
applicant’s mother arguing that “he had lost his temper and had shot [the 
applicant’s mother] for the sake of his honour”.1029 The applicant’s husband 
was convicted of murder and illegal possession of a firearm and sentenced to 
imprisonment1030 but was later released pending his appeal, at which point he 
continued to threaten the applicant.1031 In its judgment, the ECtHR found a 
violation of Article 2 (right to life) concerning the murder of the applicant’s 
mother and a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading 
treatment) concerning the state’s failure to protect the applicant. According to 
the ECtHR, Turkey had “failed to set up and implement a system for punishing 
domestic violence and protecting victims”.1032 Furthermore, the court found 
that overall, with regard to claims of domestic violence, “police officers do not 
investigate [the] complaints but seek to assume the role of mediator by trying 
to convince the victims to return home and drop their complaint”.1033 Finally, in 
a pioneering move, the ECtHR found “violations of Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination), in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, as the violence suffered 
by the two women was gender-based”.1034 The ECtHR concluded that the 
applicant had been able to demonstrate “the existence of a prima facie 
indication that the domestic violence affected mainly women and that the 
general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey created a climate that 
was conducive to domestic violence”.1035 
 In 2013, the ECtHR reached a similar decision in Valiulienė v 
Lithuania.1036 The applicant had lodged an application with the Panevėžys 
City District Court for private persecution with regard to the domestic violence 
she had suffered at the hands of her partner. The authorities, however, failed 
to investigate her allegations of domestic violence. In its judgment, the ECtHR 
found a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and of inhuman or 
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degrading treatment). According to the court, “the practices at issue (...) 
together with the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms were 
implemented, did not provide adequate protection to the applicant against 
acts of [domestic] violence”.1037 The ECtHR has also found violations of the 
ECHR with regard to domestic violence in the cases of E.S. and Others v 
Slovakia,1038 Hajduovà v Slovakia,1039 Kalucza v Hungary1040 and Eremia and 
Others v the Republic of Moldova.1041 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) dealt with similar 
issues in the landmark case of Campo Algodonero.1042 A 2003 report by the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) named the killing of 
over 200 women since 1993 in Campo Algodonero as one of its key 
concerns.1043 Despite the establishment of a Special Prosecutor’s Office in 
1998 to investigate gender-based violence in the area, “the climate of violence 
and intimidation of women continued”.1044  The 2003 IACHR report further 
testified to the “the negligence of the authorities responsible for investigating 
and prosecuting [the] crimes, and the overall inefficacy of the administration of 
justice and lack of political will at all levels to confront the problem”.1045 
In its judgment, the IACtHR found that Mexico had violated the 
American Convention on Human Rights. It expressly recognised, for first time, 
the “States’ affirmative obligations to respond to violence against women by 
private actors”.1046 Furthermore, it was also the first time that the IACtHR 
examined “cases at issue in the context of mass violence against women and 
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structural discrimination” and “found that gender-based violence can 
constitute gender discrimination”.1047  
In 2011, IACtHR reiterated this position in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) 
v United States.1048 In its judgment, the IACtHR found that “[t]he systemic 
failure of the United States to offer a coordinated and effective response to 
protect Jessica Lenahan and her daughters from domestic violence, 
constituted an act of discrimination, a breach of their obligation not to 
discriminate, and a violation of their right to equality before the law under 
Article II of the American Declaration [on the Rights and Duties of Man]”.1049 
Furthermore, the IACtHR went on to recognise that State inaction towards 
cases of violence against women fosters an environment of impunity and 
promotes the repetition of violence “since society sees no evidence of 
willingness by the State, as the representative of the society, to take effective 
action to sanction such acts”.1050 The court’s decision was significant, as it 
was the first time the United States had been held accountable under 
international law for violating the human rights of a victim of domestic 
violence.  
With regard to international refugee law, the question of state 
responsibility in cases of persecution committed by non-state actors has 
particular importance for gender-related persecution claims, as “women often 
have a less direct relationship with the State or because the access to 
protection is gendered”.1051 Furthermore, there is evidence that “women are 
more likely than their male counterparts to experience or fear persecution by 
[non-state actors] and (...) that they may be less able to obtain the protection 
of the State against such harm”.1052 According to Crawley “[w]hilst there is no 
shortage of episodes where women are directly victimised by State or by 
agents of the State, much of the violence committed against women is (...) 
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perpetrated by husbands, fathers, boyfriends, in-laws and, in the case of 
female genital mutilation, women in the local community”.1053  
5 3 1 Emerging state responsibility  
There has, however, been a move towards under international refugee law of 
attributing the responsibility for persecution committed by a non-state actor to 
the state. According to paragraph 51 of the UNHCR Handbook on 
Procedures, even though persecution usually relates to officials’ actions, it 
“may also emanate from sections of the population that do not respect 
standards established by the laws of the country concerned”.1054 The 2002 
UNHCR Guidelines confirm this view in paragraph 19, which states that “there 
is scope within the refugee definition to recognise both State and non-State 
actors of persecution”. 1055  Consequently, “serious discriminatory or other 
offensive acts committed by the local populace, or by individuals, can also be 
considered persecution if such acts are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, 
or if the authorities refuse, or are unable, to offer effective protection”.1056  
The acknowledgement that violence committed by non-state actors can 
amount to persecution has also found support in various different jurisdictions, 
especially in common law jurisdictions, which have generally accepted that 
persecution committed by non-state actor takes place because the state is 
“unable or unwilling to offer effective protection against such harm”.1057 The 
possibility of non-state persecution has been accepted in Australia, among 
others, in the case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v 
Ibrahim,1058 as well as in Canada in the case of Zalzali v Canada,1059 and in 
the UK by the House of Lords in Adan v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department1060and Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department.1061 
                                                             
1053
 Crawley Refugees and Gender: Law and Process 52. 
1054
 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1992), U.N. Doc. 
HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, para. 51. 
1055
 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-related Persecution within 
the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees’ (7 May 2002), UN Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01, para. 19. 
1056
 Para. 19. 
1057
 Edwards, “Age and gender dimensions in international refugee law” in Refugee Protection 
in International Law: UNHCR”s Global Consultations on International Protection 59. 
1058
 High Court of Australia, [2000] HCA 55 (26 October 2000). 
1059
 Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, [1991] 3 FC 605. 
1060
 [1999] 1 AC 293. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  188 
Overall, as Crawley and Lester observe, “[s]tate practice in much of the world 
(...) is overwhelmingly supportive of the position adopted by UNHCR, that 
persecution by non-State agents falls within the scope of 1951 Convention 
refugee definition”.1062  
5 3 2 The ‘bifurcated approach’ 
The 1993 Canadian Guidelines defines the persecution that women fear as 
“acts of violence either by public authorities or at the hands of private citizens 
from whose actions the state is unwilling or unable to adequately protect the 
concerned persons”.1063 This has been termed a ‘bifurcated approach’ and 
has been described as a legal theory that acknowledges that “an applicant’s 
persecutor is an individual not abusing her based on [a Convention ground], 
but rather that the government fails to protect her based on a gender-defined 
social group”.1064 This approach is a significant development, as “for most 
women, indirect subjection to the State will almost always be mediated 
through direct subjection to individual men or groups of men”.1065 
The ‘bifurcated approach’ was first formulated and applied by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1993 in Ward v Canada (Ward), with Judge La 
Forest concluding that “state complicity in persecution is a not a pre-requisite 
to a valid refugee claim”.1066 Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Ward indicates that even in cases where a non-state actor commits the 
persecution, “asylum standards can still be met if authorities permitted the 
persecution or if the authorities are “unable to offer effective protection”.1067 
As Gomez argues, the Canadian Supreme Court accepted, in the judgment, 
that requiring an asylum-seeking woman “to put her life at risk in order to 
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prove that she sought the protection of the state” would defeat the whole 
purpose of refugee protection.1068  
With regard to defining the state’s inability to protect its citizens, the 
judgment in Ward defined two possible situations. In the apparent situation of 
a state’s inability to protect, the claimant would have been expressly denied 
protection by the state. 1069  However, in cases where “the state has not 
actually been approached by the claimant for protection, the state should be 
presumed capable of protecting its nationals”. 1070  Yet, despite this 
presumption, the claimant is “still allowed to present a rebuttal by 
demonstrating evidence that amounted to a lack of protection by the 
state”.1071  
In the UK, the bifurcated approach was applied as early as 1998, with 
the publication of Gender Guidelines for the Determination of Asylum Claims 
in the UK.1072 In Section 1(17), the Guidelines defined the bifurcated approach 
in the form of an equation: Persecution = Serious Harm + Failure of State 
Protection.1073  
In 1999, the House of Lords formally accepted the bifurcated approach 
in Islam and Shah. 1074  In this case, the House of Lords paid particular 
attention to the manner in which women were viewed and treated in their 
country of origin.1075 Lord Steyn came to the conclusion that “[n]otwithstanding 
a constitutional guarantee against discrimination on the grounds of sex a 
woman’s place in society in Pakistan is low”1076 and that “in Pakistan women 
are unprotected by the state: discrimination against women in Pakistan is 
partly tolerated by the state and partly sanctioned by the state”.1077 Having set 
the framework for the case, the House of Lords accepted the test of 
Persecution = Serious Harm + Failure of State Protection. As Musalo argues, 
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this is significant, because by “determining nexus in reference to the individual 
persecutor as well as the State, [the House of Lords] found an analytical path 
around the barrier created by the characterization of family violence as 
‘personal’ rather than as a Convention Reason”.1078 Ultimately, under the test 
established by the House of Lords, a state’s failure to protect the victim of 
persecution can “serve as the nexus to [a Convention ground] rather than the 
individual abuser”.1079   
The acceptance of the bifurcated approach in the UK was confirmed 
again in 2000, when the Immigration Appellate Authority published its Asylum 
Gender Guidelines (IAA Guidelines) 1080  which acknowledges the 
pervasiveness and the gender-specific form of “physical and mental violence 
and ill-treatment within the family”.1081  The IAA Guidelines go farther and 
accept that serious harm committed by a non-state actor may amount to 
persecution, as it states that “treatment which would constitute ‘serious harm’ 
if it occurred outside the family will also constitute ‘serious harm’ if it occurs 
within a family context”.1082 However, in order for the serious harm inflicted by 
a non-state actor to amount to persecution, the IAA Guidelines require that 
the victim demonstrate that “the state has failed or would fail to protect 
her”.1083 State failure is described as the authorities being either “unwilling [or] 
unable to give effective protection”.1084  
Moreover, the Australian Government accepted the bifurcated 
approach in its 1996 Guidelines on Gender Issue for Decision Makers.1085 
Under Article 4(11), agents of persecution include “a non-state actor from 
whom the state has been unwilling or unable to protect the victim”. 1086 
Furthermore, under articles 4(12) and 4(13) a state’s failure to protect its 
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citizens include an “ineffective and inaccessible system for dealing with 
complaints or the state’s practice of ‘turn[ing] a blind eye’”..1087 
In 2002, the High Court of Australia applied the bifurcated approach in 
Khawar. 1088  In Khawar, the applicant’s asylum claim had originally been 
denied, with the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) stating that those harming 
[the applicant] were not motivated by her membership of any particular social 
group, but by purely personal considerations related to the circumstances of 
her marriage, the fact that she brought no dowry to the family and their dislike 
of her as an individual”. 1089  On appeal, Judge Branson of the Australian 
Federal Court overruled the RRT’s decisions by stating that due to the “central 
feature of state-tolerated and state-sanctioned gender discrimination, the 
argument that the appellants fear persecution, not because of their 
membership of a social group, but because of the hostility of their husbands, 
is unrealistic”.1090 This decision was upheld by the High Court of Australia, 
which applied the same Persecution = Serious Harm + Failure of State 
Protection formula, that the House of Lords had applied in Ex Parte Shah. 
According to the High Court, the nexus requirement could consequently be 
met when either the serious harm or failure of State protection is for reasons 
of a Convention ground.1091 Ultimately, the High Court’s judgment in Khawar 
reconfirmed the approach taken by Lord Hope of Craighead in an earlier 
House of Lords case, Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, 1092  according to which “in the case of an allegation of 
persecution by non-state agents, the failure of the state to provide the 
protection is (...) an essential element. It provides the bridge between 
persecution by the state and persecution by non-state agents which is 
necessary in the interests of the consistency of the whole scheme”.1093 
Similarly, in 1999 the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority 
accepted the bifurcated approach in Refugee Appeal No 71427/99, 1094  in 
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which the applicant, an Iranian woman, applied for asylum after having been 
subjected to brutal domestic violence by her husband on a regular basis. In a 
judgment delivered by Chairperson Haines QC, despite the applicant’s 
husband’s behaviour not satisfying the nexus requirement, the applicant was 
granted asylum, because “Iran condones, if not actively encourages, non-
state actors such as husbands or former husbands to cause serious harm to 
women”.1095 According to Chairperson Haines QC, “in relation to this risk of 
non-state harm there will be an undoubted failure of state protection”.1096 With 
regard to the nexus required, according to Chairperson Haines QC:  
 
“[T]he reason why the appellant is exposed to serious state harm and 
to a lack of state protection both from the husband and from the state 
itself is because she is a woman. The cloak under which this 
persecution will ostensibly take place will be religion. (...) But as we 
have stated before, the overarching reason why the appellant is at risk 
of persecution is because she is a woman”.1097  
 
Ultimately Chairperson Haines QC concluded that “while the serious harm 
faced by the appellant at the hands of her first husband is not for a 
Convention reason, the failure by the state to protect her from that harm is for 
the Convention reasons of membership of a particular social group, religion 
and political opinion”.1098  
The UNHCR already accepted the bifurcated approach in 1992 in the 
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures. 1099  According to paragraph 65 of the 
handbook, despite persecution being “normally related to action by the 
authorities of a country”, it can also take place when “serious discriminatory or 
other offensive acts are committed by the local populace (...) if they are 
knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove 
unable, to offer effective protection”.1100  
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This position was reiterated again in 1997, specifically with regard to 
domestic violence and FGM. According to the UNHCR, “domestic violence 
becomes an asylum issue (...) in situations where the abuse attains a certain 
level of severity, and where the authorities are unable or unwilling to provide 
any protection to the person or people concerned”. 1101  Furthermore, with 
regard to FGM, the UNHCR stated that “in situations where [FGM] is imposed 
on a woman against her will and where the authorities are unable or unwilling 
to provide that person with protection, then female genital mutilation could 
provide the basis for a claim to refugee status”.1102 
The acceptance of the bifurcated approach was further confirmed in 
the 2002 UNHCR Guidelines, according to which gender-related violence can 
amount to persecution whether perpetrated by State or private actors.1103 In 
paragraph 11, the 2002 Guidelines confirm the attributability of responsibility 
to the State in cases where, despite having prohibited the persecutory 
practice, “the State (...) nevertheless continue[s] to condone or tolerate the 
practice, or [is not] able to stop the practice effectively”.1104  
Consequently, according to the 2002 Guidelines, a mere enactment of 
a law prohibiting or denouncing persecutory practices “will (...) not in itself be 
sufficient to determine that the individual’s claim to refugee status is not 
valid”.1105 Furthermore, the 2002 Guidelines specifically address cases where 
states do not accord protection from ‘serious abuse’ as a matter of policy and 
name domestic violence as an example of this type of abuse.1106 According to 
paragraph 15, “if the State, as a matter of policy or practice, does not accord 
certain rights or protection from serious abuse, then the discrimination in 
extending protection, which results in serious harm inflicted with impunity, 
could amount to persecution”.1107  
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Overall, the emerging adoption of the bifurcated approach has been 
significant with regard to gender-related persecution asylum claims. As 
Edwards argues, the bifurcated approach “ensure[s] the equitable treatment 
of men and women before the law”. 1108  Ultimately, accepting only the 
traditional, direct link between persecution committed by the state and the 
claimant would “discriminate against women who are more likely to be 
subjected to indirect links between the persecution and the actions of the 
State, through an inability or an unwillingness of the State to protect them”.1109  
However, the bifurcated approach has not found universal acceptance. 
Jurisdictions relying on the ‘accountability approach’ stress that the 
responsibility of the State of origin for the acts inflicted upon the victim is a 
constitutive element of persecution in the sense of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention.1110 For example, in a 1995 decision, the Federal Administrative 
Court of Germany held that “States are the holders of the monopoly of 
power”.1111 According to the court, persecution is therefore “the abuse of such 
jurisdictional power of the State”, and consequently “only agents of the State 
or groups that have replaced the State as holder of that power and have 
become a de facto government can persecute”.1112  
Similarly in the United States, despite having accepted the bifurcated 
approach in 1996 in the landmark case of Kasinga1113, as discussed in sub-
chapter 3 4 1, which involved a Togolese woman seeking asylum out of fear 
of being forced to undergo FGM, the BIA rejected the theory in 2001 in the 
case of In re R-A-1114 and stressed the need of nexus between the actual 
persecutor and a convention ground.1115 In rejecting the bifurcated approach, 
the BIA stated that “[it] understand[s] the ‘on account of’ test to direct an 
inquiry into the motives of the entity actually inflicting the harm”.1116 Although 
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the attorney general later vacated the case, no US court has since explicitly 
adopted the bifurcated approach.1117  
The ‘accountability approach’ has furthermore been widely criticised 
especially from the perspectives of state sovereignty and the process of 
concluding treaties. As Türk argues, to include state accountability as a 
requirement in the refugee definition “would in essence formulate an 
additional requirement, which was not foreseen originally and cannot be 
justified with reference to the actual wording of the refugee definition”.1118 
Nevertheless, the civil law jurisdictions of Germany, Switzerland, France and 
Italy continue to be divided on the issue and are inclined to require some level 
of accountability of the State.1119 Overall, discrepancies continue to remain 
between the case law in different jurisdictions.1120 
 
5 4 Emphasis on ‘utility’ in the refugee status assessment process  
In addition to the inherent gender-bias of the current refugee law regime as 
described in chapters 1 and 2, the results of the private/public divide as 
analysed under 5 2 and the persecution of non-state actors as demonstrated 
under 5 3, it has been argued that the androcentric application of the current 
refugee definitions also supports the disproportionate numbers of male 
refugees in developed countries.1121 The androcentric refugee framework has 
also produced seemingly gender-neutral state practice and national policies 
that have further limited the chances for women to obtain asylum. 1122  As 
Ganguly-Scrase argues, women refugees are rendered invisible in many 
national policies, which focus on asylum-seekers as male. 1123  The 
androcentric policies combined with gender-biased international refugee law 
have brought about a situation where the majority of the world’s forcibly 
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displaced are women, and yet, the greater part of asylum-seekers are 
men.1124  
The propensity of states to stress the ‘utility’ of the asylum-seekers for 
the country and to select asylum-seekers whom the state views as ‘easily 
assimilatable’ has strongly contributed to the overwhelming proportion of 
asylum-seekers in the Western states being male. 1125  As Valji explains, 
because of the limited opportunities for women to attend school to receive 
education or to find work due to social and economic factors in most parts of 
the world, the “side-lining of humanitarian principles to fulfil labour demands 
subverts the intentions of providing protection, and places women at an unfair 
advantage”.1126  
Canada, for example, has added a ‘personal suitability’ or ‘admissibility’  
component above and beyond the refugee selection criteria. 1127  Owing to 
these additional components, in addition to meeting the 1951 Refugee 
Convention’s definition of a refugee, the asylum-seeker must also “meet the 
criteria of admissibility, which generally means that the person should exhibit 
the potential for eventual successful settlement in Canada”.1128 The criteria 
used for the evaluation of ‘personal suitability’ are largely of a socio-economic 
nature, such as exposure to Western lifestyles, education, job skills, and 
knowledge of English or French.1129 Gender, by contrast, is not considered as 
part of the evaluation.  
 This gender-free evaluation is, however, not gender neutral in its 
consequences.1130 According to Boyd: 
 
“Gender stratification in many countries means that women receive 
fewer educational opportunities than men, are less likely to acquire 
English or French language skills as part of schooling, and may have 
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less exposure to urban or industrial jobs. Furthermore, given the gender 
gap in Canadian wages, women may be considered less economically 
self-sufficient than men if they have many dependents. Finally, gender 
stratification in refugee camps also can result in male refugees 
occupying important mediating positions that increase the chances of 
selection for resettlement”.1131 
 
Closely tied to the hurdle of ‘utility’ or ‘admissibility’ are the socio-
economic obstacles faced by many of the women fleeing persecution from 
developing countries. Despite the 1951 UN and the 1969 OAU refugee 
conventions not containing any distinction “between the protection obligations 
owed to men and women defined as refugees (…) In practice however, 
women refugee claimants can face numerous difficulties in gaining access to 
international [refugee] protection”. 1132  By using Canada as an example, 
Mackling demonstrates the difficulties that women refugees face and argues 
that it is “a variety of psychological, cultural, and financial impediments [that] 
render women less able than men to undertake the hazardous, uncertain and 
expensive journey to Canada”.1133  
Similarly, Bhabha observes that one manifestation of refugee women’s 
disadvantage in the refugee determination process is their limited access to 
asylum adjudication fora in the first place. As Bhabha argues “[i]f, given 
similar risks of persecution, a smaller percentage of women (...) than of 
similarly placed men make asylum applications, this is a prima facie indication 
of disadvantage and it is consistent with the claim that women (...) have a 
harder time getting asylum”. 1134  The disadvantaged position of refugee 
women is indeed demonstrated by the statistical evidence on the 
demographic characteristics of refugees, which indicates two findings: “First, 
in every single developing country of asylum neighbouring the refugees’ 
country of origin, women (...) refugees substantially outnumber adult males. 
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Second, in every developed state, male asylum seekers far outnumber 
females”.1135 
Similarly, Bacon and Booth observe that “at the most basic level, women 
claimants often lack access to economic and social resources which would 
enable them to flee persecution in their country of origin”.1136 This observation 
was also pointed out in the 2006 United Nations Population Fund Report on 
the State of the World Population, which stated that women refugees “often 
bear a disproportionate share of responsibilities and burdens” when it comes 
to caring for children, the sick and the elderly.1137 Furthermore, as Kneebone 
argues, the notable absence of women asylum-seekers from Western 
countries is partly caused by “women tend[ing] to be left behind in refugee 
camps (…) whilst the men are either fighting or fleeing or have been 
killed”.1138 
On the whole, despite women and children making up a large majority of 
the world’s refugee population, a disproportionately small number are likely to 
reach safe countries because of poverty and a lack of mobility. 1139 
Furthermore, the injustice that women face under the current refugee law 
framework is degenerated by the fact that men as a group are more 
economically and politically empowered.1140  
Pittaway and Bartolomei have further argued that resettlement policies 
“actively discriminate against women on grounds of both race and gender”.1141 
Likewise, Oloka-Onyango states that the “racist considerations (...) in 
operation in the evolution of the new immigration practices and (...) the 
restrictive application of refugee law (...) obviously has significant implications 
for the status of women”.1142 
However, despite the evident discrimination, hardly any international or 
domestic legal instruments or policies have acknowledged the way in which 
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racism and sexism intersect to doubly discriminate against refugee 
women. 1143  Overall, the discrimination against refugee women persists in 
numerous forms and in various situations. As Pittaway and Bartolomei state, 
refugee women remain discriminated against in situations of “armed conflict, 
in refugee determinations, and in resettlement because of their gender”.1144 
 
5 5 Xenophobia 
Similarly to the other hurdles faced by women asylum-seekers, the 
xenophobic undercurrent in the domestic asylum processes has a uniquely, 
detrimental impact on the asylum claims of women. With regard to racism and 
xenophobia in the refugee determination process, the practice of ‘othering’ 
often takes place. The practice of ‘othering’ of refugees, or “regarding one or 
several sections of the community as [having] intrinsically lesser value than 
the dominant culture or power holders”, has increased both in developed 
countries and in Africa,1145 where there has been an escalation in the climate 
of xenophobia and racism. 1146  Van Boven has described the xenophobic 
phenomena of ‘othering’ as “a climate and a perception that a priori regards a 
foreigner as an adversary, a rival, a competitor, or an adventurer who is a 
threat to prosperity, culture and identity”.1147 ‘Othering’ has been especially 
harmful to refugee women, as Pittaway and Bartolomei explain: 
 
“Racism directed at refugee populations in resettlement countries often 
causes refugee women to remain silent about their experiences of 
gender discrimination and violence within their own communities. Often 
racism within the broader community exacerbates the pressure on 
refugee women to maintain their traditional roles in order to keep their 
communities intact. The problems of many refugee women remain 
hidden in countries of resettlement. (...) Refugees [furthermore] face 
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systematic discrimination on the base of race, ethnicity, and gender in 
the process of selection for resettlement in third countries—most often 
developed countries with predominantly white populations. Refugees 
are selected for resettlement from situations of refuge in first countries 
of asylum. There is a marked trend for resettlement countries to give 
first preference to refugees most likely to ‘blend’ into the host 
country”.1148 
 
The requirement of being able to ‘blend’ into the host population 
demonstrates the inherently racist nature of the resettlement process, which 
ultimately results in favouritism towards refugees from the North. Generally, 
refugees from the South are usually assisted with basic food and medical 
supplies, while refugees from the North are frequently offered resettlement in 
the North, and/or substantial assistance in the rebuilding of infrastructure.1149  
As Pittaway and Bartolomei observe, this imbalanced and racist 
approach is often justified on the grounds of ‘cultural compatibility’. 1150 
According to a UNHCR report, especially single mothers from the South are 
“often denied access to resettlement services on the grounds that they will be 
a drain on the host economy”.1151  Overall, owing to the double hurdle of 
gender and race, women’s migration from Third World countries to Europe 
has virtually ceased.1152 As Hathaway poignantly states, “[w]e’re not going to 
see a flood of female claimants. Most women can’t get out of their countries, 
and when they can, they are lucky to make it to the next country”.1153  
The phenomenon of increasing xenophobic sentiment is not limited to 
developed countries but has also been on the rise in Africa in the past 
decades. The sympathetic approach of the local populations towards refugees 
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that was dominant in the 1960s has been disappearing with a new negative 
and restrictive approach gaining ground.1154  
The factors behind the change in attitude are multifaceted. In 1960s, a 
majority of the refugee flow originated from Southern Africa, from where 
asylum-seekers were fleeing from racist, colonial and apartheid regimes.1155 
As Rutinwa observes, these asylum-seekers were willingly accepted by the 
host populations who were “in total solidarity with their governments in 
standing up against colonial and racial domination in Africa”.1156 Overall, the 
asylum-seekers were seen as freedom fighters who were “retreating to 
mobilize themselves in order to fight for their right to self-determination and 
the worth and dignity of the African race”, and they were consequently 
perceived in political rather than humanitarian terms.1157      
Towards the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s, the growing 
economies of many African countries enabled the hosting of refugees without 
it impacting the government-funded welfare programmes for local 
populations.1158 However, the economic decline, which has since taken place 
on the African continent, combined with the austerity measures imposed by 
the IMF and the World Bank as a condition for economic aid, has forced many 
African governments to abort the welfare programmes.1159 Consequently, with 
increasing competition for resources, the approach of the host populations 
towards asylum-seekers has rapidly deteriorated.1160  
The rapid negative change in the approach towards refugees could 
already be detected in South Africa in the 1990s. In 1998, South Africa’s then 
Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Lindiwe Sisulu, described the deteriorating 
attitude of the local population towards refugees. According to Sisulu:  
 
“[t]he social and economic mobility of large numbers of foreign 
nationals when many citizens remain impoverished, criminal activity on 
the part of some, and the presence of refugees has resulted in little 
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differentiation between immigrants, economic migrants and refugees, 
by our citizens (...) prejudice and intolerance towards foreign nationals 
are rampant, with refugees being the most vulnerable. Foreign 
nationals are perceived as a ‘problem’ that must be ‘dealt with’”.1161 
 
5 6 Culturalist approach   
It is important to recognise the reverse side of the ‘othering’ that is taking 
place in Western refugee settlement processes. Under the current refugee 
settlement system, there is a continuing neo-colonial portrayal of third-world 
women as ‘cultural others’ who have to be saved from their ‘uncivilised 
cultures’.1162 According to Razack, one of the only ways for a refugee woman 
to stand any chance of securing gender-based asylum, she must cast herself 
as a cultural other fleeing from a more ‘primitive culture’.1163 Similarly, Sinha 
has highlighted the tendency of some asylum adjudicators in the US to grant 
gender-based asylum only in cases where a strong ‘cultural hook’ 1164 
exists.1165 
This neo-colonial approach dominates the current international refugee 
paradigm, and as a result, woman refugees have better chances of having 
their asylum claims accepted only if they present themselves as victims of 
“dysfunctional, exceptionally patriarchal cultures and states”.1166 According to 
Razack, this approach is based on the dubious construct of the “benevolent 
generous First World once again extending a helping hand to a hopelessly 
backward Third World in refugee course”.1167 This view is further echoed by 
Spijkerboer and Macklin, who have suggested that the ‘neo-colonial’ approach 
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“feeds into a protection discourse (…) highly imbued with notions of political, 
economic, social and cultural superiority”.1168  
The neo-colonial approach is detrimental to women refugees, as it fails 
to focus on the actual crime of gender-related persecution itself but rather 
centres on the ‘moral superiority’ of the First World. Additionally, this construct 
has inbuilt limitations as it will “only work when the [women] victims can 
access readily understood racial tropes”. 1169  According to Kneebone, the 
current refugee paradigm “constructs women culturally or socially (…) and 
diminishes their experiences as woman refugees”.1170 This reliance on culture 
has serious consequences for those women whose claims involve 
persecution that cannot be linked to culture or a cultural practice.1171 This is 
also pointed out by Crawley, who argues that the “associations of ‘third world 
women’ with ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ have implications for both asylum seeking 
women and the discourse of protection more generally”.1172 Furthermore, the 
stance of attributing persecution faced by women refugees to culture alone 
does not recognise that violence against women is a global phenomenon and 
the most pervasive abuse of human rights. 1173  The culturalist argument, 
therefore, further promotes the narrow concept of human rights that excludes 
the violence faced by women and “highlights the political nature of the abuse 
of women”.1174  
Gender-related persecution, which is often based on various instances 
of private behaviour1175, has traditionally been “disregarded as relatively trivial 
and frivolous, in contrast with the classic grounds of persecution”. 1176 
Additionally, with the currently dominant restrictionist immigration policies, the 
adjudicators often encounter a “high-stakes comparison and ‘objective’ 
evaluation of opposing normative and ethical systems, where a sovereign 
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state’s internal cultural norms and policies”1177 are being assessed. Very often 
the outcome, especially in gender-related persecution cases, is the 
“invocation of state sovereignty to define ethical and ideological boundaries 
for international protection”.1178 
As a consequence of the receiving states’ restrictionist approach to 
refugees, there has been a considerable increase in the use of culturalist 
arguments by the adjudicators. These culturalist arguments have had a 
detrimental impact on women refugees, because the former often ignore 
violence against women as a global phenomenon and promote the narrow 
concept of human rights, which excludes the violence that women face. By 
linking human rights violations against women with a ‘cultural practice’ rather 
than recognising them as a form of persecution, the culturalist approach 
leaves women vulnerable and without any protection, while it condones the 
brutal crimes against women that continue to take place on a global scale. 
For instance, in the Gilani case1179, as discussed in sub-chapter 4 3, 
which involved a claim of gender-related persecution, state sovereignty and 
culturalist arguments were used to deny asylum. The application in Gilani was 
based on the applicant’s fear of persecution due to her membership in a 
particular social group consisting of “women or Westernized middle-class 
Islamic women” or alternatively due to her political opinion or religion,1180 with 
the applicant’s fear of persecution arising out of “her fundamental opposition” 
to policies concerning women in Iran after the Islamic Revolution.1181 
The immigration adjudicator in Gilani denied the application despite 
acknowledging that in Iran “women in general are seriously under privileged 
and very much regarded as second class citizens under the domination of the 
male”. 1182  However, according to the adjudicator, “this is something that 
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applies to all women in Iran”. 1183  With this statement, the adjudicator 
depoliticized majoritarian dominance 1184  by making the prevalence of the 
persecution a qualifying factor in access to rights 1185  and consequently 
negated the right to protection from gender-related persecution for every 
Iranian woman.  
Finally, the adjudicator used the combination of state sovereignty and a 
culturalist stance to deny the application by stating that “one is on dangerous 
ground if you attempt to interfere with a person’s customs or religious beliefs 
and on even more dangerous ground if you do so on a national or worldwide 
scale”.1186 As Bhabha observes: 
 
“By conflating the applicant’s customs and beliefs with those of the 
Iranian government, establishing binary opposition between 
Westernized and Iranian worlds, and using a personalized appeal to 
national sovereignty as a trump, this case maps the Iranian state 
directly onto the woman’s body, and eliminates precisely that space for 
the articulation of difference within the category of woman, and of 
individual autonomy that the refugee regime was designed to 
protect”.1187 
 
A similar approach was taken by the BIA in Fatin v Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (Fatin).1188 In Fatin, the applicant’s fear of persecution 
arose out of her refusal to wear a veil in post–Islamic Revolution Iran. 
According to the applicant, this refusal would lead to her “be[ing] punished in 
public or be[ing] jailed”,1189  with the punishment taking the form of being 
“whipped or thrown stones at”.1190 The asylum application was specifically 
based on the applicant’s fear of persecution resulting from her membership in 
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the particular social group of “upper class of Iranian women who supported 
the Shah of Iran, a group of educated Westernized free-thinking 
individuals”.1191 The BIA, however, denied the asylum application by stating 
that the applicant would simply be “subject to the same discriminatory 
treatment as all other women in Iran”.1192  
As Bhabha observes, in Fatin state sovereignty argument was utilised 
to reject an asylum application based on gender-related persecution. Despite 
the state-imposed practices going against the applicant’s “fundamental 
beliefs” and “resulting in a fear of persecution”, according to the adjudicators 
“it is up to the individual member of the society to confirm because of her 
nationality”. 1193  Overall, gender-related persecution cases “reveal the 
unresolved tension between individual and state interest in the control of 
sexuality, and thus provide a fertile arena for investigation arguments 
qualifying the scope of universal human rights intervention and denying 
refugee protection”.1194  
Globalisation has worsened the position of asylum-seeking women, who 
historically have been disadvantaged by the Refugee Convention and 
underrepresented for many years among refugees in Western countries while 
awaiting asylum.1195 As Nilsson argues, globalisation has had an effect on the 
‘feminisation of immigration’, which has led to increasing numbers of women 
seeking asylum alone, without their male relatives.1196 Studies have revealed, 
however, that women’s applications are more successful if they seek asylum 
on the basis of their relationship with their families than if they apply based 
only on their own experiences. As Nilson observes, “derivative persecution of 
female asylum seekers is more readily accepted by decision makers than 
direct persecution, where the claimant has to establish that she has suffered 
or fears persecution on a particular Convention ground”.1197 
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5 7 Conclusion 
As I have demonstrated in this chapter the deeply entrenched dichotomy 
between public and private spheres, which can be found in both domestic and 
international law, including international refugee law, has severely hindered 
women seeking asylum. The gender-related persecution that women face is 
often deemed to take place in the ‘private’ sphere and consequently is 
considered to fall outside the protection of international refugee law. However, 
courts very often misconstrue the nature of gender-related persecution and 
deem sexual violence by military officials, for example, to be a ‘private’ act. 
The stereotypical construction of refugee women as ‘vulnerable’ and apolitical 
has also had a negative impact on the success of women asylum-seekers’ 
claims.  
Especially with regard to asylum applications based on domestic 
violence, the most prominent feature in the current asylum jurisdiction in 
Western states is “the limited reference to recent developments in 
international human rights standards on domestic violence”.1198 As Mullally 
argues, with regard to gender-related persecution in general and domestic 
violence in particular, “the worlds of refugee and human rights law continue to 
remain apart”. 1199  This point, manifested in the political nature of both, 
domestic violence and the resistance to it, continues to be challenged by the 
Western states under asylum jurisdiction.1200 Ultimately, asylum adjudicators 
continue to view the political nature of resistance to domestic violence as a 
‘personal matter’, and consequently “the ‘political opinion’ ground of refugee 
law frequently remains beyond the reach of refugee women” as further 
discussed under sub-chapter 4 3.1201 
Courts have traditionally been reluctant to recognise that persecution 
committed by non-state actors falls under the purview of international refugee 
law. However, with the emergence of the concept of indirect state 
responsibility and the so-called ‘bifurcated approach’, as I demonstrate under 
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sub-chapter 5 3 2, there seems to be a slow change towards a more gender-
inclusive interpretation of actors capable of committing persecution.  
In addition to the discriminatory legal framework, refugee women are also 
facing further discrimination due to their lower socio-economic status and their 
race. Owing to increased xenophobia and protectionism in the receiving 
states, the refugee policies often tend to stress refugees’ ‘utility’ and ability to 
‘blend’ into the main population. This has caused serious obstacles to refugee 
women, as their limited access to education or work experience again places 
them at an unfair advantage.  
A further factor making the asylum applications of women fleeing 
domestic violence more difficult is that the applicants often find themselves in 
a ‘double bind’. 1202  According to Mullally, the racial ‘othering’ and the 
gendered stereotypes of ‘Third World women’ that are typical in Western 
asylum jurisdictions, combined with the Western states’ eagerness to protect 
their sovereignty, pose further obstacles to domestic violence asylum 
claims.1203  This is manifested in the common presumptions regarding the 
extent of domestic violence in a particular society, which strengthens the view 
that to recognise a domestic violence claim for asylum would open 
floodgates.1204  
Ultimately, instead of constructing gender-related persecution in the 
adverse and narrow way in which the courts I discussed above under 3 4 are 
proceeding, it should be understood as ‘resulting from the intersection of 
individual or state persecution and structural injustice’, as Parekh and Walker 
argue. 1205  The normalising effect of the combination of these two factors 
ultimately results in the invisibility and minimisation of gender-related 
persecution.   
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Chapter 6 
Acknowledging gender-related persecution 
 
6 1 Introduction 
As is evident from the discussion in the previous chapters international 
refugee law is inadequate in offering protection to women subjected to 
gender-related persecution. The analysis in the preceding chapters clearly 
demonstrated how law makers, adjudicators and policy makers alike have 
tried to stretch and bend the definition and nexus requirement as set out 
under Article 1 A 2 of the 1951 Convention; with little success. 
This final substantial chapter focuses on three different domestic 
approaches to gender-related persecution that have been put in place to 
supplement the weak protection that the international legislative framework 
offers. I undertook this analysis to explore the methods that states have 
adopted to fill the protection gap to be able to safeguard victims of gender-
related persecution. The states’ adoption of alternate approaches 
demonstrates the increasing global recognition of the shortcomings of the 
international refugee law framework regarding the provision of adequate 
protection to victims of gender-related persecution. This recognition has 
forced states to find different ways to address the protection gap. However, 
while the adoption of alternative measures illustrates an emerging willingness 
of states to accept gender-related persecution as a legitimate ground of 
persecution, it remains questionable how effective these approaches will be 
without the re-conceptualisation of the underlying theory of international 
refugee law, specifically with regard to the refugee definition.  
 In sub-chapter 6 1 I discuss the gender guidelines that have been 
created to assist domestic adjudicators when deciding about cases that 
involve gender-related persecution. Although the creation of gender 
guidelines is a step in the right direction, it is uncertain whether they will be 
sufficient, because of their non-binding nature, and ultimately the discretion is 
still vested in the hands of the adjudicator. 
In sub-chapter 6 2 I focus on the emerging concept of complementary 
protection and its applicability to gender-related asylum claims. While the 
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possibility of finding alternative forms of protection for victims of gender-
related persecution is worth exploring, it seems because of the lack of 
universal understanding and a legislative framework that complementary 
protection is an inadequate solution to the protection gap faced by victims of 
gender-related persecution. Even in certain regions such as within the 
European Union, where there is a multilateral legislative framework for 
complementary protection, implementation has been inconsistent.  
In the final sub-chapter I return to one of the issues that provoked my 
research into gender based persecution namely the alternative solution of 
adding gender as an independent, legally binding category to the refugee 
definition under domestic law. This approach has been tried in a limited 
number of states, including South Africa (as indicated in the introduction), 
Spain, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. Sub-section 6 3 examines the hypothesis that the 
embedding of gender as an independent category in the legal framework 
would secure adequate protection to those fleeing gender-related persecution. 
By granting gender the status of an independent category under the refugee 
definition, the root cause of persecution faced by women worldwide would be 
recognised, and its seriousness acknowledged.    
 
6 2 Gender guidelines 
6 2 1 UNHCR Gender Guidelines 
As a point of departure in 1993, the UNHCR Executive Committee (ExCom) 
presented Conclusion No 73 on Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence,1206 
in which it recommended that states develop “appropriate guidelines on 
women asylum-seekers in recognition of the fact that women refugees often 
experience persecution differently from refugee men”. 1207  More 
comprehensive gender guidelines were issued in 2002, when the UNHCR 
published its Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-related 
Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 
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1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 1208  The aim of these 
guidelines was to provide guidance to the domestic courts for a more gender-
sensitive interpretation of the international refugee law and consequently a 
more inclusive framework for gender-related persecution cases.  
However, while examining the impact of the 2002 UNHCR Gender 
Guidelines, the 2012 European Parliament Report came to the conclusion that 
the influence of the UNHCR Gender Guidelines in practice has been very 
limited due to their non-binding character. 1209  This had already been 
demonstrated in a 2004 UNHCR comparative analysis, which concluded that 
the UNHCR Gender Guidelines had not been officially adopted into domestic 
legislation or policies in any of the 42 European countries surveyed.1210 This 
finding was echoed by the 2012 Secretariat of the European Parliament study, 
according to which the implementation of the UNHCR Gender Guidelines 
“remains either inadequate or non-existent in most of the European 
countries”.1211 
Michels similarly argues that due to their informing (rather than 
obligatory) character, the UNHCR Gender Guidelines have not made any 
ground-breaking difference to the way in which gender-related asylum cases 
are adjudicated. 1212  Furthermore, the impact of the UNHCR Gender 
Guidelines on gender-related asylum claims is weakened by not being clear 
on “whether, when or how gender-related claims entitle female asylum 
seekers a refugee status”.1213  
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6 2 2 Domestic gender guidelines 
Following UNHCR ExCom’s Conclusion No 73, Canada was the first country 
to adopt gender-sensitive guidelines in March 1993. Since its publication, the 
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board has updated the guidelines twice: 
first in November 1996, with the publication of Guideline 4: Women Refugee 
Claimants Fearing Gender-related Persecution,1214 and for the second time in 
February 2003, with the publication of Compendium of Decisions: Guideline 4 
- Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution.1215 The 
Canadian Guidelines recognise that women can belong to a ‘gender-defined 
social group’1216, as discussed in sub-chapter 4 2, on account of which they 
can “fear persecution as the consequence of failing to conform to, or for 
transgressing, certain gender-discriminating religious or customary laws and 
practices in their country of origin”.1217 Similarly, the guidelines recognise that 
women can face “persecution resulting from certain circumstances of severe 
discrimination on grounds of gender or acts of violence either by public 
authorities or at the hands of private citizens from whose actions the state is 
unwilling or unable to adequately protect the concerned persons”.1218 
Following the lead of Canada, the US was the second country to adopt 
gender-sensitive guidelines. In May 1995, the United States Department of 
Justice published the Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum 
Claims from Women memorandum 1219   (US Guidelines). It serves as 
guidance for a gender-sensitive interpretation of gender-related claims.1220 
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The US Guidelines, however, only have persuasive authority and can 
arguably be ignored by immigration judges.1221 
Similar developments have taken place in various other countries, 
including the Netherlands, 1222  Australia, 1223  Sweden 1224  and the United 
Kingdom.1225 As a consequence of the development of gender guidelines, 
Sengupta argues that there is an emerging customary international law of 
gender-based persecution as a ground for granting refugee status. 1226  In 
addition to the creation of gender guidelines, some states have included 
gender as an independent ground of persecution to their domestic 
jurisdictions, which supports the idea of an emerging customary law. I further 
explore this idea below in sub-chapter 6 4.  
Yet, regardless of the introduction of gender guidelines, national 
jurisprudence remains restrictive to gender-related asylum claims. For 
example, the Dutch Guidelines reject gender as an exclusive ground of PSG 
and require additional grounds of persecution. According to Article C.2.11: 
 
“[s]ex cannot be the sole ground to determine membership of a 
‘particular social group’. Women in general are too diverse a group to 
constitute a particular social group. In order to establish membership of 
a particular social group one should be put in an exceptional position 
compared to those whose situation is similar. In addition, the persons 
should be targeted individually”.1227 
 
Despite the gender guidelines on international protection standards 
having been around for more than two decades, the domestic refugee law 
practice has been slow to change. The gender guidelines have been criticised 
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for their continued inadequacy in providing true protection for victims of 
gender-related persecution. Gibney, for example, has described the current 
response from Western states as “organised hypocrisy”.1228 With regard to 
both UNHCR and domestic gender guidelines, one of the main criticisms 
towards their efficacy in providing protection to victims of gender-related 
persecution is that they lack teeth. 1229  Because neither international nor 
domestic gender guidelines are legally binding, but merely directional, they 
ultimately leave the decision to the adjudicating immigration judge.  
This was demonstrated in the 2012 European Parliament Report on the 
effect of gender guidelines in nine EU member states. The study exposed the 
mixed experiences of gender guidelines in asylum adjudication as well as ad 
hoc approaches to implementation.1230 Similarly, Mullally argues that in the 
jurisdictions where gender guidelines do exist, their “impact on adjudication 
appears limited”. 1231  Additionally, the substance of the various gender 
guidelines is not uniform, and the extent to which the existing domestic 
gender guidelines comply with UNHCR guidance notes and guidelines varies 
significantly.1232  
Similar observations were made the 2012 European Parliament Report 
on the national non-binding gender guidelines adopted in Romania, Sweden 
and the UK and the alternative gender-sensitive guidance documents adopted 
in Belgium and Italy. 1233  The study concluded that even though “gender 
guidelines or instructions may enhance gender awareness among national 
stakeholders, their implementation in practice is often lacking”.1234 
An additional concern caused by the non-binding nature of the 
domestic guidelines is their vulnerability to being repealed.1235 Owing to their 
non-binding legal status, none of the existing domestic gender guidelines 
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guarantees the victims of gender-related persecution any legal certainty or 
continuous protection. As Kandt observes with regard to Canadian gender 
guidelines: 
 
“[S]ince the Canadian Guidelines are only persuasive, not binding, it is 
possible that should a government that is less sympathetic on these 
issues come to power in the future, these guidelines could easily be 
scrapped without having to go through any formal legislative process. 
This is a significant danger (...). Such a threat would not be posed 
towards the five categories that have been adopted under the UN 
Convention by its signatory countries”.1236 
 
6 3 Complementary protection and its applicability to gender-related 
persecution cases 
Another alternative solution to mitigate the protection gap under the current 
refugee law framework is to afford victims of gender-related persecution 
‘complementary protection’. As discussed in chapter 2, along with the 
development of the human rights instruments, the human rights–based 
complementary protection framework began to attract attention on the 
international plane in the late 1980s. 1237  The complementary protection 
framework is rooted in obligations arising out of general humanitarian 
principles and international human rights instruments. 1238  According to 
McAdam, the main function of complementary protection is to “provide an 
alternative basis for eligibility for protection”.1239 Similarly, Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam argue that complementary protection is a “shorthand term for 
widened scope of non-refoulement under international law”.1240 Despite the 
term ‘complementary protection’ having emerged only in the 1990s, the 
origins of the framework are rooted, as alluded to above, in earlier 
                                                             
1236
 Kandt (1995) Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 169. 
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international and regional human rights instruments and state practice. The 
specific instruments encompassing complementary protection and the 
prohibition of refoulement include Article 3(1) of the Convention against 
Torture (CAT), 1241  Article 7 of the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),1242 Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR)1243 and Article 12(3) of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights as highlighted under sub-chapter 2 3 above.1244  
As discussed in chapter 2, despite Western states having traditionally 
resisted the expansion of the international refugee law framework to include 
further grounds for persecution, there has been a recognition by the states 
that some people who fall outside the international refugee definition merit 
protection and should not be returned to serious forms of harm.1245 However, 
as Goodwin-Gill and McAdam observe, state practice has been “characterised 
by highly varied, ad hoc responses at the national level” that have been made 
almost exclusively at the discretion of the executive.1246 Overall, the usage of 
complementary protection was for a long time confined to situations of mass 
influx,1247 and its origins are interlinked with the development of ‘temporary 
protection’, which prohibits the states from returning persons fleeing from 
generalised violence and internal armed conflict within their state of origin.1248 
Consequently, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue that complementary 
protection is the individual counterpart of temporary protection, which extends 
protection to “single or small group arrivals on the same humanitarian 
basis”.1249  
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Nonetheless, as of yet, neither an international treaty on complimentary 
protection nor any other agreement on what complementary protection should 
encompass exists. While the UNHCR considered the possibility of drafting an 
Optional Protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention with regard to 
complementary protection as early as 1992, it concluded that such a 
possibility would be disregarded for fear of “reopening fundamental principles 
and precepts in the Convention itself for further consideration”.1250 Similarly, in 
1994, the UNHCR ExCom concluded that despite a new international treaty 
on the issue being “desirable”, there seemed to be “little inclination on the part 
of States (...) to incur further legal obligations in this domain”.1251  
In 2004, however, the EU member states adopted the first binding 
multilateral legal instrument1252 on complementary protection in the form of 
the Qualification Directive. 1253  According to Article 15 of the Qualification 
Directive, a person will qualify for subsidiary protection if exposed to serious 
harm consisting of : 
 
 “[D]eath penalty or execution; or torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or 
serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed 
conflict”.1254 
 
A year later, in 2005, the UNHCR ExCom published a non-binding 
Conclusion on the Provision on International Protection Including through 
Complementary Forms of Protection.1255 Some academics have argued that 
there is no need to expand the current international refugee law framework to 
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include gender as a category of persecution, because of these developments 
in the field of complementary protection. This argument, however, disregards 
various problems with complementary protection as a solution to the lack of 
protection against gender-related persecution. Firstly, with respect to the EU, 
the only region with a binding multilateral legal instrument, only five member 
states have granted complementary protection in a total of seven cases 
involving gender-related violence since the passage of the 2005 Qualification 
Directive.1256 At the same time, there has been almost the same number of 
rejections.1257  Similarly to the analysis in sub-chapter 5 2 of the different 
gender guidelines, this demonstrates the continuing ad hoc nature of the 
responses of the member state jurisdictions as well as the discrepancy in the 
outcomes, despite the supposedly unifying Qualification Directive. This point 
has also been observed by Petitpas and Nelles, according to whom “the 
extent to which European states currently recognise refugee status for women 
and girls at risk of gender-based persecution varies significantly”.1258 
As mentioned above, there have only been seven cases involving 
gender-related persecution in which complementary protection has been 
granted since the passage of the Qualification Directive in 2005. 1259  In 
Finland, complementary protection has been granted in two cases. The first 
case involved a female minor from Somalia who belonged to a minority clan 
and was at risk of forced marriage in her country of origin. 1260 While the 
Helsinki Administrative Court granted the applicant complementary protection, 
it did so on the basis of the precarious general security and humanitarian 
situation rather than on the basis of the risk of forced marriage. 1261  The 
second case involved a pregnant Ethiopian woman who had been denied 
refugee status despite having been subjected to assault and rape carried out 
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by the police in Ethiopia. 1262  The Helsinki Administrative Court, however, 
granted the applicant complementary protection because she would be “at 
risk of suffering a real threat of serious harm or inhuman or degrading 
treatment on the basis that she had experienced serious human rights 
violations in the past, she [was] in the final stages of pregnancy or would be 
returned with a new-born child and that she would not have any social 
networks to fall back on”.1263  
In Germany, only one case of complementary protection linked to 
gender-related persecution has been granted. In 2010, the Administrative 
Court in Münster granted protection from deportation to a Nigerian woman 
due to the threat of FGM and forced marriage if she was returned to her 
country of origin.1264 Importantly, however, the applicant’s refugee claim was 
originally rejected because the court found that FGM did not constitute 
persecution.1265  
In 2010, the Spanish Supreme Court granted complementary 
protection to a Columbian woman who had applied for refugee status after 
having been subjected to rape and physical mistreatment by a non-identified 
group that subsequently threatened her and her partner.1266 The applicant’s 
refugee claim was refused on the basis that the applicant had failed to 
establish a link between the gender-related persecution suffered and her 
political opinions.1267 In its judgment, the Spanish Supreme Court reiterated 
that persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention had not 
been established.1268 The Supreme Court granted complementary protection 
on the basis of the applicant having suffered individually as a result of the 
ongoing situation of indiscriminate violence in Colombia.1269 Yet again, it is 
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important to note that the Supreme Court based its decision to grant 
complimentary protection on what it described as indiscriminate violence 
rather than gender-related persecution.   
In France, the National Asylum Court (Cour nationale du droit d’asile, 
CNDA) granted complementary protection in two cases involving gender-
related persecution. In 2010, the CNDA granted complementary protection to 
a Guinean woman who had refused to undergo FGM in her country of 
origin. 1270  She further claimed that she had been “involved in anti-
governmental political activities and that she was subjected to physical abuse 
for this reason”.1271 Eventually, her parents sent the applicant to France to be 
subjected to forced marriage. Once in France, the man she was married to 
subjected the applicant to violence and confinement. The applicant applied for 
refugee status based on membership of a particular social group. The 
application was rejected, as according to CNDA, there was not sufficient 
evidence to “conclude that the applicant’s anti-governmental political 
activities, which only started once she was in France and which she 
manifested during this forced marriage, could amount to such an infringement 
that she could be seen as a member of a particular social group”.1272 Despite 
the gender-related violence the applicant had suffered, the CNDA did not 
consider her membership of a PSG to be the cause of this violence. 
Ultimately, the CNDA granted the applicant complementary protection on the 
basis that she had “deliberately opposed [her parents’] will and that she would 
face, if returned to her country of origin, acts amounting to inhuman and 
degrading treatment from her relatives, without being able to request 
effectively the intervention of the authorities due to the private and domestic 
nature of the case”.1273 
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Similarly, the CNDA granted a Nigerian woman complementary 
protection in 2011.1274 The applicant had fled Nigeria to Spain due to threats 
of being subjected to forced marriage and FGM in her country of origin.1275 In 
Spain the applicant was forced to prostitute herself for several months before 
she fled to France.1276 The CNDA firstly assessed the applicant’s refugee 
claim, which it refused due to the facts relating to her fear of being subjected 
to a forced marriage and to FGM “not being established”.1277 Furthermore, 
with regard to the forced prostitution that the applicant had been subjected to 
in Spain, the CNDA found that the applicant should not be seen as a “member 
of a particular social group in Nigeria, which would possess its own identity 
because it was perceived as different by Nigerian society and, consequently, 
subjected as such to specific persecution”. 1278  Consequently, the CNDA 
rejected the applicant’s refugee claim as based on membership in a PSG 
comprising victims of trafficking. The CNDA, however, granted the applicant 
complementary protection, because “given her personal and family situation, 
the applicant could not avail herself of the effective protection of the 
authorities of her country of origin”.1279 Ultimately, the CNDA concluded that 
the applicant faces a serious threat of inhuman or degrading treatment in her 
country of origin by the members of the network that brought her to Spain and 
to which she still owed a great deal of money.1280 
Finally, in 2012, in J.T.M. v Minister for Justice and Equality,1281 the 
Irish High Court granted complementary protection to a Nigerian woman 
fleeing serious ill treatment, rape and torture that she had suffered at the 
hands of her husband, to whom she was forcibly married for 16 years. The 
claimant’s refugee application was refused by the Refugee Appeals 
Commissioner and later by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal “on the grounds 
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that internal relocation was appropriate”. 1282  The applicant consequently 
applied for complementary protection, which the Ministry for Justice and 
Equality initially refused because of the finding that the non-state persecutor 
(the husband) could not be considered an ‘actor of serious harm’, as it had not 
been demonstrated that the state of origin was unable or unwilling to provide 
protection against the harm. 1283  Consequently, according to the Ministry, 
because ‘serious harm’ could only be carried out by ‘actors of serious harm’, it 
could not be established that the applicant had suffered ‘serious harm’ in her 
country of origin, despite clear evidence that she had suffered torture.1284 
Overall, these cases demonstrates that despite all of them arguably 
including serious gender-related harm, in a vast majority of cases 
complementary protection was granted because of more general reasons 
such as “precarious general security and humanitarian situation” or “on-going 
situation of indiscriminate violence”, rather than on the basis of the threat of 
serious gender-related harm. By granting complementary protection on more 
generalised grounds, however, the courts fail to acknowledge the harm 
suffered by the applicants because of their gender.1285  
Another cause for concern related to the use of complementary 
protection in cases involving gender-related persecution is that, whilst there 
have only been seven gender-related persecution cases in which 
complementary protection was granted in the states discussed above, there 
have also been a number of cases in which protection was denied on 
questionable grounds. In 2008, the Administrative Court in Munich denied 
both refugee status and complementary protection to an Iraqi woman who had 
adopted a Western, independent way of life since moving to Germany.1286 
According to the applicant, if she was returned to her country of origin, she 
would face a serious threat of violence, permanent restrictions on her freedom 
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and risk to her life in the form of an honour killing, because her family 
members did not accept her Westernised way of life.1287 In denying refugee 
status to the applicant, the Administrative Court in Munich stated that the 
applicant had failed to successfully establish persecution since the threat to 
her life or freedom was not related to her race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or her political conviction. 1288 
Furthermore, with regard to the applicant’s attempt to link the threat to her life 
or freedom to her gender, it held that the “[h]arassment perpetrated by 
members of her clan [was] (...) obviously not related to her inalienable 
characteristic as a woman, but to the fact that she [did] not want to behave 
according to the moral standards of her clan”. 1289  According to the 
Administrative Court in Munich, transgression of social and cultural norms 
regarding gender roles and behaviour is not protected under German 
domestic nor international refugee law. 1290  It also denied complementary 
protection to the applicant, because the threat of honour killing or other form 
of serious violence resulting from her transgression of accepted moral 
conduct was a general, albeit “increased individual risk”.1291 According to the 
Administrative Court in Munich, the risk faced by the applicant was:  
 
“[N]ot a result of arbitrary violence, but (...) a target-oriented, 
predictable danger, aimed directly at the applicant, which is an 
expression of a criminal attitude among some individuals of her culture 
of origin (...) This risk emerges and prospers in the absence of a 
functional constitutional order based on peace, providing for 
corresponding punishment and is, therefore, a typical general risk”.1292  
 
This decision arguably contradicts the 2005 Qualification Directive, 
which requires serious threat of “death penalty or execution or torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country 
of origin or serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason 
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of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed 
conflict”1293 in order to grant complementary protection, not the presence of all 
of them.  
In a second German case, the Administrative Court in Aachen denied 
refugee status and complementary protection to a Nigerian minor who 
claimed that she would be at serious risk of FGM if she was returned to 
Nigeria.1294 In denying the applicant’s claim, the court came to the conclusion 
that it could “not be established with a reasonable degree of probability that 
the applicant, in case of return to Nigeria, [was] at risk of political persecution 
in the form of FGM”.1295 It came to this conclusion despite acknowledging that 
“FGM, in all its known forms, is still widespread in Nigeria”.1296 Furthermore, 
what makes the court’s decision so questionable is the fact that no general 
legislation prohibiting FGM in Nigeria exists, and “prosecution is possible only 
under the general criminal law”.1297 While some states in Nigeria, such as the 
applicant’s native state of Edo, have laws prohibiting FGM, no criminal 
proceedings had taken place at that time.1298 Ultimately, the Administrative 
Court in Aachen came to the conclusion that it was not “sufficiently likely that 
a circumcision would be performed, since a circumcision of a minor girl in 
principle requires the parents’ consent and in the case [in question] both 
parents (...) opposed the applicant’s circumcision”.1299 
Finally, in Sweden, in 2010, the Migration Court of Appeal 
(Migrationsöverdomstolen) denied complementary protection to a woman with 
three children from Montenegro.1300 According to the applicant, there was a 
serious threat to her life and of abuse by her brother-in-law and her father-in-
law if she was returned to Montenegro.1301 The applicant had been subjected 
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to rape, violence and forced prostitution by her brother-in-law and had 
received threats from her father-in-law in her country of origin.1302 In denying 
her and her children refugee status through complementary protection, the 
Migration Court of Appeal stated that the applicant had failed to demonstrate 
the lack of will or ability of the State of Montenegro to protect her, given that 
the brother-in-law had been prosecuted and convicted for the assault he had 
committed against the applicant.1303 Furthermore, the applicant had received 
support from a women’s shelter in Montenegro and had access to a male and 
social network leading the Migration Court of Appeal to conclude that the 
applicant would “not risk social rejection or exclusion upon return”. 1304 
However, it is questionable whether the Migration Court of Appeal sufficiently 
considered the general situation with regard to sexual violence in Montenegro. 
According to the country of origin information, “less than one third of reported 
cases of sexual violence in Montenegro results in criminal proceedings (…). 
The Montenegrin society is dominated by patriarchal structures and the said 
structures have a strong influence on the work of the police in protecting 
women at risk”.1305 
Furthermore, complementary protection is also used outside Europe, 
for example in Canada and Australia. The problems that have emerged in the 
application of complementary protection to cases involving gender-related 
violence are similar to those emerging in European jurisprudence. For 
example, like their European counterparts, the Canadian courts have tended 
to characterise violence against women as ‘random violence’ or ‘general 
criminal risk’.1306 In addition to the courts mischaracterising the nature of the 
violence and persecution faced by women, the belittling of gender violence 
arguably leads to severe complications in attempts to secure protection for 
victims of such violence.  
Another problem in the Canadian jurisprudence has been the manner 
in which the Courts have, in my opinion, incorrectly combined the legal tests 
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for refugee protection and complementary protection. While section 96 1307 of 
the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2002, which governs 
the granting of refugee status, requires only a ‘reasonable chance’ of 
persecution, section 97,1308 which governs complementary protection, sets a 
much higher threshold of proving that the threat of persecution is more 
probable than not.1309 Moreover, while section 96 requires the persecution 
feared be based on one of the five enumerated grounds, section 97 limits 
applicability to serious harm that is “not faced generally”. As Liew argues, the 
consequence of this limitation is that the nature of the harm “must be personal 
and the degree of the threat must be one that is not experienced generally by 
everyone in the country of origin”.1310 The outcome of the prohibition of the so-
called ‘generalised risk’ has been that it has “provided justification for the 
improper delimiting of gender-based claims”. 1311  Furthermore, as Liew 
observes, the prohibition of ‘generalised risk’ has made the application of 
complementary protection for persons experiencing group trauma (such as 
gender-related violence) extremely challenging, “as it prefers individualistic 
and particularized rather than collective harm and claims framed as ‘private’ 
rather than ‘public’”.1312 
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Overall, the inclusion of complementary protection in the Canadian 
refugee legislation has had a twofold impact on gender-related persecution 
cases, which is supported by the case law discussed below. Firstly, the 
complementary protection provision fails to provide true complementary 
protection in the case of gender-based claims, as it does not fill protection 
gaps left open by the refugee definition.1313 Secondly, the rhetoric that the 
asylum courts use when they discuss the gender-related persecution cases 
has been “more detrimental than beneficial towards the project of changing 
the normative language surrounding violence against women”.1314  
In Michel v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),1315 the 
Canadian Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that the applicant, a 
Haitian woman who feared rape by members of a gang if she was returned to 
Haiti, did not fall under the protection of either the refugee or complementary 
protection frameworks. While reducing the gender-related violence feared by 
the applicant to general criminal violence, the RPD found that “both women 
and men in Haiti are vulnerable to being victims of criminal gangs”.1316 The 
RPD’s decision was later overturned by the Federal Court, according to which 
“the Board should have specifically addressed whether there was 
documentary or other evidence before it as to the generalized persecution of 
women in Haiti”.1317 According to the Federal Court, the RPD should have 
examined whether the applicant would be a member of a PSG and should 
have separated the analyses of the refugee claim and the complementary 
protection claim.1318 
Similarly, the RPD denied refugee and complementary status to 
another Haitian applicant in an analogous case heard the same year. In 
Dezameau v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1319  the 
applicant feared that if she was returned to Haiti, she and her daughters 
would be “targets of criminal gangs, kidnappers and potential rapists as a 
result of the fact that they are women and more particularly those who have 
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lived outside of the country for a period of time”.1320 In denying the applicant’s 
claim, the RPD found that the applicant had never been “a victim of any attack 
related to her status as a woman”, and consequently, “there was no gender-
based claim”.1321 In assessing the possibility of gender-related persecution 
taking place in Haiti, the RPD noted that “the Prime Minister of Haiti is a 
woman”, and “half of Haiti’s population of 8 million are women”.1322 According 
to the RPD, the applicant’s fear was “rooted in a general problem of criminality 
in that country” and the threat of rape was not caused by her gender but 
rather “faced by all Haitian citizens as a result of the violence in their 
country”.1323 
As Liew highlights, it is noteworthy how the RPD in this case used the 
prohibition of ‘generalised risk’ under complementary protection “to limit the 
reach of the [refugee protection] in gender-based claims”.1324 According to the 
Federal Court reviewing the case, “a gender-related crime cannot be rejected 
because women face general oppression (...) Where the applicant has not, 
herself, experienced the type of persecution she fears, the applicant can use 
evidence of similarly-situated persons to demonstrate the risk and the 
unwillingness or inability of the state to protect”.1325  
 Overall, there is agreement amongst academics that complementary 
protection was never intended to fill the protection gaps of the refugee law 
framework with regard to gender-related persecution.1326 However, as Liew 
observes, the operation of complementary protection has gone beyond its 
original scope in the Canadian context. 1327  Liew further argues that 
complementary protection considerations, such as the prohibition of the 
‘generalised risk’, have annexed analyses concerning refugee status 
determination and ‘clouded decision-makers’ perspectives as to what are 
                                                             
1320
 para. 3. 
1321
 para. 9 
1322
 para. 10 
1323
 para. 10 
1324
 Liew (2014) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 17. 
1325
 Dezameau v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2010] FC 559 
para. 26. 
1326
 Liew (2014) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 32. 
1327
 32. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  229 
proper considerations when determining whether a particular case merits 
protection, especially in the case of gender-based claims.1328 
A further issue with complementary protection in general is that, even 
where protection is granted, there still remains a significant protection gap 
with regard to the status awarded to the applicant. As McAdam observes, “the 
quality of domestic status granted to beneficiaries of complementary 
protection varies considerably”. 1329  Furthermore, persons who have been 
granted complementary protection are provided with “shorter residence 
permits, despite the lack of empirical evidence to support [complementary] 
protection as a temporary status”. 1330  The status that EU member states 
afford through complementary protection is secondary to that of refugee 
status.1331 Under the EU Qualification Directive, refugees are granted three-
year renewable permits, while persons falling under complementary protection 
are given only one-year renewable residence permits.1332 For example, in the 
Netherlands, temporary resident permits have been granted to victims of 
domestic violence on humanitarian grounds.1333 However, in its Concluding 
Observations in 2010, the CEDAW Committee expressed concern that, 
despite the Netherlands affording complementary protection to victims of 
domestic violence, “domestic violence is still not formally recognized as 
grounds for asylum”, 1334  which would lead to the granting of a more 
permanent status.   
Overall, while complementary protection can provide temporary 
protection to some victims of gender-related persecution, it does not provide 
the necessary protection required by victims of gender-related persecution 
because of its ad hoc nature. This point is echoed by Hathaway and Foster, 
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who argue that “where a woman has a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of her gender it is not (...) sufficient to extend protection based on 
‘humanitarian reasons’ or subsidiary status. Rather, refugee status ought to 
be recognized”.1335 
As shown above, despite the emergence of the concept of 
complementary protection and the consequential expansion of the limits of the 
current protection framework, refugee law is not keeping pace with the 
development of women’s human rights and the accompanying positive 
obligations of the states.1336 As Mullally argues, this failure can be attributed 
to the “continuing constraints of refugee law’s categories, its potential for 
inclusion and exclusion, and the ever present imperative of migration control 
which, while not relevant to an assessment of protection needs, nonetheless, 
frequently constrains the willingness of states to offer protection”.1337   
 
6 4 Recognition of ‘gender’ as an independent ground of persecution 
As has been argued in the previous chapters, the current refugee definition 
under international law is incorrigibly outdated and based on a framework that 
is more than 60 years old and was designed to respond to the pleas of white, 
European males in the post–WWII era. As Schenk states, this has been 
acknowledged not only by various academics who have recognised the 
“anachronistic texture of the concept of refugee” but also by the UNHCR, 
which has “urged recognition of the inadequacy” of the current refugee 
definition under international law to meet the needs of modem society.1338 
Similarly, in 2001, the San Remo Expert Roundtable recognised that, in 
addition to the failure to acknowledge the political nature of private acts of 
harm to women, “the main problem facing women asylum-seekers is the 
failure of decision-makers to incorporate the gender-related claims of women 
in their interpretation of the existing enumerated grounds”.1339  
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The inadequate nature of the current refugee law framework with 
regard to the protection of victims of gender-related persecution can also be 
detected in states’ attempts to widen the reach of the protection through 
mechanisms such as gender guidelines and complementary protection. 
However, as have been demonstrated above, these mechanisms fall short of 
providing legal certainty or continuous protection to victims of gender-related 
persecution and result in a wide protection gap under the current refugee law 
framework.  
The situation is made worse by states’ adoption of increasingly 
restrictionist refugee policies that appear to have “surpassed both the goal of 
stopping the violence that forces people to flee and of assisting and protecting 
those who have managed to escape”.1340  This restrictionist approach has 
been poignantly demonstrated by the recent responses by some European 
governments usch as with regard to the growing refugee crisis mainly caused 
by the situation in Syria. Overall, the current refugee law framework “excludes 
general exploitation or an atmosphere of oppression from the scope of 
persecution”.1341  
This has had a severe impact on women’s asylum applications, as the 
current refugee definition “disproportionally burdens women, who due to their 
lower social status are more likely to suffer from general exploitation and 
denial of many general rights and opportunities afforded to men”.1342 Similarly, 
the dominant assumption that the application of international law is neutral 
and universal places women applying for refugee status based on gender-
related persecution at a significant disadvantage. As Stevens argues, the lack 
of recognition that “international legal principles might affect women differently 
than they affect men” has led to a situation where women’s experiences are 
inclined to be silenced or discounted. 1343  This sentiment is echoed by 
Dasgupta who argues that “in spite of their universal applicability, principles of 
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equality and discrimination (...) have not been realised by the mandates of the 
Refugee Convention”.1344  
With regard to gender-related persecution, under the current refugee 
law system, no cohesive framework exists within which it is possible to 
evaluate claims.1345 The outcome of each gender-related persecution claim is 
almost exclusively at the discretion of the adjudicator, as has been highlighted 
above.1346 Ultimately, the decision that the court reaches on the existence of a 
‘well-founded fear’, whether the case is based on one of the five enumerated 
ground or whether complementary protection is granted, is “replete with 
subjectivity”.1347 As a consequence, the current refugee law regime has been 
justly criticised for being characterised by “inconsistencies and jurisprudential 
gymnastics” with respect to gender-related persecution cases.1348  
Some of these inconsistencies would arguably be avoided if gender 
was addressed as an independent ground in the refugee definition. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the current categories of refugee definition 
do not accommodate nor give adequate protection from gender-related 
persecution. Perhaps even more importantly, the attempts to include gender-
related persecution under the existing categories do not adequately address 
“the core issue of discrimination on grounds of sex as a violation of 
fundamental rights, or (...) the problems of violence specifically directed 
against women as women”.1349 Because of this failure of the international 
refugee law to recognise the root cause of gender-related persecution, in 
combination with the difficult fit of gender claims under the existing categories, 
gender-related claims often do not appear credible to adjudicators, or 
adjudicators “find insufficient bases to attribute the persecution (...) to any of 
the other grounds” that are enumerated under international refugee law.1350 
As Stevens argues, the UNHCR’s passage of non-binding gender 
guidelines to include women in the PSG category is a recognition that 
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“gender-specific persecution is an international refugee problem and that 
interpretations of the current definition have not helped the victims”.1351 Yet, 
despite the publication of the UNHCR Gender Guidelines, PSG is not an 
adequate category to deal with gender-related asylum claims, as it does not 
recognise the root cause of the persecution. Despite the PSG category 
potentially producing ‘socially desirable results’ in some gender-related 
persecution cases, as shown in sub-chapter 4 2, it does not recognise the true 
importance of the issue on the account of gender.1352 Overall, inclusion of 
gender in the PSG category does not provide sufficient protection to women 
within the “context of society’s recognised, widespread, and institutional 
persecution of women worldwide”.1353 
 Consequently, I support the argument that the best way to enhance 
protection from gender-related persecution and to transform the refugee law 
regime into a more just and equal one is to add gender as an independent, 
legally binding category of persecution to the refugee definition. Adding 
gender would recognise the unique problems that women face due to their 
gender instead of attempting to fit them into pre-existing categories that do not 
consider women’s needs and often work against them. 1354  Furthermore, 
independent gender-category would also accord greater attention and respect 
to the issue of gender-based persecution1355 by ensuring that the refugee 
definition “will cover harms specific to women – [such as] female genital 
mutilation, rape, and gender based discrimination – and will recognize these 
harms as persecution”. 1356  As Stevens argues, the explicit recognition of 
gender-based persecution “would ensure that claims to refugee status 
accurately reflect women’s reality by allowing them to tell their story as 
opposed to attempting to tailor it to the current categories”.1357  
 However, the proposal to include gender as an independent ground in 
the refugee definition has received a lot of criticism. According to one such 
critique, the inclusion of gender would isolate women’s claims into a ‘special’ 
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category and create a standard that would treat women and men differently, 
leading to potential legitimatisation of gender discrimination.1358 However, as 
Schenk argues, rather than seeking to protect “women’s rights’ per se, the 
addition of gender as an independent ground seeks the protection of human 
rights”.1359 The addition of gender would, as argued by Bosi, guarantee an 
“even and consistent application of the law with respect to all types of 
persecution, including gender persecution”. 1360  Ultimately, as Johnsson 
states, discrimination and persecution on the ground of gender is no less a 
violation of fundamental rights than, for example, religious or political 
persecution.1361 
The problematic inclusion of gender persecution under the existing 
international refugee law has sparked an academic debate from which two 
opposing approaches have emerged. According to the more traditional 
approach, which aims to maintain the legal status quo, there is no need to 
modify the current international legislation. This argument is based on the 
rationale that problems with the inclusion of gender claims under the current 
framework are not caused by the existing international legislation per se but 
rather by the social and political context in which the claims of women are 
adjudicated.1362 For example, with regard to the problem of ‘privatisation’ of 
sexual violence by the asylum adjudicators, Crawley argues that the problem 
is not the existing refugee definition per se, as it does not require adjudicators 
to view sexual violence as inherently private, but rather the “particular 
conceptualization of sexual violence that legitimates and normalizes it”.1363  
According to Crawley, it is within this context that “the way in which a non-
legal conception of violence is used to distort sexual abuse” has to be 
addressed.1364 It is important to note, however, as Inlender points out, that 
while this argument does address the inclusion of asylum claims based on 
gender-specific persecution under the existing refugee law framework, it 
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overlooks and fails to solve the much more difficult problem of including 
gender-based persecution claims. 1365  The ‘privatisation’ of gender-related 
persecution was discussed in detail in sub-chapter 5 2. 
According to the proponents of the legislative status quo, rather than 
improving the current position of women asylum-seekers, adding gender as 
an independent category might actually make matters worse. For example, 
according to Binder, while it would be desirable to modernise and develop the 
refugee definition, such a change is highly unlikely due to political realities and 
trends in immigration policies. 1366  Consequently, Binder argues for the 
improvement of the current administrative and judicial practices under the 
existing international legal framework. 1367  Similarly, Fox argues that the 
addition of gender as an independent ground for persecution “would 
unnecessarily delay assistance to women since member-nations will find it 
necessary to argue and debate a change of that magnitude”.1368 According to 
Fox, a better approach would be a human rights–based definition of 
persecution combined with a recognition of gender under PSG. 1369  On a 
theoretical level, however, Fox agrees that the addition of gender as an 
enumerated ground would serve as a legal solution, as it would “ease the 
fiction of ‘fitting’ a claim within either a religion, political opinion, race, 
nationality or social group category, where the claimant’s true basis of 
persecution is due solely to her gender”.1370 Ankenbrand is cautious about the 
possible positive effects on women’s asylum claims of the addition of gender 
as an independent category. According to her, the addition of an independent 
gender category would bear the risk of “reducing the diverse female 
experience to a specific category of gender-related persecution which might 
exclude women even more from the traditional refugee definition and 
depoliticize women’s lives”.1371 
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Overall, the inclusion of gender as an independent ground has 
received criticism from the proponents of the legislative status quo for 
‘essentialising’ women asylum-seekers and their experiences of persecution 
by constructing “a false sense of cohesiveness, which women as a group do 
not (...) possess”.1372  For example, according to Crawley, while there are 
certain cases where gender alone is the motivation for persecution, “more 
often the persecution is not applied equally to all women”. 1373  The anti-
essentialist critique will be further discussed in sub-chapter 5 7.  
The existing categories do not contest the biases against women that 
are inherent in the asylum application system. As Stevens argues:  
 
“as long as the legal system continues to be ‘objective’ with regard to 
gender differences, women’s claims will continue to go unrecognized 
because “[t]he male epistemological stance is objectivity, and sexual 
objectivity is the ‘primary process of the subjection of women”.1374  
 
The addition of gender as an independent ground for persecution in the 
refugee definition would acknowledge the true motivation behind gender-
related persecution rather than incorporating it into male-dominated 
categories and would further strengthen the recognition of the universality of 
violence against women. This point will receive further attention in Chapter 6.  
 Another point of criticism levelled against gender as an independent 
ground is the fear that the inclusion of an independent gender category would 
‘open the floodgates’ of female refugees and overwhelm the receiving 
states.1375  However, the floodgates argument is not a legitimate one with 
regard to current human rights law and the apparent protection function of 
international refugee law. As Bosi argues, “it is clearly more crucial to save 
the life of one human being, of one woman persecuted because of her 
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gender, than it is to fear that a second [woman] may apply”.1376 Furthermore, 
apart from the questionable legitimacy of the argument, it does not have a 
basis in reality. As Musalo points out by using Canada as an example, the 
introduction of the Gender Guidelines has not lead to an explosion of 
claims.1377 Since 1993, when Canada became the first state to issue gender 
guidelines, gender claims have “consistently constituted only a miniscule 
fraction of Canada’s total claims”.1378 Despite the addition of gender as an 
independent ground in the Gender Guidelines, victims of gender-related 
persecution must still fulfil the procedural and substantive requirements, such 
as a well-founded fear and lack of state protection.  
Ultimately, only the addition of gender persecution as an independent 
category to the legal refugee definition will ensure that women also receive 
the full benefits of refugee law, in accordance with the principle of non-
discrimination.1379 Furthermore, the inclusion of gender as an independent 
category would remove any doubts about the applicability of refugee 
protection to gender-related asylum claims and eliminate the need for 
complementary protection. As Bosi argues, the addition of gender as a sixth 
category to current refugee law is “necessary to eliminate the gender bias that 
exists in asylum law and provide heightened, long-term protection for the 
human rights of women”.1380  
As indicated in the introduction, a handful of jurisdictions have 
undertaken this pioneering expansion of the legal refugee definition in their 
domestic legislations and in so doing have challenged the international 
refugee law regime’s failure to protect women. South Africa, as one of the first 
jurisdictions in the world, included ’gender’ as an independent category for a 
well-founded fear of persecution after amending section 3 of the 1998 
Refugees Act in the Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008. As the chairperson 
of the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs of South Africa stated, the 
rationale behind this amendment was to “take out all the ambiguity, stop all 
the arguments that might take place in the future because not everyone sees 
                                                             
1376
 812. 
1377
 K. Musalo, ‘Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to 
(Principled) Action?’ (2007) 14 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law 119, 133. 
1378
 133. 
1379
 Stevens (1993-1994) Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 179. 
1380
 Bosi (2004) New York Law School Law Review 813. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  238 
gender as a particular social group”.1381 During the public hearings of the 
2008 Refugees Amendment Bill, the UNHCR Regional Office “welcome[d] the 
inclusion of gender related persecution as a ground for recognition as a 
refugee”. 1382  However, despite already being enacted in 2008, the 2008 
Refugees Amendment Act 33 is yet to be put into effect by the Minister of 
Home Affairs, which means it is premature to draw any conclusions on its 
possible effects on South African asylum adjudication.  
  Similarly, following the amendments made in 2009, Spanish refugee 
legislation1383 includes gender as an independent sixth ground of persecution. 
It spells out protection for “foreign women who have fled their countries on 
account of a well-founded fear of suffering gender-based persecution”. This 
law was later amended by Article 3 of the Organic Act 12/2009 (Ley Orgánica 
12/2009), which broadened the grounds for granting refugee status to include 
“individuals persecuted on the grounds of gender”.1384 According to Article 
3,1385  a refugee is “any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions, 
membership of a particular social group, gender or sexual orientation, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
unwilling to avail herself/himself of the protection of that country”.1386  The 
formal recognition of gender as a ground of persecution by Spanish asylum 
law has been described as representing a significant advance towards 
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July 2012. 
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pertenencia a determinado grupo social, de género u orientación sexual, se encuentra fuera 
del país de su nacionalidad y no puede o, a causa de dichos temores, no quiere acogerse a 
la protección de tal país. 
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equality between men and women. 1387  Already in 2005, in an unreported 
case, the Spanish Inter-ministerial Asylum Commission granted refugee 
status to a victim of domestic violence who had escaped a forced 
marriage.1388 This was a precedent-setting decision and the first time that 
refugee status had been granted on the basis of gender in Spain.1389 
 Similarly, many of the Latin American states, including Costa Rica,1390 
El Salvador, 1391  Guatemala, 1392  Mexico, 1393  Nicaragua, 1394  Paraguay, 1395 
                                                             
1387
 CEAR-Euskadi, ‘Asylum and gender’ (CEAR-Euskadi, October 2014) <http://cear-
euskadi.org/guia/en/asilo-y-genero-2/> accessed 19 October 2014. 
1388
 UNHCR, ‘Spain grants asylum to battered woman’ (UNHCR, 9 June 2005) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=42a849eb4&query=spain%20asylum> accessed 19 
October 2014. 
1389
 UNHCR, ‘Spain grants asylum to battered woman’ UNHCR. 
1390
 Ley de Migración y Extranjería, Ley No 8764 (19 August 2009), Art 106(1) includes 
gender as an independent ground of persecution. Art 106(1) states: ‘Se entenderá como 
refugiado a la persona que: 1) Debido a fundados temores de ser perseguida por motivos de 
raza, religión, nacionalidad, género, pertenencia a determinado grupo u opinions políticas, se 
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Uruguay 1396  and Venezuela 1397  have included gender as an independent 
ground for persecution in their domestic refugee legislation. An indication of 
the commitment to true inclusion of gender in the ambit of refugee law can be 
seen, for example, in a 2008 case from Costa Rica. In Resolution No 1023-
2008,1398 the court granted refugee status to a woman from the United States 
who was seeking asylum on the basis of domestic violence. In granting the 
asylum, the court held that “domestic violence can be the basis for refugee 
status” and that it would be “inconsistent with international refugee rights to 
deny protection on this basis”.1399  
Significantly, in 2014, two substantial steps were taken towards the 
inclusion of gender as an independent ground in the international refugee 
definition. The first one was the entry of force of the Council of Europe 
Convention on preventing and combatting violence against women and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
se encuentre fuera del país de su nacionalidad y no pueda o, a causa de dichos temores, no 
quiera acogerse a la protección de tal país. 
1395
 Ley No. 1938 – General Sobre Refugiados (9 July 2002) Art 1(a) includes sex as an 
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domestic violence (Istanbul Convention).1400 The Istanbul Convention is the 
first legally binding treaty in Europe that specifically addresses violence 
against women, including female genital mutilation. 1401  Furthermore, with 
regard to its scope, it is currently the most comprehensive international treaty 
to address violence against women.1402  
The Istanbul Convention was created following the acknowledgement 
by the Council of Europe that half of the 33 million of the world refugees are 
women and girls, many of whose asylum claims involve fear of gender-based 
violence.1403 Furthermore, the Council of Europe recognised that available 
asylum systems often fail women and that “all too often, when applying the 
United Nations 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
states fail to acknowledge and take into account the differences in how 
women and men experience persecution”.1404  According to the Council of 
Europe, it is this gender blindness that “results in inconsistent asylum 
decisions and deprives many women of international protection”.1405 
Remarkably, Article 60 of the Istanbul Convention contains provisions 
directly addressing asylum applications relating to gender-related persecution. 
Article 60(1) states that all parties “shall take the necessary legislative or other 
measures to ensure that gender‐based violence against women may be 
recognized as a form of persecution within the meaning of Article 1 A (2), of 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and as a form of 
serious harm giving rise to complementary/subsidiary protection”. 1406 
Furthermore, Art 60(2) requires the parties to “ensure that a gender‐sensitive 
interpretation is given to each of the Convention grounds and that where it is 
established that the persecution feared is for one or more of these grounds, 
applicants shall be granted refugee status according to the applicable relevant 
                                                             
1400
 CETS No. 210 
1401
 Petitpas and Nelles, ‘The Istanbul Convention: new treaty, new tool’ (2015) Forced 
Migration Review 83. 
1402
 Council of Europe, ‘Refugee Women and the Istanbul Convention’ (Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, 23 January 2013) 
<www.assembly.coe.int/Communication/Campaign/DomesticViolence/20130123_RefugeeWo
menIstanbulConvention_E.pdf > accessed 27 September 2015. 
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instruments”.1407  Article 60(2) is further supplemented by Art 60(3), which 
requires the parties to take “necessary legislative or other measures to 
develop gender‐sensitive reception procedures and support services for 
asylum seekers as well as gender guidelines and gender‐sensitive asylum 
procedures, including refugee status determination and application for 
international protection”. 1408  The creation of a specific legal instrument 
addressing the violence against women as a form of persecution is a big step 
in the right direction and “gives hope for real change in how women and girls 
are protected from gender-based violence.”1409  However, what makes the 
convention problematic is that it does so in the form of complementary 
protection rather than as part of the international refugee law framework.  
  A second great leap forward towards the full recognition of gender as 
an independent ground was taken in November 2014, when the CEDAW 
Committee, in its General Recommendation 32 on the gender-related 
dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women 
(Recommendation No 32), acknowledged the need to modernise the refugee 
definition by adding gender as an independent ground of persecution.  
Recommendation No 32 begins by highlighting that CEDAW, as a 
gender-specific human rights instrument, “covers other rights that are not 
explicitly mentioned therein, but that have an impact on the achievement of 
equality of women and men” 1410 , including the protection offered by 
international refugee law. Recommendation No 32 further stresses that 
CEDAW is “part of a comprehensive international human rights legal 
framework that operates simultaneously with international refugee law”.1411  
In recognising the lack of gender dimension in the current refugee law 
framework, Recommendation No 32 specifically notes the importance of the 
provisions of CEDAW in reinforcing and complementing the international legal 
protection regime for women and girl refugees and asylum-seekers due to 
“explicit gender equality provisions [being] absent from relevant international 
                                                             
1407
 Art 60(2) 
1408
 Art 60(3) 
1409
 Petitpas and Nelles (2015) Forced Migration Review 83. 
1410
 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 32 on the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, 
nationality and statelessness of women, 14 November 2014, CEDAW/C/GC/32, para. 5 
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[refugee] agreements”.1412  
 While discussing the substance of the current international refugee law 
regime, Recommendation No 32 specifically notes that gender-related 
persecution is absent from the text1413 and expresses concern about “many 
asylum systems continu[ing] to treat the claims of women through the lens of 
male experiences, which can result in their claims to refugee status not being 
properly assessed or being rejected”.1414  
 Consequently, in order to ameliorate the existing protection gap, 
Recommendation No 32 clearly identifies the addition of gender as an 
independent ground of persecution to the state parties’ domestic asylum 
legislation as the way forward. In paragraph 13, while discussing the aim of 
Recommendation No 32, the CEDAW Committee states that the intention of 
the recommendation is to: 
 
“[E]nsure that States parties apply a gender perspective when 
interpreting all five grounds, use gender as a factor in recognizing 
membership of a particular social group for purposes of granting 
refugee status under the 1951 Convention and further introduce other 
grounds of persecution, namely sex and/or gender, into national 
legislation and policies relating to refugees and asylum seekers”.1415  
 
Similarly, in paragraph 30, the CEDAW Committee highlights the obligation of 
the state parties to eliminate discrimination against women by stating that the 
states parties are “required to take proactive measures to ensure that the 
legally recognized grounds of persecution, including those enumerated in the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (…) are given a gender-
sensitive interpretation”.1416 Furthermore, paragraph 30 again encourages the 
state parties to “add sex and/or gender as an additional ground for refugee 
status in their national legislation”. 1417  Finally, under the Specific 
Recommendations of Recommendation No 32, the CEDAW Committee 
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emphasises the need to include gender as an independent ground to the 
domestic legislations by stating that the state parties are to consider “adding 
sex and/or gender (...) to the list of grounds for refugee status in their national 
asylum legislation”.1418 In conclusion, as clearly indicated in Recommendation 
No 32, the addition of gender as an independent ground of persecution is the 
only way to guarantee a non-discriminatory refugee protection framework for 
both men and women.  
 
6 5 Conclusion  
The reconceptualisation of the refugee definition is long overdue. For over 60 
years, gender discrimination has persisted in international refugee law, 
contrary to Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which calls 
for “all necessary changes to be made in the law to end discrimination against 
women”. 1419  Under the current international legislative framework, women 
continue to face a disproportionate burden with regard to gender-related 
asylum claims. Without modernisation, the international refugee law 
framework will continue to fail tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of women 
who have experienced often serious violence amounting to persecution 
because of their gender and are in desperate need of protection. While the 
development of gender guidelines and the emergence of complementary 
protection might alleviate the plight of some victims of gender-related 
persecution, these are not durable solutions and will not guarantee adequate 
protection to one of the most vulnerable groups of refugees, women.  
In order to acknowledge the true extent and seriousness of violence 
against women amounting to persecution and to provide sufficient protection 
to the victims in this regard, the addition of gender as an independent 
category is necessary. The addition of gender as an independent ground of 
persecution to the international refuge law framework would not only make 
international refugee legislation more gender-equal, recognise the persecution 
faced by women for what it truly is and afford it greater attention and respect, 
but it would also improve the protection afforded to women worldwide 
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because of the persuasive authority wielded by UN determinations in the field 
of human rights and refugee law globally.1420 It would also bring international 
refugee law on par with other international human rights treaties that have 
evolved continuously to afford greater protection to women’s human rights. 
Ultimately, as Stevens argues, the addition of ’gender’ as an independent 
refugee category is no less of “a moral and political imperative”.1421  
As discussed above, in 2014, the CEDAW Committee called on the 
state parties to start adding gender as a sixth ground to their domestic 
legislation. While the addition of ’gender’ as an independent ground to the 
1951 Refugee Convention would be a good solution to closing the gender 
protection gap in the current international legal framework, it is a risky 
endeavour, as opening the 1951 Convention for modifications under the 
current dominant restrictionist atmosphere could backfire with the state parties 
further limiting the scope of protection of the existing international legislation.  
Consequently, one of the main avenues for the inclusion of gender as 
an independent category would be to hold states accountable for their 
obligations under CEDAW to “refrain from engaging in any act of 
discrimination against women that directly or indirectly results in the denial of 
the equal enjoyment of their rights with men”1422 by encouraging them to add 
gender as an independent ground of persecution to their domestic refugee 
legislation.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
Violence against women is a global phenomenon. As I have demonstrated in 
this dissertation it is a well-established fact that women face brutal violence, 
often tantamount to torture and persecution. Violence against women is 
habitually linked to their social, economic and political position as women.1423 
The Commission on the Status of Women acknowledged this in its 2013 
Conclusions as I indicated in the introduction and under sub-chapter 3 2.1424 
As I have established in this dissertation, despite the brutality and frequency 
of this violence uniquely aimed at women because of their gender, the 
international refugee law framework continues to exclude gender as an 
independent ground for asylum.  
Women make up approximately half of the world’s 33 million 
persecuted and forcibly displaced people.1425 Many of them have experienced 
gender-related violence, amounting to persecution. Nevertheless, as I have 
repeatedly showed in my research, and as supported by the Council of 
Europe, asylum procedures often fail these women and leave them outside 
the scope of the protection offered by international refugee law.1426  
This dissertation was based on the fundamental feminist theoretical 
standpoint, as set out under sub-chapter 1 4, that all women share certain 
experiences that fundamentally differentiates them from men. 1427  I further 
acknowledged that there exists a universal practice of gender inequality that 
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affects all women around the world. Within the context of the scope of my 
research, considering the fields of international refugee and human rights law, 
my overarching assumption was that while women’s rights are not adequately 
protected under the current refugee law framework, this could be ameliorated 
with the addition of gender as an independent ground for persecution. This, I 
argued throughout, would considerably enhance the protection of women's 
human rights and reduce existing gender discrimination under international 
refugee law.  
Based on the in-depth examination of various aspects of international 
refugee law that I have undertaken in this dissertation, I conclude that gender 
inequality indeed exists in international refugee law. Consequently, based on 
the analysis that I have undertaken in this dissertation, I furthermore conclude 
that the inability of international refugee law to provide adequate protection 
victims of gender-related persecution is rooted in its failure to include gender 
as a ground for persecution, which has created a deeply concerning 
protection gap.  
In this final concluding chapter I attempt to bring together the answers 
to the research questions as I have analysed them throughout each chapter of 
this dissertation. I end this dissertation by suggesting a practical way forward 
through a number of recommendations based on the research findings. 
 
7 1 Historical origins and the gender-bias nature of the refugee law 
framework 
In chapter 2 I analysed the causes behind the gender protection gap under 
international refugee law. I illustrated how the historical events of post–WWII 
Europe and the Cold War had a deep impact on the drafting process of the 
1951 Convention, leading to its disproportionate focus on the protection of 
civil and political rights. 1428  During this process, the drafters focused 
especially on the plight of the millions of principally male refugees following 
the events of WWII and the Holocaust. I indicated that as a consequence, the 
refugee definition, which emerged at the end of the drafting process, became 
heavily focused on the male experience of persecution, leaving any form of 
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protection from persecution based on gender completely absent from the 
1951 Convention.  
Accordingly, I concluded that the narrow definition of a ‘refugee’ 
embedded in the 1951 Convention, is especially challenging to women 
asylum-seekers, whose experiences of persecution are often unique to their 
gender and fall outside of the current definition. As a consequence, victims of 
gender-related persecution are often denied the protection awarded by the 
international refugee law.  
Furthermore, I demonstrated how, during the travaux préparatoires, the 
drafters of the 1951 Convention did not deliberately omit gender-related 
persecution from the convention’s jurisdiction but rather did not deem gender 
important enough to be considered to any appreciable extent during the 
drafting process.1429 Similarly, I demonstrated how the lack of international 
human rights instruments safeguarding women’s rights at the time of drafting 
the 1951 Convention had a detrimental effect on the protection of refugee 
women.1430  
I further concluded that since the drafting of the 1951 Convention, the 
understanding and acknowledgement of concepts such as gender 
discrimination, women’s rights, and the structural inequalities in gendered 
power relations have evolved considerably. Specifically, international and 
regional human rights instruments that provide women with specific rights 
have emerged. These instruments have been crucial in the protection of 
women’s human rights and have proved to be “a valuable tool for 
supplementing the more obvious deficiencies in international refugee law”.1431 
Overall, I concluded that despite certain positive developments that have 
taken place in the interpretation of international refugee law since the 
emergence of women’s rights instruments, international refugee law continues 
to be stagnant and stand in stark contrast to the rest of the international 
human rights framework protecting women. The gap between the protection 
offered by international refugee law and international human rights law is 
especially disquieting, as international refugee law is often the last resort for 
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individuals seeking to escape serious human rights violations. International 
refugee law only takes effect when all other methods to protect human rights 
have failed.   
 Furthermore, in chapter 2, I drew the important conclusion that one of 
the main causes of the failure of international refugee law to protect women is 
its biased and inherently patriarchal nature.1432 In this regard, I illustrated how, 
regardless of unprecedented changes in the causes of refugee flows, the 
international refugee law framework itself has remained stagnant and hence 
become obsolete. I further concluded that, owing to the out-dated and male-
centred definition of ‘refugees’ and ‘persecution’, the definition is inadequate 
and incapable of providing protection to modern-day female asylum-seekers.  
Consequently, aided by this definition, state parties’ narrow and 
restrictive interpretation of the grounds of persecution in the 1951 Convention 
continue to leave victims of gender-related persecution without adequate 
protection. Accordingly, the framework, in both its substance and its practical 
application, is blind to the experiences of refugee women.  
 
7 2 Persecution under international refugee law 
In chapter 3, I examined whether the current interpretation of what constitutes 
‘persecution’ can encompass the unique form of persecution that women 
often face because of their gender. In this regard I demonstrated how violence 
against women is often normalised and belittled in asylum adjudication 
processes due to underlying deep-rooted structural injustices. I importantly 
concluded that due to the existing universal structural violence against 
women, even severe violence against women do not seem serious enough for 
the asylum adjudicators to amount to persecution.  
Although the requirement of non-discrimination and equality is solidly 
embedded in international human rights law, as demonstrated in chapter 2, 
the practice under international refugee law is still unsuccessful in 
implementing these principles in a meaningful way. The failure of the 1951 
Convention to provide adequate protection to women asylum-seekers fleeing 
gender-related persecution is demonstrated in the discriminatory construction 
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and interpretation of the term ‘persecution’. This is further exacerbated by the 
nexus requirement and the limited grounds set out in Article 1(A)(2) as further 
analysed in chapter 4.  
In chapter 3, I moreover highlighted how the general construction of 
what ‘persecution’ entails under Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention has 
been unclear at best. The undefined nature of the term can be explained by 
recognising that the aim of the drafters was to leave the definition of term 
open-ended, as concluded under chapter 2, in order to accommodate future 
forms of persecution that were inconceivable at the time of the drafting. This, 
however, has not been the case with regard to gender-related persecution. 
Rather, the undefined nature of ‘persecution’ has exacerbated the 
discrimination faced by women asylum-seekers due to the lack of express 
recognition of gender-related persecution.1433  
Relatedly, I in chapter 3 exemplified how, under the current dominant 
construction of ‘persecution’, primacy is given to the protection of civil and 
political rights, as confirmed in chapter 2. This narrow construction has been 
harmful to women applying for asylum based on gender-related persecution 
as the persecution they face is part of a larger structural inequality that makes 
them vulnerable to abuses that cannot be defined as neither entirely political 
nor exclusively caused by states.1434 In this discussion, I also demonstrated 
how the lack of recognition of non-physical harm amounting to persecution 
has placed women at a disadvantage, as the cumulative effect of non-physical 
harm is often a strong element of gender-related persecution. Due to the 
difficulty of objectively assessing whether or not non-physical harm amounts 
to persecution, courts have been reluctant to make such assessments. For 
example, in the US case of Niang v Gonzales 1435 , the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that persecution cannot be based on fear of psychological harm 
alone. This has led to a situation where the courts simply disregard the 
existence of non-physical harm in asylum claim cases.  
Furthermore, in chapter 3 5, I illustrated how the heavy bias in favour of 
the male experience has made women’s unique experiences of persecution 
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seem non-credible to adjudicators as these experiences differ heavily from the 
‘traditional’ male-centred forms of persecution. Overall, in chapter 3 I 
concluded that a considerable obstacle to gender-related persecution claims 
relates to the question of credibility. Specifically the manner in which the 
evidence of gender-related persecution is presented can adversely affect the 
applications of women asylum-seekers. As I established in sub-chapter 3 5 
narrative discrepancies, calm manner or late revelation of evidence by the 
applicant are often viewed suspiciously by the adjudicators when credibility of 
the claim is assessed. Despite the emergence of gender guidelines, as I 
further analysed in sub-chapter 6 2, I demonstrated how asylum-seeking 
women continue to face particular difficulties in establishing credibility in 
asylum application cases. This, I argued, significantly hinders the applications’ 
chances of success, due to the importance placed on the credibility of the 
applicant’s claim by the asylum system and the highly discretionary nature of 
the asylum adjudication process. 
In a related finding, I concluded that asylum-seeking women often face 
problems relating to communication when their asylum application is based on 
sexual violence amounting to persecution. The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that matters of a sexual nature are considered taboo in many 
cultures, and victims of sexual violence often experience guilt, isolation and 
fear. Consequently they avoid basing their claim on sexual violence. This 
unwillingness often leads to situations where the victim of gender-related 
persecution fails to correctly describe the nature and severity of the sexual 
violence they have experienced and as a consequence, are denied asylum by 
the adjudicators.1436  
In sub-chapter 3 5, I moreover highlighted how women are often 
subjected to double persecution. In addition to facing persecution based on 
‘traditional’ grounds, women are often subjected to unique persecution based 
solely on their gender. I importantly established that gender-related 
persecution takes various forms that range from physical and sexual violence 
to severely discriminatory laws that severely limit women’s rights and 
freedoms. Despite the different kinds of gender-based persecution, I 
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demonstrated that an element common to all of the forms is that either the 
motive or the form, or in certain cases, both, are gendered.  
Despite overwhelming evidence of the violence against women 
amounting to persecution, asylum adjudicators have been reluctant to 
recognise it such. Rather than assessing the violence experienced by refugee 
women on its face value, courts often trivialise the violence. This is especially 
true with regard to sexual violence, as demonstrated by the US cases of 
Campos-Guardado v INS 1437  and Klawitter v INS 1438 .  I concluded that 
especially the US courts have had a tendency to diminish political oppression 
to constitute personal harm only, specifically where persecution contains a 
sexual element. Overall, I established that the normalisation takes place with 
regard to all of forms of persecution that women are uniquely subjected to, 
physical and sexual violence, as well as severe gender discrimination.  
Within this context I also concluded that states’ vigilant protection of 
their sovereignty in the form of trying to eliminate any asylum ground that may 
lead to the ‘opening of floodgates’, has been one of the main causes behind 
the gap between the human rights rhetoric and the lack of protection offered 
to victims of gender-related persecution.1439 As I highlighted in sub-chapter 3 
4, the willingness of especially Western states to grant asylums has been 
limited particularly with regard to human rights violations amounting to 
gender-related persecution. There is a strong resistance to the inclusion of 
gender as an independent ground of persecution, especially among states 
that “fear that this might result in a critique of their national gender 
relations”.1440 
 As I moreover demonstrated in sub-chapter 3 4 the wide discretion 
granted to the asylum adjudicators has a negative impact on women’s asylum 
claims. I concluded that both the narrow definition of a ‘refugee’ under 
international law and the wide discretion given to the courts adjudicating 
asylum claims have contributed to the failure to include women asylum-
seekers’ unique experiences of persecution. 1441  In this regard I further 
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concluded that the process of determining a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ 
is deeply subjective. Ultimately, the adjudicator decides whether there is a 
fear of persecution, whether it is credible and well-founded, and whether it is 
based on one of the five categories of persecution recognised under 
international refugee law, as I further analysed in chapter 4.  
In chapter 3, I also established that domestic violence is frequently 
linked to the perceived ‘proper role’ of a woman in the relevant society, and 
that it often takes place when the social or religious mores ascribing ‘proper 
behaviour’ are broken. This is especially true of ‘honour crimes’, where 
women are subjected to brutal violence or murdered when they are viewed as 
having transgressed the norms of acceptable behaviour and ‘brought shame’ 
to their families and societies.1442 Generally speaking, domestic violence is a 
product of unequal power-relations between men and women and the 
dominant constructions of masculinity and femininity. 1443  For this reason, 
domestic violence is often dismissed because of reasons linked to perceived 
‘proper’ behaviour and the gender roles of men and women.1444     
Similarly, in sub-chapter 3 4 3, I concluded that ‘honour crimes’ are 
strongly linked to the control of women’s sexuality in particular and are a 
powerful tool through which male dominance is exercised. Male dominance 
over women’s sexual expression and reproductive rights is further reinforced 
by the tolerating attitudes of the states in which honour crimes and domestic 
violence frequently take place. As I highlighted in sub-chapter 3 1 it has been 
suggested that gender guidelines be adopted in order to include gender-
related persecution in the realm of international refugee law. 1445  I argue, 
however, that these guidelines have proven to be inefficient as well as 
problematic, as gender guidelines have been adopted only in a minority of 
jurisdictions worldwide, and their effectiveness, where adopted, continues to 
be disputed. This specific issue was further discussed in chapter 6. 
Ultimately, I concluded in chapter 3 that the dominant construction of 
‘persecution’ under the current international refugee law does not ensure 
adequate protection of women asylum seekers fleeing gender-related 
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persecution. I further concluded that with regard to the protection of asylum 
seeker women, the main problem with the current regime is its failure to 
recognise gender as a cause of persecution. Consequently, I drew the 
conclusion that the current refugee regime is not adequately equipped to 
include gendered forms of persecution and is in a dire need of re-
conceptualisation. 
 
7 3 Gender-related persecution and the nexus requirement of the 1951 
Convention 
In chapter 4, I investigated whether the five existing grounds of persecution in 
Article 1(A)(2) are capable of capturing persecution based solely on gender. I 
demonstrated that the requirement of a nexus between the persecution 
experienced and one of the five grounds embedded in the 1951 Convention is 
one of the most difficult hurdles faced by women applying for gender-related 
asylum. I concluded that the reason behind the difficulties is not only the 
legitimacy of the persecution experienced, as discussed in chapter 3, but the 
lack of gender as an express ground for persecution under the refugee 
definition. As a consequence, victims of gender-related persecution have 
been forced to try to fit their claims under the existing grounds, namely PSG, 
political opinion and religion. This, I argue, have resulted in mixed outcomes 
and more importantly legal uncertainty.  
I further concluded that the situation is exacerbated by the domestic 
courts’ reluctance to expand the existing categories to include gender-related 
claims. This was demonstrated in the analysis of US jurisprudence especially 
with regard to PSG, the most commonly used ground for gender-related 
persecution cases. As discussed in sub-chapter 4 2, cases such as In re R-A-
1446  demonstrate the US adjudicator’s unconcealed reluctance to 
acknowledge gender as a basis of persecution under the PSG category. This 
has created a situation, where in the few cases that PSG has been accepted 
as a ground, the courts have had to resort to heavy legal manipulation of the 
category in order to keep the definition as narrow as possible. This has led to 
a complex and highly constricted construction of the PSG. 
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Similarly, my analysis of the French jurisprudence illustrated that while 
the French courts do occasionally accept PSG as a ground for gender-related 
persecution claims, they limit its applicability by adopting a cumulative 
approach leading to a requirement much higher threshold of evidence of 
persecution. I finally concluded that further problems have been generated by 
the unclear definition of the category, which has been described as 
ambiguous, narrow and contrived.1447 Overall, I concluded, based on case law 
from Australia, New Zealand, US, UK and Canada that no uniform 
interpretation of what constitutes a PSG has emerged among the Western 
jurisdictions making its application to gender-related persecution highly 
complex. 
I similarly concluded that also the ‘political opinion’ ground has proven 
to be unsuitable for majority of gender-related persecution claims. While there 
have been successes in some gender-related asylum applications, the results 
of the cases in which it has been used are rife with inconsistencies especially 
in the US jurisprudence. As I illustrated in sub-chapter 4 3, while Lazo-Majano 
v INS 1448  demonstrated that gender-related persecution cases could be 
successful under the ‘political opinion’ category, this was overturned in 
various cases since, including Campos-Guardado v INS1449, In re Kuna1450 
and In re R-A- 1451 . Similarly, I demonstrated that while some European 
countries, such as Belgium, Hungary, Italy and Malta, have occasionally 
included gender-based persecution under the ‘political opinion’ category, 
various other European countries, such as France, Spain and Sweden, 
continue to fail to include gender-related cases under this ground, leading to 
diverse outcomes depending on the jurisdiction where the application was 
lodged and consequential legal uncertainty.  
While examining ‘religion’ as a potential ground under which to include 
gender-related persecution, I reached the same conclusion as with regard to 
the utilisation of PSG and political opinion categories. While there has been 
some recognition by the UNHCR, Australia and Canada that gender-related 
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persecution can take place for religious reasons, in practice gender-related 
persecution cases are very rarely included into the concept of religion. 
Therefore, I concluded that including gender-related persecution cases under 
the ‘religion’ ground remains an inadequate response.   
Ultimately, I determined that none of the exciting grounds can provide 
appropriate protection to women fleeing persecution due to their gender which 
is why the addition of gender as a sixth ground under domestic legislation is of 
such importance, as I further discussed in chapter 6 and will further address 
below. I further concluded that by attempting to fit gender-related persecution 
claims under the existing grounds rather than expressly acknowledging 
gender as an independent ground for persecution, Article 1 (A) (2) provides 
an insufficient, piecemeal, micro-level solution to a global and 
multidimensional problem.1452 More worryingly, due to the unsuitable use of 
the current persecution grounds, inappropriate focus has been placed on 
fitting gender-related persecution under the PSG, political opinion and religion 
categories rather than on gender itself leading to highly fabricated and often 
logically questionable results.  
 
7 3 The complex context of gender-based persecution 
In chapter 5 I added further context to the inadequate nature of Article 1(A)(2) 
by examining whether the dichotomous construction of persecutory acts into 
‘public’ and ‘private’ has aggravated gender inequality under the current 
refugee law framework. I highlighted how this deeply entrenched dichotomy, 
which can be found in both domestic and international refugee law, has had a 
detrimental effect on the gender-related asylum claims of women asylum-
seekers. Because gender-related persecution faced by women is often 
deemed to take place in the ‘private’ realm, it consequently falls outside the 
protection of international refugee law, which traditionally only concerns itself 
with human rights violations taking place in the public sphere. 
This inequality is further exacerbated by the gender-bias construction 
of what ‘public acts’ entail. As demonstrated in sub-chapter 5 2, courts often 
misconstrue the nature of gender-related persecution and deem, for example, 
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sexual violence by military officials to be a ‘private’ act. 1453 The stereotypical 
construction of refugee women as ‘vulnerable’ and apolitical has also had a 
negative impact on the success of the women asylum-seekers’ claims under 
the current refugee law framework, which focuses heavily on the protection of 
civil and political rights as I established in chapter 3.  
I additionally recognised that with regard to asylum applications based 
on domestic violence, one of the most prominent feature of the decisions of 
the courts analysed under 5 2, is a very limited reference to the developments 
in international human rights law with regard to women’s rights and the 
prohibition of violence against women.1454 Overall, with regard to violence 
against women amounting to persecution, the spheres of refugee and human 
rights law continue to remain separate.1455  
I demonstrated that this separation is manifested in the manner in 
which the political nature of specifically sexual and domestic violence, as well 
as resistance to gender-related persecution, continues to be challenged by 
the Western domestic courts. These courts often regard such matters as 
‘personal’, which leads to a denial of the political nature of gender-related 
persecution and the ‘political opinion’ ground of persecution in gender-related 
asylum claims.1456 This was demonstrated, for example, in the US case In re 
R-A-1457, where the BIA rejected the asylum application because the applicant 
failed to demonstrate the political motivation behind the domestic violence she 
had been subjected to by her husband. In reaching this conclusion, the BIA 
ignored the nature of domestic violence as a mechanism of patriarchal control 
over women, ‘built on male superiority and female inferiority, sex-stereotyped 
roles and expectations, and economic, social, and political predominance of 
men and dependency of women’.1458  
In chapter 5, I also established that Western domestic courts have 
traditionally been reluctant to recognise persecution committed by non-state 
actors as falling under the purview of international refugee law. However,  with 
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the emergence of the concept of indirect state responsibility and the so-called 
‘bifurcated approach’, first formulated and applied by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 1993 in Ward v Canada1459, there seems to be a gradual change 
towards a more gender-inclusive interpretation of actors capable of 
committing persecution. For example, the possibility of non-state persecution 
has been accepted in Australia in the case of Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs v Ibrahim,1460 as well as in Canada in the case of Zalzali v 
Canada1461 and in the UK by the House of Lords in Adan v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department1462 and Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department. 1463  Ultimately, I argue, by enforcing the bifurcated approach, 
states will move towards a more equitable treatment of women before law.  
In chapter 5 I furthermore highlighted how in addition to the discriminatory 
legal framework, asylum-seeking women are faced with further acts of 
discrimination due to their lower socio-economic status as well as their race. I 
demonstrated how increased xenophobia and protectionism in receiving 
states have led to the refugee policies often stressing the refugees’ utility and 
their ability to blend in with the main population. This has caused serious 
obstacles to asylum-seeking women, as their limited access to education or 
work experience again places them at an unfair disadvantage.  
In chapter 5, I further showed how applicants basing their claims on 
gender-related persecution often find themselves in a ‘double bind’. 1464  I 
concluded that the racial ‘othering’ and the gendered stereotypes of ‘Third 
World women’ often used in Western asylum jurisdiction, combined with the 
Western states’ eagerness to protect their sovereignty, pose further obstacles 
to gender-related asylum claims. 1465  This is manifested by the courts’ 
reluctance to recognise domestic violence as a legitimate ground for asylum 
because of its prevalence in many societies and the related fear of the 
‘opening of floodgates’.1466  
                                                             
1459
 [1993] 2 SCR 689. 
1460
 [2000] HCA 55. 
1461
 [1991] 3 FC 605. 
1462
 [1999] 1 AC 293. 
1463
 [2000] 3 All ER 577. 
1464
 Mullally (2011) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 479. 
1465
 479. 
1466
 479. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  259 
I demonstrated how the culturalist approach adopted by many 
jurisdictions has had an impact on gender-related persecution claims. I 
concluded that, because of the dominant neo-colonial approach of the 
Western domestic courts vis-à-vis asylum-seeker women from the developing 
world, gender-related persecution claims are more likely to succeed if the 
applicant presents herself as a victim of a dysfunctional and patriarchal 
society. Ultimately, this neo-colonial approach is detrimental to the aylum 
claims of women refugees, as it focuses not on the actual crime of gender-
related persecution but instead on the ‘moral superiority’ of the First World.  
Finally, in sub-chapter 5 8, I concluded that instead of the Western 
domestic courts’ currently adverse and narrow constructions of gender-related 
persecution, such persecution should rather be understood as resulting from 
the convergence between individual or state persecution and the structural 
injustice faced by women. Consequently, I concluded that it is the normalising 
effect of the combination of these two factors that ultimately results in the 
invisibility and minimisation of gender-related persecution.  
 
7 5 Acknowledging gender-related persecution 
Following the demonstration of the deficiency of the current international 
refugee law framework with regard to gender-related persecution, I 
proceeded, in chapter 6, to examine the alternative approaches that states 
have adopted to mitigate the apparent protection gap. These alternative 
approaches included the adoption of gender guidelines, complementary 
protection and ultimately, the addition of gender as an independent ground 
under domestic legislation.  
 With regard to the adoption of gender guidelines, I concluded that while 
it can be interpreted as a sign of the gradually emerging transformation in the 
states’ attitude towards gender-related persecution, in many cases the 
domestic asylum jurisprudence has been slow to change and remains 
restrictive towards gender-related asylum claims, despite the introduction of 
gender guidelines. Overall, the extent to which the domestic courts comply 
with the gender guidelines varies considerably as was demonstrated in sub-
chapter 6 2. 
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 With respect to gender guidelines, I further concluded that as a result 
of their non-binding nature, their weakness lies in their vulnerability of being 
repealed. Consequently, gender guidelines are unable to guarantee real legal 
certainty or continuous protection to victims of gender-related persecution. On 
the whole, the application of gender guidelines across different jurisdictions 
remains very diverse and is characterised by ad hoc implementation at the 
discretion of the adjudicating immigration judge, leading to legal uncertainty. 
 I further concluded that while the utilisation of complimentary 
protection, which is based on obligations arising out of general humanitarian 
principles and international human rights instruments, in cases involving 
gender-related persecution might provide temporary relief to some of the 
victims, it is not a sustainable solution. I also established that, similarly to 
gender guidelines, the utilisation of complementary protection has been 
characterised by highly varied, ad hoc responses at the domestic jurisdiction 
level, which are made almost exclusively at the discretion of the executive. 
Additionally, I established that what renders complementary protection an 
inappropriate protection tool with regard to gender-related persecution is the 
secondary nature of the status afforded by complementary protection if 
compared with that of a refugee status. Even with the emergence of 
complementary protection and the consequent push for protection limits, 
international refugee law is not keeping pace with the development of 
women’s human rights and states’ positive legal obligations as discussed in 
sub-chapter 2 4. 
As I have showed, despite the emergence of alternative approaches to 
gender-related persecution, women continue to face a disproportionate 
burden with regard to gender-related asylum claims under the current 
international legislative framework. While the development of gender 
guidelines and the emergence of the complementary protection might 
alleviate the plight of some victims of gender-related persecution, they are, I 
as I have demonstrated, not durable solutions and will not guarantee 
adequate protection victims of gender-related persecution. 
Finally, in chapter 6, I importantly examined whether the inclusion of 
gender as an independent ground for persecution in domestic legislation 
would enhance women’s rights to non-discrimination, equality, dignity, life and 
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security of person and whether the current international refugee law regime 
should be similarly amended to include gender as a ground for persecution in 
order to ensure adequate protection for women asylum-seekers. I ultimately 
concluded that without modernisation, the international refugee law framework 
would continue to fail tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of women who have 
experienced serious violence amounting to persecution due to their gender 
and are in desperate need of protection. I further concluded that in order to 
acknowledge the true extent and seriousness of violence against women 
amounting to persecution and to provide sufficient protection to the victims, 
the addition of gender as an independent category is mandatory. The addition 
of gender as an independent ground of persecution to the international refuge 
law framework would not only make international refugee law more gender-
equal, recognise the persecution faced by women for what it truly is and afford 
it greater attention and respect, but also improve the protection afforded to 
women worldwide. It would furthermore bring international refugee law on par 
with other international human rights treaties, which have continuously 
evolved to afford greater protection to women’s human rights.1467  
This conclusion is supported by the CEDAW General Recommendation 
No 32, which calls on state parties to add gender as a sixth ground to their 
domestic legislation. The Istanbul Convention has taken a similar approach 
and calls for all state parties to “take the necessary legislative or other 
measures to ensure that gender-based violence against women may be 
recognized as a form of persecution within the meaning of Article 1 A(2), of 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees”.1468 In the same vein, 
although on a more general level, the Commission on the Status of Women 
urged governments in its 2013 Conclusions to “review and where appropriate 
revise, amend or abolish laws, regulations, policies, practices and customs 
that discriminate against women or have a discriminatory impact on women, 
and ensure that [they] comply with international human rights obligations, 
commitments and principle of non-discrimination”.1469   
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While the addition of ’gender’ as an independent ground to the 1951 
Convention would be the optimal solution to closing the gender protection gap 
in the current international legal framework, it is a risky endeavour, as opening 
the 1951 Convention for modifications under the current dominant 
restrictionist atmosphere could backfire, with state parties further limiting the 
protection scope of the existing international legislation.  
Consequently, in sub-chapter 6 4, I concluded that one of the main 
avenues for the inclusion of gender, as an independent category would be by 
holding states accountable under their obligations in the CEDAW, as set out 
in sub-chapter 2 4 and encouraging them to add gender as an independent 
ground of persecution to their domestic refugee legislation. In time, with the 
inclusion of gender as an independent ground for persecution in a sufficient 
number of domestic jurisdictions, positive state practice could begin to 
emerge as an important element of the formation of customary international 
law. This conclusion is supported by Goodman and Jinks’ ‘acculturation 
theory’ according to which change in state behaviour takes places through the 
“general process of adopting the beliefs and behavioural patterns of the 
surrounding culture”.1470 While examining the development of women’s rights 
in general, and women’s right to vote specifically, Goodman and Jinks 
conclude that “after an initial stage of early adopters the number of states 
providing women the right to vote increased steeply and included most states 
before the rate of adoption tapered off”.1471 Ultimately, according to Goodman 
and Jinks, “once a norm was institutionalised, a strong predictor for whether 
an individual state would enact women’s [rights] was whether other states in 
the region had done so in the past five years”. 1472 Based on Goodman and 
Jinks’ theory and the recent developments, such as the recognition of gender-
related persecution as an independent ground for asylum by various 
pioneering countries1473 as well as the recent entry into force of the Istanbul 
Convention, there is real hope for gender to emerge as an independent 
ground of persecution under the international refugee law.  
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7 6 Concluding remarks and recommendations 
In this dissertation I have argued that international refugee law is in dire need 
of modernisation and re-conceptualisation in order to become a truly gender-
equal protection framework. While various domestic jurisdictions have 
attempted to ameliorate the gendered protection gap under the current 
refugee law framework in various different ways, either by attempting to 
include the gender-related claims under the existing grounds of persecution or 
by adopting gender guidelines and complementary protection mechanisms, I 
argue that these methods have not achieved the desired gender-equal result. 
In addition to having resulted in a diverse jurisprudence in various domestic 
jurisdictions and subsequent legal uncertainty, the utilisation of the described 
methods presents a deeper theoretical problem.  
Some of the highly contrived and often logically dubious methods 
currently used to diminish the gender gap under international and domestic 
refugee law might provide a restricted solution to a limited amount of gender-
related asylum claims, but they misconstrue the actual reason behind the 
persecution and ultimately render the persecution experienced exclusively by 
women due to their gender invisible. For international refugee law to be on par 
with other international human rights instruments in combatting gender 
inequality and violence against women, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
existence and widespread nature of gender-related persecution and embed it 
in the legal framework in order to guarantee a non-discriminatory and effective 
protection framework for those who need it most. In this regard it is 
particularly important to highlight regional instruments such as the Protocol to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa and the Istanbul Convention in addition to the international human 
rights instruments discussed above.  
The final conclusion of this dissertation is that the change that is 
needed for more equal protection of victims of gender related persecution is 
slowly taking place. Based on my research with regard to the general 
expansion of the protection afforded to women’s rights by the international 
human rights regime as a whole, and specifically, to the recent developments 
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in the field of refugee law, I argue that there is evidence of emerging state 
practice in recognising gender as an independent ground of persecution. This 
evidence includes the entry into force of the Istanbul Convention, the first 
legally binding international treaty recognising violence against women as a 
form of persecution; the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation No 
32, which calls on states to include gender as a legally binding ground for 
persecution in their domestic jurisdictions; and importantly, the recognition of 
gender-related persecution as an independent ground for asylum by South 
Africa, Spain, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
Similarly, the emergence of the UNHCR and domestic gender 
guidelines as well as the use of complementary protection by various states 
indicates that the tide is slowly changing with regard to the acceptance of 
gender-related persecution as a ground for refugee status. This is also 
reflected in case law from countries such as Australia, Canada, UK, New 
Zealand accepting the ‘bifurcated approach’ and persecution committed by 
non-state actors as falling under the realm of international refugee law. 
Overall, as the gradual development of gender as an independent 
ground from emerging state practice to a full-fledged customary law, takes 
place international refugee law will begin to fall in line with the rest of the 
human rights law framework and become a non-discriminatory protection tool, 
as was arguably envisaged in the Preamble to the 1951 Convention. 
The primary recommendation advanced in this dissertation is therefore 
that the 189 states parties to the CEDAW be held accountable for their 
obligations under the CEDAW, as is evident from the General 
Recommendation 32, to ensure a gender-equal and non-discriminatory 
treatment of female asylum-seekers by adding gender as an independent 
ground to their domestic asylum legislations. Additionally, the entry to force of 
the Istanbul Convention provides an excellent example and a point of 
departure with regard to the legitimisation of gender as an independent 
ground of persecution on a regional level. Consequently, I recommend the 
creation of further regional legal instruments embedding gender as an 
express ground of persecution into to law, together with the acknowledgement 
of violence committed by non-state actors as a form of persecution.     
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Secondly, I recommend that the international community recognise the 
emerging state practice of gender as an independent ground of persecution, 
based on recent developments including the Istanbul Convention’s entry into 
force, General Recommendation No 32 calling for states to include gender as 
an independent ground for persecution under their domestic jurisdiction, and 
importantly, the amendments to domestic jurisdiction already undertaken by 
states such as South Africa, Spain, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Thirdly, I recommend that domestic courts continue developing their 
jurisprudence with the aim of reaching a more gender-neutral interpretation of 
what ‘persecution’ entails, while being mindful of the dominant male-centred 
understanding of the term and paying specific attention to the uniqueness and 
political nature of gender-related persecution as set out in this dissertation.  
 Lastly, with regard to gender-related persecution committed by non-
state actors, I recommend that domestic courts adopt the bifurcated approach 
based on the best practises examined in the dissertation. In adopting this 
approach, the courts recognise that gender-related persecution committed by 
non-state individuals is linked to the government’s failure to protect its citizens 
from gender-related human rights abuses and ultimately to the failure to 
protect its citizens’ core right to life, liberty and security of person as set out in 
the CEDAW, ICCPR and the UDHR. By adopting the bifurcated approach, 
domestic courts will furthermore ensure the equal treatment of men and 
women before the law. 
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